(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The majority states, “the defmition of ‘or’ as applied here means that petitioner is entitled to either enforce or pursue the tort action ... or pursue a workers’ compensation [action].” (Emphasis added.) The legislature, however, used the words “enforce” by a tort action or “collect” workers’ compensation benefits. Neither “enforce” nor “collect” is synonymous with “pursue.” Therefore, the majority’s claim that mere pursuit of one of the remedies reflects the legislature’s intent cannot be based, as claimed, on a “clear reading of the statute.”
Section 87.21 is ambiguous and principles of statutory construction should be applied. American Asbestos, 463 N.W.2d at 58. The ultimate goal in construing statutes is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent in enacting the law. Jahnke v. Incorporated City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d 780, 787 (Iowa 1971). In discovering such intent, we consider the language used, the purpose to be served and the evil sought to be remedied. Id.
It is not the word “or” which creates ambiguity in this ease, but the words “enforce” and “collect” read together with the word “or.” The majority correctly notes that “or” marks an alternative and signifies one of two things may be done, but not both. See Bates, 168 N.W.2d at 398. However this proposition provides no guidance for determining the meamng of “enforce” and “collect.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “enforce” as:
[t]o put into execution; to cause to take effect; to make effective; as, to enforce a particular law, a writ, a judgment, or the collection of a debt or fine; to compel obedience to.
Black’s Law Dictionary 528 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Black’s explains “collect” is to obtain payment or liquidation of a debt or claim either by personal solicitation or legal proceedings. Id. at 263. These words connote successful recovery.
The purpose of section 87.21 cannot be read in isolation from the workers’ compensation statutes (chapters 85, 85A, 85B and 86). When more than one statute is pertinent, we consider the statutes together in an attempt to harmonize them. State v. Sullins, 509 N.W.2d 483, 485 (Iowa 1993). The purpose of these laws is to award speedy and reasonable compensation to workers suffering injury at work. See Mitchell v. Phillips Mining Co., 181 Iowa 600, 607, 165 N.W. 108, 110 (1917). The legislature intended the umnsured employer should pay damages, and that it should be reasonably certain that the employee could collect them. Id. Workers’ compensation is above all a security system and the worker should not have to gamble for workers’ rights under an election doctrine. See A. Larson, Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation § 67.31 (1994).
Renos, by virtue of being umnsured, were in violation of section 87.1 and thus were *446subject to section 87.21. Section 87.21 is penal in nature. See Virginia Used Auto Parts, Inc. v. Robertson, 212 Va. 100, 181 S.E.2d 612, 613 (1971).1 It imposes liability upon the uninsured employer (statute asserts employer “is liable”) either in a civil action, in which the employer is not permitted to assert important defenses, or in a workers’ compensation proceeding. Therefore, considering the legislative intent to penalize the uninsured employer along with the intent to benefit the worker, it would be inappropriate to consider section 87.21 as containing an election provision which limits the employee to pursuing one remedy when that remedy is not achieved. In that situation, the uninsured employer escapes all liability in contravention of section 87.21 ⅛ assertion that the employer “is liable.” This result puts the uninsured employer at an advantage over the insured employer. The legislature did not intend that an employer who rejected the provisions of the workers’ compensation act should be given an advantage over those who accepted them. Mitchell, 181 Iowa at 607, 165 N.W. at 110.
We can also look to prior statutes to determine the legislature’s intent. See Le Mars, 304 N.W.2d at 424. It is significant that prior to 1970, section 87.21 did not state the uninsured employer “is liable” and did phrase the employee’s rights in terms of a right “to elect” between the two remedies. This court has said that ordinarily a change in the language of a statute indicates an intention to change its meaning. Hansen v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm’n, 239 Iowa 1139, 1141-42, 34 N.W.2d 203, 205 (1948). This change in language, along with the purposes of the act, indicates the legislature intended to reject the election doctrine.
I would hold that if an employee, such as Stroup, has been unsuccessful in a damages suit brought under section 87.21, the employee is not barred from then filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Double recovery, which the phrase “two bites at the apple” means to convey, is not the issue or the result here. Some recovery for injuries suffered is what section 87.21 provides. The interpretation I suggest is in line with established policy to liberally construe workers’ compensation statutes in favor of the worker and to influence employers to obtain workers’ compensation insurance and adhere to its terms. See Beier Glass Co. v. Brundige, 329 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1983); Mitchell, 181 Iowa at 608, 165 N.W. at 110. I would reverse the district court judgment and remand to the agency for a determination of Stroup’s claim.
HARRIS, LAVORATO, and NEUMAN, JJ., join this dissent.
. The majority points out that most cases from other jurisdictions which have faced this issue are distinguishable. However, Virginia Used Auto Parts is persuasive because the state statute in that case was similar to Iowa’s: the uninsured employer "shall be liable ... either for compensation under [the workers' compensation] Act or at law in a suit instituted by the employee ... to recover damages for personal injuiy or death by accident.” Virginia Used Auto Parts, 181 S.E.2d at 613. The Virginia court decided the statute did not require the employee to make an election of remedies. Id.