concurring specially.
I join in this opinion only because we are dealing with summary judgment and not a *535trial on the merits. I agree that the work sheet should have been disclosed and was not. Whether this nondisclosure constitutes misconduct depends on whether it prevented Pius from fully and fairly preparing or presenting his case. Pius could have deposed the bank president and learned of his “feeling” that the $65,000 note was to be secured by the first mortgage. He didn’t and were we reviewing a post-trial motion, I would affirm the trial court’s decision on the ground that other discovery would have revealed the same facts that the nondisclosed work sheet failed to reveal. But because summary judgment has been traditionally disfavored [though this trend, I believe, has softened, see, e.g., First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Williston v. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d 284 (N.D.1988); Gress v. Kocourek, 427 N.W.2d 815 (N.D.1988); Northwestern Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Fargo v. Biby, 418 N.W.2d 786 (N.D.1988); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Asbridge, 414 N.W.2d 596 (N.D.1987); Production Credit Ass’n of Fargo v. Foss, 391 N.W.2d 622 (N.D.1986) ], I a'gree Pius should have a go at the merits of the case.
Construing Pius’ proposed amended pleading as one for “reformation” is, of course, being kinder and gentler than even the author of that exhortation could have anticipated, but in light of the sound policy undergirding Rule 60(b)(3) and in light of our bias against summary judgment in general and nondisclosure in particular, I concur.