dissenting:
At issue is whether a successfully completed court supervision constitutes a prior conviction for purposes of section 6 — 303(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6 — 303(d) (West 2006)). Because I believe that it cannot, I respectfully dissent.
Section 6 — 303(d) of the Vehicle Code requires that “[a]ny person convicted of a second violation of this Section shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/6 — 303(d) (West 2006). Simply put, in order to be convicted of a second violation under section 6 — 303(d) a defendant must have been convicted of a first violation under this section. The record is clear that the instant offense is the defendant’s first conviction under the Act. His previous arrest, for which he successfully completed a term of court supervision, was discharged “without adjudication of guilt.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 6—3.1(f) (West 2006).
A conviction is statutorily defined as “a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense.” 720 ILCS 5/2 — 5 (West 2006). For there to be a conviction, there must have been a judgment of conviction or sentence. Here, the defendant, having successfully completed a term of court supervision, there is no judgment of conviction. Thus, he was not convicted of a previous violation.
The majority’s focus on the dependent clause “and shall not be termed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime,” is misplaced. That phrase may, as the majority notes, speak to the issue whether successful completion of supervision affects rights such as the right to vote. However, such is not the issue in this matter. The phrase quoted by the majority does not negate the fact that completion of supervision is not a conviction. The statute clearly states that completion of supervision is not an adjudication of guilt {i.e., a conviction) and shall not be termed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disability imposed by other law.
I also disagree with the majority’s reading of People v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298, 301 (1995). “There can be no dispute that the term ‘committed,’ in its ordinary sense, has a broader scope than the term ‘convicted.’ ” Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d at 306. Here, the statute at issue, unlike the one at issue in Sheehan, provides for felony status only where the defendant was previously “convicted” of the same offense, not where he had “committed” the same offense.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand for further proceedings. I therefore, respectfully, dissent.