dissenting.
I agree that the purpose of 27-11-01 is to protect the public from unqualified legal advisors. But I disagree that Mr. Ranta is the unqualified legal advisor intended to be protected against. Nor do I agree that the result in this case, where the facts are so dissimilar to State v. Niska, 380 N.W.2d 646 (N.D.1986) and Application of Christianson, 215 N.W.2d 920 (N.D.1974), is preordained by those precedents.
Mr. Ranta, unlike Mr. Niska, is trained in the law. Against Mr. Ranta’s efforts to practice law in this state, the public needs no protection. Mr. Ranta, unlike Mr. Chris-tianson, is not a suspended attorney. To the contrary, he is an attorney in good standing in Minnesota with 40 years of experience in tax law. Small wonder that Mr. McCarney sought out Ranta and maintained a working relationship with him over many years.
The only protection effected by the holding in this case is the protection of the economic interests of the attorneys of this state and the estate of Mr. McCarney. While there may be some justification for the former, the question is whether that justification outweighs the forfeiture to Ranta and windfall to McCarney occasioned by our holding. I do not believe it does and, therefore, I dissent.
The majority reasons that our statute’s purpose is to determine before an individual practices in this state whether he is competent and qualified to do so. While I agree with this principle, I disagree that this purpose has not been fulfilled. The fact that Mr. Ranta holds a Minnesota license is precisely the determination that our statute seeks to accomplish. That such determination has been made by the Min*167nesota authorities, not ours, does not frustrate the statute’s purpose. Indeed, we rely on the merit and judgment of the Minnesota bar and bench in a myriad of instances — our five-year admission to practice without examination, Rule 4, Admission to Practice, our approval of Minnesota continuing legal education seminars for North Dakota CLE credit, our liberal border city accommodation of Minnesota attorneys, and vice versa. That trust recognizes that modern demands of business and the mobility of our society — indeed the public interest, require a sensitivity to the ramifications of regulating the practice of law.
I believe that the circumstances of this case provide an exception to the general rule that an out-of-state attorney unlicensed in this state may not enforce a promise to pay attorney fees. The federal court practice exception may be fairly construed to encompass the instance of federal tax advice by an attorney licensed to practice in Minnesota. The majority dismisses out of hand the federal court exception because Ranta did not appear in federal court. Whether or not the tax advice given results in litigation and thus in federal court or tax court, is not in my view determinative. Arguably, good tax advice will not end in litigation so that the majority’s conclusion aids “bad” tax attorneys and lowers the boom on “good” ones by withholding fees from the latter because they do not “appear” in federal court. It is the impermissible interference with federal practice by the State that justifies the federal court exception to the rule against recovery of fees. See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 F.Supp. 1 (SD N.Y.1964). Since tax law is a matter of federal court jurisdiction, it is a comparable burden on federal courts for states to restrict who may represent tax clients out of court when litigation arising from such representation ends up in federal court, if at all. The justification for the federal court exception applies with equal force to the instant facts. I would thus affirm the judgment.
Because it will take many cases to refine and define the repercussions of the holding in this case, it may be helpful to discuss the local counsel exception contained in Rule 11.1, N.D.R.O.C. The majority acknowledges that some states allow an out-of-state attorney to recover fees where the attorney made proper disclosure to the client and associated with local counsel. Concluding that “such is not the situation here,” the majority avoids consideration of that exception. I agree that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Ranta associated with local counsel. Indeed, the record here is abysmal because this case was really tried on the issues pleaded — namely, the nature of the legal services rendered (primarily tax advice) and their reasonable value. Had the issue of Mr. Ranta’s nonlicensure in North Dakota been pleaded and tried, we would likely be privy to more relevant information. While the evidence is undisputed that Ranta was hired for tax advice and that the clients he served in North Dakota were tax clients, it is less clear whether local counsel was involved.
Rule 11.1, North Dakota Rules of Court, affords an out-of-state attorney the opportunity to practice in North Dakota by associating with local counsel. The interest of the client in choosing the attorney who will represent her, mandates liberal interpretation of rules or statutes restricting interstate practice. Hahn v. Boeing Co., 95 Wash.2d 28, 621 P.2d 1263 (1980). Rule 11.1 should thus be interpreted liberally to allow for association with local counsel in all matters, whether in court or not. Better still, the rule should be amended to dispel any doubt. North Dakotans are entitled to the freedom to choose the best attorney available, whether in state or out and should be afforded the broadest latitude to do so.
Our state, of course, has legitimate interests in maintaining control over who may provide legal services within its borders. We are properly concerned over ensuring that legal representation be provided by persons of sound training, ethics and familiarity with not only the general principles of law, but the particular features of North *168Dakota law. Here, that was accomplished. Therefore, the interests weighing in favor of enforcement of McCarney’s promise to pay Ranta for legal services, i.e. the avoidance of unjust enrichment and forfeiture, are more substantial than the regulatory purpose of, the statute.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
MESCHKE, J., filed a dissenting opinion.