dissenting.
If this case involved a proper initial interment of a body, followed by a request for disinterment, I would be in full accord *337with the majority’s analysis and conclusions. It does not. Rather, this ease represents the ratification of a result wrongfully obtained. By an appeal as of right resulting from a dissent in the Appellate Division, N.J. Count. art. VI, § V, ¶ 1(b); R. 2:2-1(a)(2), we are called on to review such eondemnable behavior. Viewing this case narrowly, the majority endorses and rewards that behavior. That I cannot do.
Because plaintiff never validly waived her statutory rights and the original internment here was procured either by fraud or mutual mistake in violation of clear and unambiguous legislative dictates, the majority’s reasoning, albeit correct, is irrelevant. Fui'ther, the result reached by the majority rewards a wrongdoer, a result that runs counter to this Court’s lengthy equitable traditions and, more importantly, its fundamental obligations. For those reasons, and substantially for the reasons so clearly and convincingly presented in the opinion by Judge Miniman on behalf of a majority of the Appellate Division panel, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Plaintiff Joan Marino and the decedent, Larry L. Marino, Sr., were married for over twenty-three years. During that time, plaintiff raised Larry Sr.’s two sons from a prior marriage, Larry Jr. and Brett, as if they were her own; plaintiff and decedent also had four children of their own, Jennifer, John, Daniel, and Nicholas. Larry Sr., then age forty-nine, died at home on October 23, 2005. At the time of Larry Sr.’s death, all of the children save for Nicholas were adults.
Several years earlier, plaintiff and decedent had purchased cemetery plots where plaintiff and decedent planned to be buried. Those plots were in the same cemetery where both plaintiffs family and decedent’s family had their own plots; plaintiffs and decedent’s personal plots were purchased through plaintiffs mother and were located somewhat closer to plaintiffs family’s plot. Shortly after Larry Sr.’s death, and although Larry Sr.’s Will *338made no mention of the disposition of his remains, the children unilaterally determined that their father should be buried in his parents’ plot, where there would be no room for plaintiff when she died. Despite plaintiffs emotional entreaties, the children claimed they had voted to bury their father in the paternal plot; the only accommodation they offered plaintiff was that their father’s grave would be dug deeper so that plaintiff could be buried “stacked” on decedent’s coffin. According to plaintiff, she acquiesced in this arrangement under duress: she was told bluntly that Larry Jr. and Jennifer were the named executors of decedent’s estate; that the decision of where to bury Larry Sr. was reserved to the executors; and that if she failed to consent to the children’s plans, plaintiff would be barred from her husband’s viewing, services, and burial. Some time later, plaintiff brought an action in Chancery to vindicate her statutory right to determine where her husband was to be buried, a right that was denied to her by the children and the Chancery court, reinstated to her by the Appellate Division, but again stripped from her by this Court.
II.
A.
The law governing those facts is straightforward. The citizens of this state, speaking through the Legislature, have decreed that when, as here,
the decedent has not left a will appointing a person to control the funeral and disposition of the remains, the right to control the funeral and disposition of the human remains shall be in the following order, unless other directions have been given by a court of competent jurisdiction:
(1) The surviving spouse of the decedent or the surviving domestic partner.
(2) A majority of the surviving adult children of the decedent.
(3) The surviving parent or parents of the decedent.
(4) A majority of the brothers and sisters of the decedent.
(5) Other next of kin of the decedent according to the degree of consanguinity.
(6) If there are no known living relatives, a cemetery may rely on the written authorization of any other person acting on behalf of the decedent.
[N.J.S.A. 45:27-22(a).]
*339In this clear and unambiguous passage, New Jerseyans have made the judgment that if a decedent does not set forth in his Will where and how to dispose of his remains, that decision falls, in order, on those persons the Legislature has specified. First and primary among those is the surviving spouse. In sum, then, if a decedent fails to make a testamentary disposition of his remains and his surviving spouse decides where and how those remains are to be handled, that decision is both uniquely that of the surviving spouse and, more to the point, final.
