(dissenting) — I must dissent.
Plaintiff-appellant states a single proposition he relies on for reversal — that the trial court erred in holding the treaty between the United States and Greece did not allow plaintiff’s ward, a citizen of Greece, to take an interest in the estate of his adopting father:
In' an able brief plaintiff cites Article VI of the Federal Constitution, three decisions of the supreme court, our own case of Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa 407, 423, 69 N.W. 560, 37 L. R. A. 583, and the article by- Professor Boyd in 47 Iowa Law Review 105, 117, to which the majority refers, as authority for the point that treaties between the United States and foreign governments are the supreme law of the land and insofar as 'state statutes are in conflict therewith they are suspended. To like effect are Doehrel v. Hillmer (Ladd, J.), 102 Iowa 169, 171, 71 N.W. 204, and In re Estate of Klug, 251 Iowa 1128, 1136, 104 N.W.2d 600, 604.
The annotation in 4 A. L. R. 1377, 1383, 1384, cites a long list of decisions, including many .others from Io-wa, for the point plaintiff makes. Additional, more recent, precedents are .cited in annotation, 134 A. L. R.. 882, 885.
The article by Professor' Boyd, supra, states: “Because treaties are given supremacy over state laws by the federal constitution, restrictions such as Iowa has placed on- rights of nonresident aliens are of no effect when in conflict with more 'libr eral treaty .provisions.”
.Plaintiff’s principal reliance is upon Article IX, 2, of the ■treaty between the United States and Greece which provides: “2. Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted freely to- dispose of property within the territories of the other *25Party with respect to.tbe acquisition of which through testate or intestate succession their alienage has prevented them from receiving national treatment,- and they shall b.e permitted a term of at least five.years in which to effect such -disposition.”
Plaintiff argues this provision means that if a Greek' national is prevented by his' alienage from acquiring by succession property in a state in the same manner an American national may acquire it, the-Greek shall be permitted to dispose of the property within five years. In other-words, it is plaintiff’s contention that Article IX of the treaty- provides Greeks shall be able to acquire property in the United States but the states may place restrictions on its acquisition. And' if they do, the Greek shall have up to five years to dispose of his property. "
-The article by Professor Boyd in 47 Iowa Law Review 105, 116, 117, refers to a number of recent treaties of “Friendship, Commerce and Navigation”, as this treaty is designated, between the United States and a foreign country which “have required that the alien beneficiaries dispose of the property within five years.”
An article by Professor Boyd in 51 Michigan Law Review 1001, 1016; states: “The predominant treaty right granted to aliens is a qualified one. The alien is allowed a specified period .of time in which to liquidate the realty and remove the proceeds without restraint or interference from the country in which it is situated. By this method the states are left to determine their own policies concerning the holding of realty by aliens and at the same time the alien is allowed the'markét value of the property and forfeiture is avoided.”
Professor Boyd observes at page 118 of his article, supra, in the Iowa Law Review, “It is often said that treaties are to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the spirit of the nations’ agreement.”
The United Statés Supreme Court has said: “Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be preferred.” (Citation) Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 487, 25 L. Ed. 628, 629. Doehrel v. Hillmer, *26supra, 102 Iowa 169, 172, 71 N.W. 204, 205, quotes this with approval.
If Article IX, 2, of the treaty here is fairly susceptible of the meaning plaintiff ascribes to it, and I think it is, it seems clear the restriction on ownership of property contained in our Code section 567.8, on which the majority decides this case, is suspended or rendered ineffective by the treaty unless the Greek national attempts to hold the property longer than five years. Plaintiff appears to have a valid claim under the terms of this treaty to the property in controversy here. The more restrictive and conflicting provisions of our Code section 567.8 are ineffective as to plaintiff’s ward and plaintiff is not required to prove the existence of reciprocal rights as the statute contemplates.
I think Doehrel v. Hillmer, supra, 102 Iowa 169, 71 N.W. 204, and Ahrens v. Ahrens, 144 Iowa 486, 489, 123 N.W. 164, Ann. Cas. 1912A 1098, tend to support this view. The Ahrens opinion states, “That the right to sell canned with it the ownership as a necessary incident to the power of sale is held by all the authorities.”
I understand the principal basis of the majority’s decision is plaintiff’s failure to prove that under Greek law no restriction not reciprocal is placed on the right of nationals of the United States to inherit property in Greece and we are told plaintiff had the burden to establish such reciprocal right. It is true our Code section 567.8, paragraph 2, so- provides. However, the treaty contains no' such provision and it is “the supreme law of the land.” The requirement of our statute is more restrictive than the provisions of the treaty and they control. The effect of the majority opinion is that more restrictive provisions of section 567.8, paragraph 2, are made to supersede the treaty.
I would reverse.
THOMPSON, Sneld and MooRE, JJ., join in this dissent.