(dissenting).
The judges of the First Judicial District, which includes Black Hawk County, maintain a list of attorneys who are willing to accept appointments to represent indigent defendants in criminal cases and indigent applicants in post-conviction proceedings. The judges have also adopted District Rule 1 which includes the following: “As a guideline only, the sum of $40 per hour is established as the average, ordinary, and customary charges for like services in the District.”
The district court in Black Hawk County appointed Mr. Coonrad to represent indigents in several cases. Mr. Coonrad represented the indigents and subsequently presented his claims for services. In his claims, in addition to cash advanced for expenses, he listed his hours of services for research, travel, conferences, other out-of-court time, pretrial in-court time, and trial time. For the total of such hours in each case he asked for compensation at the rate of $65 per hour.
Various judges passed on the claims, and they allowed Mr. Coonrad’s expenses and $40 times the numbers of hours of service except for one ease in which a judge allowed $45 per hour.
Mr. Coonrad objected to allowances of less than $65 per hour, and requested reconsideration of the claims. He accompanied his requests with his affidavit and the affidavits of seven other local attorneys practicing in the criminal defense field. One attorney stated he was receiving “$65.00 an hour for work on private pay criminal cases....” Another stated, “When I take a case under a private agreement, my fee is based roughly on an hourly rate which ranges from $60.00 per hour to $75.00 per hour, with adjustments for unique considerations that might be involved in a given case. The eventual total fee may exceed $75.00 per hour in a given case or it may be less than $60.00 per hour. The final bill will usually receive some adjustment from the hourly rate, depending on the result and other factors which may *203be considered in charging a fee pursuant to the Professional Code of Responsibility.” Another stated, “The criminal work that I do on a private basis is billed at the rate of $60 per hour.” Another, “That although I charge a flat fee for most private pay criminal defense representation, I established that fee based on the nature of the charges and the individual facts of each case. I do generally average in excess of $75.00 per hour, however, by the fees which I charge.” Another stated he charged $50 per hour; also, “I charge criminal work, generally, on a retainer up front plus hourly basis, or if the client wishes, on a set fee for the entire matter, in which case, the total fee is guaranteed regardless of the time involved and that fee must be paid in advance.” Another stated he used a minimum charge of $65 per hour and “most criminal work is charged at minimum of seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per hour.” Another, “My own charges to my clients for criminal representations is $60.00 per hour and $500 per day in trial. This rate will vary both up and down depending on the client’s financial abilities as well as the complexity and gravity of the offense charged.”
The chief judge of the district asked Judge Van Metre to rule on Mr. Coonrad’s requests for reconsideration. Judge Van Metre considered the affidavits and denied the requests, stating:
The Court has examined the claims and notes that Mr. Coonrad has voluntarily placed his name on the list maintained by the Court Administrator for court appointments to represent indigent defendants in Black Hawk County. He is under no compulsion to do this, and there are a number of able attorneys with equal or superior experience of Mr. Coonrad available in Black Hawk County who have also placed their names on this list and are willing to render legal services to indigents at the rate of $40.00 per hour. In other words, this is a customary fee in Black Hawk County for similar work.
Mr. Coonrad initiated these certiorari proceedings to test Judge Van Metre’s ruling. The controversy does not involve the amount of Mr. Coonrad’s services; that is not in dispute. It involves their value.
Several principal methods have been used throughout the country for valuing legal defense services: flat rates for various kinds of cases; fees set by the court within stated limits; hourly rates; and discretionary fees set by the courts. Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services 30-31 (A.B.A. Approved Draft 1968).
Iowa formerly had a version of the flat rate method. Iowa Code § 775.5 (1958). In section 775.5 of the Iowa Code of 1962 the General Assembly placed this state in the discretionary group (“reasonable compensation to be decided in each case by the court”). Under that statute, this court decided “reasonable” compensation meant a sharing the burden of the defense of indigents — part of the financial burden to be borne by the public and part by the attorneys in their traditional role as defenders of the defenseless and oppressed. Woodbury County v. Anderson, 164 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1969). In section 815.7 of the Code of 1979 (and subsequent Codes) the Assembly left Iowa in the discretionary category but added the following language which I have emphasized: “reasonable compensation which shall be the ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community to be decided in each case by a judge of the district court_”
We subsequently construed the emphasized language and held that it provides for defense fees at the going rate in the community without reference to the fact of representation under court appointment except for the element of certainty of payment. Hulse v. Wifvat, 306 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1981). We stated:
[Ujnder section 815.7 reasonable compensation is “the ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community.” The district court held that “like services” means similar services rendered to indigent defendants pursuant to court appointments.