That is not what happened here. According to plaintiff, she was informed by Larry Jr. that he and his half-sister Jennifer were the designated executors of the decedent’s estate and that, therefore, where and how decedent was to be buried was their decision, and theirs alone. Plaintiff also testified that, although she piteously pleaded that decedent be buried in the plot she and decedent had purchased for precisely that purpose, she acquiesced in allowing decedent to be buried in his family’s plot only under duress, as she was threatened that she would be excluded from her husband’s viewing, services, and burial. Even according to Larry Jr., the decision to bury his father in his parents’ family plot was one reached by a vote of the children, completely disregarding the wishes of his father’s widow who, tellingly, also was the woman who raised him from age five as if he were her own child.
B.
In those circumstances, any claim that plaintiff purportedly waived her sole and exclusive statutory right to make the interment decision concerning her husband is unworthy of credence. All witnesses agreed that plaintiff consistently maintained that she wanted to bury her husband in the plot they had purchased together, and that she grudgingly conceded to the burial arrangements foisted on her by the executors’ wrongful claim of right. Tn that stark context, it cannot be said that plaintiff waived the right exclusively granted to her by N.J.S.A. 45:27-22(a). We have made clear, time and time again, that
*340“[w]aiver is the voluntary am) intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Knorr v. Smeal, 178 N.J. 169, 177 [836 A.2d 794] (2003) (citing W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co. v. Indus. Trust Co., 27 N.J. 144, 152 [141 A.2d 782] (1958)). See also Shotmeyer v. N.J. Realty Title Ins. Co., 195 N.J. 72, 89 [948 A.2d 600] (2008). It is beyond question that “[a]n effective waiver requires a parly to have full knowledge of his legal rights and inlen[d| to surrender those rights.” Knorr, supra, 178 N.J. at 177 [836 A.2d 794] (citing W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co., supra, 27 N.J. at 153 [141 A.2d 782]). A waiver cannot be divined hut, instead, must he the product of objective proofs: “The intent to waive need not be stated expressly, provided the circumstances clearly show that the party knew of the right and then abandoned it, either by design or indifference.” Ibid. (citing Merchs. Indem. Corp. of N.Y. v. Eggleston, 68 N.J.Super. 235, 254 [172 A.2d 206] (App.Div.1961), affd, 37 N.J. 114 [179 A.2d 505] (1962)). That benchmark standard leaves little room for doubt, as “[t]he party waiving a known right must do so clearly, unequivocally, and decisively.” Ibid. (citing Country Chevrolet, Inc. v. Twp. of N. Brunswick Planning Bd., 190 N.J.Super. 376, 380 [463 A.2d 960] (App.Div.1983)). See also Shotmeyer, supra, 195 N.J. at 89 [948 A.2d 600] (quoting Knorr, supra). Specifically, “waiver ‘presupposes a full knowledge of the right and an intentional surrender; waiver cannot be predicated on consent given under a mistake of fact.’ ” County of Morris v. Fauver, 153 N.J. 80, 104-05 [707 A.2d 958] (1998) (quoting W. Jersey Title & Guar. Co., supra, 27 N.J. at 153 [141 A.2d 782]).
[Sroczymki v. Milek, 197 N.J. 36, 63-64, 961 A.2d 704 (2008) (Rivera-Soto, X, concurring in part and dissenting in part).]
That there was nothing voluntary or intentional in plaintiffs abdication to the burial demands made by the executors or the children is self-evident. Moreover, it also remains beyond question that plaintiff simply did not know that it was her sole, exclusive, and statutory right to demand where and how her husband was to be buried so that, even if her acts were voluntary and intentional, they certainly were not in respect of a known right. Taken either separately or in the aggregate, one and only one conclusion takes form: these facts do not even begin to scratch the surface of what is needed in order to constitute a valid waiver.
C.
