concurring in result.
It seems to me that confusion abounded here but that the hearing officer’s finding that Ehrlich was given a reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney, is based upon the weight of the evidence and, thus, is conclusive.
Ehrlich was entitled to contact an attorney before taking the chemical test. Kuntz v. State Highway Comm’r, 405 *215N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1987). Cf. Friedman v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn.1991) (arrestee has limited right under Minnesota constitution to consult attorney before taking chemical test); McDonald v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn.1991). The importance of the opportunity to consult with counsel is to mitigate the confusion that inheres in the situation where there is a Miranda assurance of a right to counsel followed by a denial of access to an attorney to advise whether to take a chemical test. See Bickler v. North Dakota State Highway Comm’r, 423 N.W.2d 146, 147 (N.D.1988) (“We believe our holding in Kuntz eliminated the contradiction between the postarrest Miranda assurance of a right to counsel, and the subsequent denial of access to an attorney’s advice on whether to take the chemical test.”).
Under Kuntz and Bickler, any confusion that would justify a reversal of a license revocation, is obviated by the opportunity of an arrestee to consult with counsel before taking a chemical test. That opportunity was present here. Accordingly, I would hold there is no cognizable claim of confusion.
I,therefore, concur in affirming the judgment which affirms the suspension of Ehrlich’s driving privileges.
MESCHKE, J., concur.