dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Footnote 2 of the majority opinion explains better than I can, the basis for my dissent. So long as Rogelstad v. Farmers Un. Grain Term. Ass’n, Inc., 226 N.W.2d 370 (N.D.1975), is good law, then we are obliged to review a trial court’s denial of class action status, with scrutiny akin to the strict scrutiny we employ in our review of certain constitutional issues, or, as the majority suggests, de novo review. I say this because of the rule articulated in Rogelstad, but not followed by the majority, that this court will not hesitate to overrule and reverse a trial court’s determination denying class action status in order to accomplish the remedial objectives of the class action rule. Rogel-stad thus articulated a clear policy of interpretation of Rule 23 that would “provide an open and receptive attitude toward class actions.”
A statement that we will not hesitate to overrule a trial court’s denial of class action status is a pronouncement that class action is favored in this state and there had better be compelling reasons for denying it. While we have also stated that our standard of review of an order denying class action status is abuse of discretion, Saba v. Counties of Barnes, Benson, Etc., 307 N.W.2d 590, 593 (N.D.1981), Rogelstad clearly expands the customary, limited scope of that review.
It seems to me that the majority ought to explicitly overrule Rogelstad, instead of continuing to cite it while ignoring its pre*86cepts. As it stands, the majority implicitly overrules Rogelstad’s pronouncement that Rule 23 is to be interpreted openly and favorably to class actions and that we will not hesitate to overrule denials of class action status.
Applying the Rogelstad rule to this case, in my view, requires reversal of the denial of class action. The reasons given by the trial court for denying class action status disintegrate when the nature of this particular lawsuit is considered in light of the remedial objectives promoted by Rule 23.1 The plaintiffs want resolved the issue of whether the Highway Commissioner must follow certain procedures before removing interim permitted signs. In order to achieve uniform application of procedural requirements deemed necessary by the court before the removal of any sign, the plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order prohibiting the removal of interim permitted signs. Initially, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting the removal of all interim permitted signs. Had this restraining order not been amended, it would have benefited all potential members of the class and obviated the need for a class action. See, e.g., Gray v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 73 F.R.D. 638, 641 (D.D.C.1977), and cases cited therein.
However, the temporary restraining order was amended, leaving the Highway Commissioner free to remove all interim permitted signs leased by advertisers not named in the action. Class certification is thus necessary to avoid repetitious litigation of the same issue by advertisers not named in this case and to prevent inconsistent and unfair treatment of the advertisers by the Highway Commissioner. Rule 23 is a procedural tool designed to meet these objectives. See Rogelstad, supra at 376. See also 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1754 (2d ed. 1986).
The trial court and the majority agree that management of the class would pose unusual difficulties because the membership of the class is subject to change as new advertising leases are entered into and old leases expire. However, the fact that a class is subject to constant change weighs in favor of class certification, rather than against. See Leist v. Shawano County, 91 F.R.D. 64, 67 (E.D.Wis.1981); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 F.R.D. 619, 624 (E.D.Pa.1976). It is only when management difficulties make a class action less fair and efficient than some other method, such as individual interventions or consolidation of individual lawsuits, that a class action is improper. 1 Newberg, Class Actions, § 4.32 at 338 (2 ed. 1977).
In this case, a class action enhances fairness and efficiency because advertisers entering into new leases automatically become members of the class and will not have to initiate separate lawsuits in order to prevent the removal of the interim permitted signs displaying their messages. The Highway Commissioner also benefits from class certification because all advertisers notified of the action are bound by the decision of the trial court, thus putting to an end the claims of the advertisers in one lawsuit. Additionally, the potential for constant change in the membership of the class makes joinder impracticable. See, e.g., Leist v. Shawano County, supra; Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, supra. Thus, the requirement that joinder of all members is impracticable is met in this case.
Another concern expressed by the trial court and reiterated by the majority is the differences in the advertising contracts and the content of the messages displayed. While there may be differences in the length of the leases and the content of the messages, the issue sought to be determined by the representative plaintiffs, whether the Highway Commissioner may remove interim permitted signs without *87giving notice to the class members and without classifying and prioritizing the signs before removal, is common to all members of the class. The differences in the advertising leases are irrelevant because the advertising contracts are not at issue in this case. The representative plaintiffs seek to adjudicate the appropriate procedure for the removal of the signs, not specific priorities. If, at the completion of the lawsuit, the trial court were to determine that the Highway Commissioner had the duty to classify or prioritize the signs before removal, the class could be fixed for that purpose. Thus, the differences in the advertising contracts have no bearing on the common interest of the class members in determining whether the Highway Commissioner must follow certain procedures before removing the interim permitted signs.
Finally, the trial court found that other means of adjudicating the claims and defenses are not impracticable or inefficient. Pervasive in the trial court’s reasoning in denying class certification is its reliance upon the notion that other advertisers can intervene in the action. This rationale overlooks or miscalculates both the impracticability of joinder and the inadequacies of requiring intervention in this case due to the limited scope of the temporary restraining order.
Denying class action status in this case defeats the remedial objectives of Rule 23 by preventing the resolution of a common issue in a single action and by opening the door to repetitious litigation and potentially inconsistent adjudications involving the duties of the Highway Commissioner to the advertisers. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order denying class action status and remand the case for further proceedings.
MESCHKE, J., concurs.. Although related to the Newman Signs cases cited by the majority, this is a separate case involving different parties and issues and should be viewed on its own merits. If the trial court knew as much about the ulterior motives of Newman Signs from previous litigation as the majority deduces, then perhaps it should have disqualified itself in order to permit Rule 23 to be applied with the receptive attitude mandated by Rogelstad.