Even if it could be said that plaintiff somehow waived her statutory right to designate the disposition of her husband’s remains, it is also clear that any such waiver was procured by fraud. We have long held the view that “[ejvery fraud in its most general and fundamental conception consists of the obtaining of an *341undue advantage by means of some act or omission that is unconscientious or a violation of good faith.” Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624, 432 A.2d 521 (1981) (citation omitted). We have differentiated between legal and equitable fraud, noting that “Ldjepending on the remedy sought, an action for fraud may be either legal or equitable in nature.” Ibid. (citations omitted). We also have noted that “fraud may be either actual or constructive” and that “ft]he distinguishing factor is the element of untruth between the parties required in the former but not in the latter.” Ibid. (citation omitted).
The differences between legal and equitable fraud have been highlighted as follows:
A misrepresentation amounting' to actual legal fraud consists of a material representation of a presently existing or past fad, made with knowledge of its falsity and with the intention that the other party rely thereon, resulting in reliance by that party to his detriment. The elements of scienter, that is, knowledge of the falsity and an intention to obtain an undue advantage therefrom are not, essential if plaintiff seeks to prove that a misrepresentation constituted only equitable fraud. Thus, whatever would be fraudulent at law will be so in equity; but the equitable doctrine goes farther and includes instances of fraudulent misrepresentations which do not exist in the law.
[Id. at 624-25, 432 A.2d 521 (citations, internal quotation marks, and editing marks omitted).]
A cause of action in fraud “requires the satisfaction of five elements: a material misrepresentation by the defendant of a presently existing fact or past fact; knowledge or belief by the defendant of its falsity; an intent that the plaintiff rely on the statement; reasonable reliance by the plaintiff; and resulting damages to the plaintiff.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 175, 892 A.2d 1240 (2006). See generally Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610, 691 A.2d 350 (1997) (same). Finally, if “Ipjlaintiff seeks only equitable remedies!., she] therefore need meet only the lesser burden of proving equitable fraud! and, consequently, scienter is not at issue.” Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County, supra, 86 N.J. at 625, 432 A.2d 521 (citation omitted).
An even-handed application of those principles to the circumstances presented here yields a textbook example of equitable *342fraud: the executors and children materially misrepresented that they and they alone had the authority to determine the disposition of their father’s remains; in so doing, they intended that plaintiff rely upon that misrepresentation; plaintiff reasonably relied on that misrepresentation; and, because plaintiff was denied the right to bury her husband in the plot they had purchased for that purpose, plaintiff was damaged. Furthermore, defendants cannot claim that their mother should have known better than to rely on their representations and, instead, should have sought her own counsel. Placing aside the utterly reprehensible notion that a grieving widow somehow is required affirmatively to rebut the authoritarian demands of her children by prancing off to consult with a lawyer in that painfully narrow window of time during which burial plans are made, our law is clear: “One who engages in fraud, however, may not urge that one’s victim should have been more circumspect or astute.” Id. at 626 n. 1, 432 A.2d 521 (citation omitted).
Because plaintiffs acquiescence to the executors’ and children’s burial plans was the product of equitable fraud, decedent’s initial interment was of no legal effect. Hence, the statutory requirements for disinterment found in N.J.S.A. 45:27-23 are not triggered.
D.
Even if it could be said that plaintiff somehow waived her statutory right to designate the disposition of her husband’s remains, and even if it could be said that plaintiffs acquiescence in decedent’s burial arrangements was not procured by fraud, there can be no doubt that plaintiffs consent to decedent’s burial was the product of a mutual mistake that renders that consent inoperative.
Viewing the proofs in the light most favorable to defendants, Larry Jr. testified that, when he discussed where decedent was to be buried with plaintiff, she “was visibly upset [because] she, in fact, wanted ... my father buried in the plots that her mother had *343purchased for them[.j” He noted that he “went to [his] siblings and explained to them that [their father could be buried in his parents’ plot and not where his widow/their mother wished], and I wanted them to decide on where ... my father was going to be buried.” He acknowledged that “[a]t that time [plaintiff] became upset again. She was looking for any alternative to make this not happen.” Larry Jr. also testified that he consulted with a lawyer before decedent’s funeral and that, according to that lawyer’s opinion, Larry Jr., as executor, had the authority to decide decedent’s funeral arrangements. That statement triggered the following question and answer:
Q. Is it accurate to say that as a result of whatever [that lawyer] told you, you assumed responsibility for and control of the disposition of your father’s remains?