*204[T]he new language refers to ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community. It does not refer to ordinary and customary fee allowances for similar indigent services.... The language plainly refers to fees charged to nonindigent clients in similar litigation.
We thus hold that plaintiff is entitled to full compensation for his reasonably necessary services.
Id. at 710, 712 (emphasis added). A judge of the district court who applies the Hulse standard has broad discretion in setting the amount of the fee. Id. at 709. See also Lunde v. Ruigh, 356 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa 1984); Walters v. Herrick, 351 N.W.2d 794 (Iowa 1984). Judges may call upon their own knowledge and experience as to value of legal services in the community. Hulse, 306 N.W.2d at 709.
The issue in these certiorari proceedings is whether Judge Van Metre applied the standard of section 815.7. He relied on the district rule fixing $40 per hour as a guideline. The specific question therefore is whether that rule comports with the standard in section 815.7 as explicated in Hulse.
Two difficulties appear in endeavoring to harmonize the district rule and the Code provision. One is that the rule uses a $40 guideline set by the judges, in contrast to fees arrived at by the unregulated flow of forces between attorneys and clients “in the community” as contemplated by the statute. Judge Van Metre stated in his ruling: “All the attorneys who do submit their names have been aware for a number of years that $40.00 per hour is the rate paid by the Courts; and if they are not satisfied with that figure, they can remove their name from the list.” This places an attorney in the position of accepting $40 per hour, whatever the going rate in the community may be, or of foregoing court appointments. Presumably the figure could be reduced to $35 per hour or even lower, if sufficient attorneys came forward to handle the workload. But specified figures per hour do not become “the ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community” because some lawyers will accept them under court order. That approach divorces compensation for court appointments from compensation for private retainers and flies directly in the face of the statute and Hulse.
The other difficulty is the per hour approach in the rule: $40 per hour. If the Iowa legislature had desired a per hour approach it would have adopted that method, as some jurisdictions have done. The per hour approach is easier to apply, but it is not appropriate for ascertaining “ordinary and customary charges” under our statute.
Iowa attorneys function under the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. That Code lists the following factors for determining reasonable fees:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
D.R. 2-106(B). This court adopted the substance of these factors and applied them to defense services, except for the last one, in Parrish v. Denato, 262 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Iowa 1978) (“ ‘In determining a reasonable attorney fee, generally the time necessarily spent, the nature and extent of the service, the amount involved [or, as here, the possible punishment involved], the difficulty of handling and importance of issues, responsibility assumed and the results obtained, *205as well as the standing and experience of the attorney in the profession should be considered.’ ” (Citations omitted.)). I add that under Hulse certainty of payment is also a factor for consideration.
This court has stated in previous decisions that the time involved is only one of the relevant factors. Hulse, at 712 (“Although we recognize the convenience of a fixed rate of compensation based on time expended, a rigid adherence to that method of valuation ignores the other factors which must be considered in determining reasonable compensation. True uniformity in compensation can be achieved only when all the variables affecting reasonableness are considered.”). See also Walters, 351 N.W.2d at 797; Mathison, 333 N.W.2d at 480. While the present district rule also states the factors in DR 2-106(B), the allowances in each of the six cases involved in these proceedings was on the flat $40 per hour rate ($45 per hour in one case). The compensation comes out to the penny at those hourly rates. Indeed, Judge Van Metre stated that attorneys who submit their names have been aware for a number of years “that $40.00 per hour is the rate paid by the Courts.... ”
I conclude that the district rule and the fee orders in the six cases made pursuant to it cannot be squared with the standard in section 815.7 and Hulse. The result of the majority’s decision is that districts can in fact adopt and enforce an hourly rate below the going charges in the community. Section 815.7 of the Code has been changed from “ordinary and customary charges for like services in the community” to “ordinary and customary charges for like services at the courthouse.”
I realize that a fixed dollar figure combined with a per hour approach is simple and quite easily applied. I also appreciate that district judges are in a direct line of fire between taxing bodies on one side and the defense bar on the other, as demonstrated in the contents of the appendix in these proceedings. This is an inevitable result of our statutory discretionary system based on customary charges in the community. The General Assembly chose to adopt that basis and to confide the discretion to the district judges.
Fixing fees by judges, as with lawyers’ fixing fees in private practice, has always been difficult. The task requires time, judgment, and fortitude. But it is part of judging.
I would sustain the writ and remand the proceedings to district court for fee hearings and orders consistent with these views.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and McCORMICK, J., join in this dissent.