(dissenting).
I dissent. In order to sustain an award to the claimant based on an alleged employment discrimination, both the local civil rights commission and a majority of this court engage in a self-contradictory fact-finding process in which different interpretations are placed on the same evidence depending on which element of the claim is being considered.
In considering whether Wright has established that one or more of his major life activities are sufficiently limited to satisfy the definition of disability which it has fashioned, the majority views the evidence as showing a man with a drinking problem which had reached “critical proportions.” In support of this conclusion, it points out that Wright regularly engaged in drinking with customers during working hours when he himself testified that “if I took one drink I ended up drunk.” In the month prior to that in which he began treatment, Wright was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol while returning from company business in a company car. He was convicted of that offense. At or about the same time, his relationships with his family had deteriorated to an impossible situation resulting in physical violence.
Although the majority accepts the implicit significance of the foregoing evidence in its finding that Wright’s major life activities were impaired when he began treatment on August 21, 1981, it completely ignores the implicit significance of the same evidence in considering the validity of the commission’s finding that within a period of only thirty days Wright’s condition had improved to an extent that he could perform the duties of his job satisfactorily with no direct threat to the property or safety of others.
I submit that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the latter finding which is an essential element of Wright’s right to recover for employment discrimination. Under any fair and balanced consideration of the record, Wright’s drinking problems after treatment were substantially the same as they had been before treatment had begun. There had been no apparent progress in solving the several interpersonal problems he was experiencing, each of which was of a character which detracted from his ability to satisfactorily perform his job assignment.
In order to sustain its finding that Wright’s substance abuse problem would not hinder his job performance, the commission relies upon the conclusory testimony of a staff member at the treatment facility who was not familiar with the requirements of Wright’s employment with Consolidated. The same staff member signed a discharge summary for Wright’s treatment program which completely negates any meaningful progress on his part while in the treatment program.
Perhaps in recognition of the undisputed evidence that Wright’s treatment program *536had been a failure, the commission also seeks to sustain its finding that he could perform in his employment setting by a misplaced reliance on its belief that he had performed satisfactorily at his job prior to receiving treatment. The latter conclusion appears to rest on the fact that Wright, prior to receiving treatment, went to work each day, went through the motions of doing what he was supposed to do, and in the process of his sales activities generated a certain amount of business for his employer. I submit, however, that it is not one of the policies of our employment discrimination laws to compel the continued employment of an uncontrolled substance abuser simply because that person is able to function to some extent within a work environment.
In the present case, Wright’s substance abuse problem was still uncontrolled based upon any fair characterization of the evidence. The obvious risks to an employer from continuing such a person in a job capacity which requires use of a company car in entertaining prospective customers of the employer cannot be ignored. The commission attempted to ignore this problem by conveniently compartmentalizing the potential effects of the handicap between personal and business activities and by concluding that in the past Wright’s transgressions fell more heavily in the personal area than in the employment area. I submit that the line simply cannot be drawn in this manner.
Wright’s potential for aberrant behavior had been exhibited within his employment setting by an OMVUI arrest and conviction. This was about a month before he undertook treatment. Consolidated’s decision not to terminate his employment immediately following that occurrence was made at a time before Wright himself had confided to his employer that his drinking problem was out of control. Once that knowledge was imparted to Consolidated, it would, I submit, have been justified in reversing its prior decision to continue Wright’s employment. It did not act precipitously on the matter, however, and agreed that if some success were achieved by Wright through the treatment program at Lakeside his employment would be continued. Only when Consolidated received a copy of Wright’s discharge summary showing no progress had been made did it act to terminate his employment.
Given the foregoing circumstances, I submit that Consolidated’s decision was reasonable based on the information which was available to it. No evidence presented before the commission suggests that the decision was not reasonable. The district court was correct in reversing the decision of the commission, and I would affirm its judgment.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and McGIYERIN and LARSON, JJ., join this dissent.