A. Yes, sir.1
Clearly, then, Larry Jr., at the very least, was operating under the impression that he, as executor of his father’s estate, was the one who possessed the right and power to determine the disposition of his father’s remains. Also, he communicated that conclusion to plaintiff, whose reliance on that assertion is made all the more reasonable by the fact that it was made by the son she had raised as one of her own children since he was age five and who, as a grown man, was a police officer in the same municipality in which her husband had been chief of police.
Viewing those facts in their most charitable light, both plaintiff and defendants were laboring under a mutual mistake, that is, “ ‘both parties were laboring under the same misapprehension as to a particular, essential fact.’ ” Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 608, 560 A.2d 655 (1989) (quoting Beachcomber Coins, Inc. v. Boskett, 166 N.J.Super. 442, 446, 400 A.2d 78 (App.Div.1979)). And, “ ‘[wjhere a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected *344party[.]’ ” Ibid. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152(1) (1981)). At its core, the doctrine of mutual mistake requires that “the parties must share this erroneous assumption.” Ibid. (emphasis supplied). Because the presence of a mutual mistake means that there has been no meeting of the minds sufficient to warrant that the parties be bound thereby, neither plaintiff nor defendants should be bound by that to which no properly informed party could have agreed. See Parrette v. Citizens’ Cas. Co., 128 N.J. Eq. 206, 209, 15 A.2d 802 (E. & A.1940) (holding that “mutual mistake is ground for reformation when, as here, the minds of the parties have met contractually but because of a mutual mistake the written contract between the parties is wanting in expression or execution to evince the actual and binding contractual intent of the parties”).
E.
No matter how gauged, the actions of the executors and the children were wrongful: N.J.S.A. 45:27-22(a) clearly and without reservation places the exclusive right to determine the disposition of decedent’s remains solely in plaintiffs hands. In the end, it matters little that plaintiff never voluntarily and intentionally waived a known right; it matters little that decedent’s initial interment was procured by equitable fraud; and, it matters little that decedent’s initial interment was the result of a mutual mistake. The inescapable net consequence is that, unless the wrongfully procured initial interment of decedent is voided and the parties returned to the position they should have been in by law, defendants-—the only wrongdoers here—will enjoy this Court’s imprimatur on their foul deeds.
That result is entirely contrary to this Court’s proud and consistent traditions. One must not lose sight of the fact that this action was brought in Chancery, seeking only equitable relief. Thus, traditional maxims fully applicable to actions at law are to be, in large measure, i*elaxed in order to achieve equity, and equitable defenses otherwise irrelevant to actions at law acquire *345vitality. More to the point, decisions in equity are controlled by the doctrine of “unclean hands.” We have explained that ‘jtjhe essence of that doctrine, which is discretionary on the part of the court, is that a suitor in equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings.” Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer County, 169 N.J. 135, 158, 777 A.2d 19 (2001) (citations, internal quotation marks, and editing marks omitted). “ ‘In simple parlance, it merely gives expression to the equitable principle that a court should not grant relief to one who is a wrongdoer with respect to the subject matter in suit.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Foustin v. Lewis, 85 N.J. 507, 511, 427 A.2d 1105 (1981)). Where, as here, the matter in controversy between the parties was procured by wrongdoing—be it intentional or inadvertent—it illbeeomes this Court to ratify that result by the strict application of legal principles without also applying the “play in the joints” equity jurisprudence needs and demands. Also, we have explained that “[a] basic equitable maxim is that ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’ ” Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 384, 921 A.2d 427 (2007) (quoting Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 132 N.J. Eq. 398, 401, 28 A.2d 181 (E. & A.1942)). Although defendants violated both of these fundamental equitable requirements, they are being permitted to do so with impunity.
