On Petition to Rehear
The petitioner has filed an earnest, courteous, dignified and forceful petition to rehear in this case wherein it is contended, “that there is a limitation on the time for the filing of exceptions as set out, not only in Section 30-517, but in Section 30-516 T.C.A.” There is no question now raised as to our conclusion as to the time of *458filing within the nine months and thirty day period as was urged in the original argument before us. We have read this petition three times and have re-read our original opinion herein as well as again reading the statutes on questions referred to in the quotation above and other authorities. After having done so, we are now more than ever satisfied with the conclusion we have reached in our original opinion.
The petitioner argues very earnestly:
“that there is no way around the provision of the statute relative to claims filed within the ninth month, to the effect that if the claim is not excepted to within thirty days from the five days notice given by the clerk that the claim becomes a final judgment by force of the statute. It matters not whether the claim was filed on the first, second, or any other day of the ninth month. If it is filed on the last day of the last month, then the parties in interest would have thirty days from the five days notice given by the clerk in which to file exceptions, and which, by virtue of the amendment, would carry the period beyond the thirty days following the nine months, as provided by the other sections, and at the expiration of that thirty days, if no exceptions were filed, it would become a final judgment by virtue of the statute. But certainly in no instance is a claim filed in the ninth month controlled, so far as exceptions are concerned, by the exceptions filed within thirty days to those claims filed within the eight months. The two sections are separate and distinct. There is no ambiguity about either. The line of procedure is definite, understandable and can stand together, one independent of the other. Any other construction, in *459my opinion, is contrary to the clear and manifest intention of the legislature. ’ ’
In answering this very earnest and sincere argument we first refer to the second paragraph on page 455 (725 of 292 S.W.2d) in the original opinion wherein we stated:
“ These statutes which we are considering here beginning with Section 30-509, T.C.A. and in particular Section 30-516, T.C.A. and Section 30-517, T.C.A. all form an orderly system for the probate and distribution of estates.”
We think that this statement is true beyond a peradventure of a doubt. Now taking the statement as true which we think must be so taken, we take the language of Section 30-516, T.C.A. here pertinent which is:
“If a claim is filed within the last month of the period for the filing of claims, the personal representative shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of notice from the clerk of the filing of said claim within which to except thereto.”
Clearly this language means only that when claims are filed within the last month no judgment can be taken against the personal representative or nothing done to injure the personal representative within the thirty day period from the receipt of notice which is required to be sent and which is commented on in our original opinion. That is all that this does, it merely prohibits anything being done about a claim filed in the ninth month until thirty days after the notice has been received from the clerk. It does not require an exception to be filed.
Now we take the sentence immediately following that just quoted which is:
*460“A claim filed within the last month shall not become a final judgment against the estate until after the expiration of thirty (30) days after such notice has been given as above provided.”
This provision is likewise a prohibitory provision in that it prohibits anything being done "until after the expiration of thirty (30) days” from the giving of notice. It does not say or govern in any way the time of filing exceptions as is controlled by Section 30-517, T.C.A. This section and these two quotations above are merely prohibitory language from taking any advantage of the personal representative of the estate until he has had at least thirty days after getting of notice. It does not in any way as does the following Section 30-517, T.C.A. control the time of filing exceptions.
Section 30-517, T.C.A. is the only section in this legislation which controls the time of filing exceptions and these may be filed "at any time during or prior to such thirty (30) day period, but not thereafter * * *.” The language and exceptions of Section 30-516, T.C.A. just above quoted are an exception to the general exception covering the whole statute wherein these exceptions may be filed anywhere up to ten months, that is thirty days after the nine months from the time of publication when a claim is filed in the ninth month which after the giving of notice and the thirty days thereafter would take the period beyond the tenth month. In other words the language and purpose clearly of Section 30-516, T.C.A. is an exception to this.
We think under the authorities heretofore cited and under others that might be cited that it is clearly our duty to construe these two sections of this uniform act *461together and when thns construing it the language cannot mean anything other than what we have said.
We have carefully considered the matters herein and must overrule the petition to rehear for the reasons expressed.