(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. On May 22, 1990, police officers offered the defendant, Debra Jo Johnson-Hugi, the following ultimatum: Either cooperate with them in the role of a confidential informant or be arrested and charged with delivering a controlled substance in violation of Iowa Code sections 204.206(4) and 204.401(1) (1989). She opted for the former, but was, nevertheless, charged with the stated offenses after the issuance of the officer’s ultimatum. Because I believe the State’s actions are violative of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2)(a), I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the pending charges and affirm the court of appeals.
In State v. Van Beek, 443 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1989), we concluded that “[i]n interpreting rule 27(2)(a), the manifest intent of the legislature, [must prevail] over the literal import of the words used.” Id. at 706. In our analysis of legislative intent, we described the “evils the rule is designed to protect against” in the following way:
The purpose of [rule 27(2)(a)] is to relieve one accused of a crime of ... the anxiety of suspended prosecution, if at liberty on bail, and to require courts and peace officers to proceed with the trial of criminal charges with such reasonable promptness as proper administration of justice demands.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 901, 156 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968)). Defendant Johnson-Hugi’s pressed recruitment as a confidential informant clearly subjected her to “the anxiety of suspended prosecution.” She not only could be prosecuted at any time but had no assurance that the State would forego prosecution even if she were to make a good-faith effort to secure the evidence that the police sought. Indeed, the specter of renewed prosecution is the very tool used by the police to control the minds of all confidential informants for the duration of their service as an informant. Thus, while the “anxiety of suspended prosecution” may be a necessary evil in light of the need for confidential informants in modern-day law enforcement, the sound policy underlying rule 27(2)(a) requires that this period of uncertainty not be extended beyond the reasonable period of forty-five days.
The majority complains that, under this approach, “the time within which authorities could use informants to obtain information would be substantially limited.” The specter of hamstringing law enforcement authorities is raised. I find this suggestion overblown. Law enforcement authorities could continue to use informants for whatever time period they deem appropriate. The only obligation facing law enforcement authorities would be to determine within the forty-five day time period whether their informant is capable and willing to provide the information that they *603desire. If, within the forty-five day time period, enforcement authorities conclude that their informant is either unwilling or incapable of providing the sought-after information, they would be free to indict and prosecute. However, to the extent that the informant’s performance was adjudged adequate throughout the forty-five day period, authorities would be precluded from reneging on their promise to forego institution of criminal proceedings. This approach follows our own case law and has the salutary effect of limiting the “anxiety of suspended prosecution” to the forty-five day period as specified in rule 27(2)(a) while at the same time insuring that law enforcement authorities honor their cooperation agreements with informants.
Finally, I find it significant that an application of fourth-amendment jurisprudence also leads to the conclusion that defendant Johnson-Hugi was subjected to an arrest as of the date on which the police officers issued their ultimatum. Rule 27(2)(a) and the fourth amendment share a kinship in that the fourth amendment’s proscription on unreasonable seizures is designed “to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1126 (1976). An individual is “seized” within the meaning of the fourth amendment “only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that [she] was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980). In addition, the arrest in which the seizure is effected must also involve “either physical force or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L.Ed.2d 690, 698 (1991).
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, it is clear that defendant Johnson-Hugi was subjected to a seizure. Obviously, she was not free to ignore the requests of the officers, since had she done so, they would have reinstituted criminal proceedings. The officer’s assertion of their authority and defendant Johnson-Hugi’s submission to it are also clearly evident from the beginning. After what the majority describes as a “brief discussion” and defendant’s decision to cooperate, she was “patted down,” her purse was searched, and she was “Mirandized.” Defendant’s suggestion to go to the Clear Lake police station was rejected; instead, she was taken to the Mason City highway patrol post. She was not allowed to drive her own car but had to ride in the officer’s car. After being kept one-and-a-half to two hours, she wanted to leave because she was late for work but could not because she no longer had her own transportation. Requests to hurry so she could get to work were refused because “this is more important.” She was not allowed to use the restroom except with a female agent accompanying her. Such was the nature of the “non-arrest” of defendant and her “voluntary” cooperation. To the extent that rule 27(2)(a) is designed to prevent “oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals,” we should construe the term “arrest” consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s definition of a “seizure” for purposes of the fourth amendment.
The majority has settled upon an exceedingly formalistic definition of arrest that effectively allows enforcement authorities to establish the point of “arrest” by deciding when to utter the magical words, “you are under arrest.” This interpretation of the term “arrest” subjects citizens, such as Debra Jo Johnson-Hugi, to the anxiety of indefinitely suspended prosecution while the State “employs” them in the role of confidential informant. In this case, defendant Johnson-Hugi was conscripted for 106 days before the State decided that her services were not valuable enough to forego prosecution any longer; then they indicted her. But even 1006 days would not be too long under the majority’s rule to squeeze service from a defendant. The majority’s approach is not necessary to the enforcement of our criminal code and does violence to the policy underlying Iowa Rule of Crim*604inal Procedure 27(2)(a). I would affirm the district court and the court of appeals decisions that called for a dismissal of the charges now pending against defendant Johnson-Hugi.