Even in a legal setting involving so mundane a topic as a commercial lease, we have made clear that, although “[w|e are not eager to impose a set of morals on the marketplace!.,.] there are ethical norms that apply even to the harsh and sometimes cutthroat world of commercial transactions.” Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 N.J. 210, 230, 864 A.2d 387 (2005) (citation omitted). We have noted that “Igjamesmanship can be taken too far, as in this case.” Ibid. It is, to say the least, perplexing that the stiff backbone this Court exhibited on behalf of a garden-variety commercial tenant in an action at law is unaccountably absent in an action in equity brought by a grieving widow who was misled, if not defrauded, in her deepest moment of sorrow by the children she lovingly raised *346and who, more importantly, possessed clear, unmistakable rights provided by the Legislature, rights that have been cruelly cast aside.
F.
Finally, this analysis must be tethered to the New Jersey Cemetery Act, 2003 (Cemetery Act), N.J.S.A. 45:27-1 to -38. As the Appellate Division correctly noted, the Cemetery Act “make[s] the decedent’s decision regarding who shall make funeral arrangements binding, provided that the decision is in writing.” (citing S. Doc. No. 1992 (2003))(emphasis supplied). As the panel made clear, “under the Cemetery Act, orally expressed preferences are no longer binding and the surviving spouse may select a burial site inconsistent with those preferences.” It aptly concluded that “[t]he adult children violated this statute and deprived the surviving spouse of the right to determine the disposition of the remains of her husband of twenty-three years[,]” and that, “[ijnstead, the children decided to bury their father in a plot owned by the paternal grandmother where plaintiff wife had no right of burial.” It further noted that “[t]he Chancery judge found that this statute was violated.” It explained, however, that the Chancery judge incorrectly “analyzed the request to disinter and relocate the body to another plot in the cemetery under N.J.S.A. 45:27-23 without consideration of the potential impact of N.J.S.A. 45:27-22 on the factors bearing upon disinterment.” Because the disinterment statute—N.J.S.A. 45:27-23—“does not prohibit disinterments that are inconsistent with even a binding preference expressed in a will[,J” the panel reasoned that “[t]he issue thus becomes whether an orally expressed preference can control the disinterment and essentially trump all of the factors favoring removal when it cannot control the interment.”
It noted that “[a] court of equity is fully authorized to discharge the maxims that sustain our equity jurisprudence. Chief among these maxims is that which states wherever a legal right has been infringed a remedy will be given or, as more commonly stated, *347equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.” (quoting In re Moasavi, 334 N.J.Super. 112, 123, 756 A.2d 1076 (Ch.Div.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It highlighted that the Chancery judge did not “acknowledge that [plaintiff] had ‘the primary and paramount right to the possession of the body and the right to control its burial and other disposition.’ ” (quoting Felipe v. Vega, 239 N.J.Super. 81, 85, 570 A.2d 1028 (Ch.Div.1989)). The panel commented that, in this statutory structure, “Lt]he decision to disinter involves a balancing of the factors favoring disinterment against those that do not and we review a fundamental error in balancing the facts de novo.” (citing In re Application of Boyadjian, 362 N.J.Super. 463, 475, 828 A.2d 946 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 250, 837 A.2d 1093 (2003)). It concluded:
Here the judge did not engage in a balancing analysis oí all of the relevant factors, instead treating the decedent’s oral preference as determinative. Kven if the defense witnesses were totally credible, the decedent’s orally expressed preference does not outweigh all the other factors that strongly favor disinterment. That preference is even weaker coming from the mouths of witnesses who were not generally credible, as the judge found here. Under a proper balancing analysis plaintiff has dearly established good cause for removal that overcomes the presumption of nonremoval.
The Appellate Division’s reasoning and conclusions are unassailable. Therefore, its judgment should be affirmed.
III.
Because plaintiff never validly waived her statutory rights; because the original internment here was procured either by fraud or mutual mistake in violation of clear and unambiguous legislative dictates; because the result reached by the majority contravenes settled principles of equity jurisprudence and inexplicably rewards a wrongdoer; and substantially for the reasons thoughtfully presented by Judge Miniman on behalf of a majority of the Appellate Division panel, I respectfully dissent.
Far reversal—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS—6.
For affirmance—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.
Nothing in this dissent should be construed to intimate whether a viable cause of action exists against that lawyer for such patently erroneous advice.