dissenting.
Law is qualified by degree to teach industrial arts and did teach some industrial arts from 1981 until his nonrenewal in 1986. It is that synthesis of qualifications and experience that underlies Law’s argument that under the RIF policy, he should have been compared with the industrial arts teachers, but was not.
Like the majority, I agree that the trial court was wrong in holding that the reduction-in-force policy was not contractual and that even if it were contractual, the policy did not apply to the facts in this case. However, I dissent from the majority’s approval of the trial court’s finding that the “evidence of Law’s credentials in industrial arts and the qualifications of the other teachers were considered and this issue was fairly presented” to the school board.
I believe Dobervich v. Central Cass Public School District, 302 N.W.2d 745 (N.D.1981), is instructive on how we should review a trial court’s review of whether a school board did what it was called upon to do. In Dobervich, it was a statute that directed the school board to do a particular thing. It would be sheer legerdemain to draw a distinction between a statutory mandate to a school board and a contractual mandate. Whether it is the legislature or a contract that defines what the school board must do, it seems to me, the board must do it in either event.
In Dobervich the issue was whether the school board followed the statutory requirement that it give serious consideration to the damage to a teacher’s professional status and reputation resulting from nonre-newal. We concluded that a mere statement on the record that a school board considered such matter “is neither decisive nor indicative of whether or not the board 'took this matter into consideration....” Dovervich, supra at 753. Rather, “whether or not the board has met this obligation of the statute is to be determined from the entire record.” Dobervich, supra at 754.
I have carefully reviewed the entire record. Not only is there no statement that the board considered a comparison of Law with the other three industrial arts teachers, there is precious little indication that such a comparison was considered at all, and no indication that the issue was fairly presented.
In my view, the record does not sustain the trial court’s finding that the issue of relative credentials and qualifications was fairly presented or considered.
The administration offered no evidence upon which the board could have evaluated Law’s credentials or performance against those of the other three industrial arts teachers. That is so because the administration misinterpreted the RIF policy to make such a comparison unnecessary because Law was hired for building trades and there were no other building trades teachers to compare him with. Thus, the administration misconstrued the RIF policy and then made its recommendation based on its misconstruction.
While Law argued to the board that the policy had been incorrectly interpreted by the administration and that his credentials and experience were better than the other industrial arts teachers, that is hardly the procedure envisaged by the RIF policy. Even the majority agrees that the RIF policy was meant to be a benefit to the teachers. It can hardly be a benefit for a teacher to bear the burden of presenting to the board what is, under the RIF policy, the administration’s responsibility — an objective comparison of qualifications based on the administration’s exercise of judgment after examining all of the data available to the administration. Information *383about the other teachers’ backgrounds is far more accessible to the administration. Comparative data, presented to the Board by the administration, is also free from any gloss of self-interest.
The policy provides that it is the administration that is to implement the RIF policy in the first instance by comparing the teachers and making a recommendation for nonrenewal based on that comparison. That procedure was not followed. The procedure which was followed and which the trial court approved, and the majority condones, reminds me of the scenario where a trial court instructs the jury that a white male may not be found liable for negligent conduct. The attorney for the plaintiff then argues to the jury that a white male most certainly may be held negligent. The jury finds the white male defendant not negligent. Would we say that the jury heard the argument of counsel and proceeded to affirm its verdict? I doubt it. The analogy, I believe, is fair and, therefore, I dissent.