(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
What law applies to Lillian J. Bergham-mer’s claim for loss of consortium ?
The parties do not raise constitutional issues but are in disagreement as to the law which is applicable to that claim. Minnesota law appears to apply under the “most significant relationships” test. Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa). But what Minnesota law — the law which the Minnesota courts hold to be applicable or the law which we may differently hold to apply?
Involved here is a problem of the applicable law in two dimensions. Conventional conflict of laws principles deal with different laws geographically. That question is not difficult here; as seen, Minnesota law applies. We may therefore put that question aside.
But the present case also involves different laws temporally. Between the time of the collision and the trial, the Minnesota law on consortium was changed by judicial decision. Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865.
Three legal issues must be considered. What law, temporally, is usually applicable to a claim? With respect to this claim, what is the applicable law according to the Minnesota courts? What is the applicable law according to us ?
I. Different Laws Temporally. When only one state is involved but different laws exist in point of time, the substantive law as of the time of an occurrence is applied to that occurrence, rather than the law as of the time of the trial. 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, 1 n. 1, 2 (1935) (“Some proper law must have governed the juridical situation at the time of its occurrence”). Applying the law as of the time of trial would mean that the results in litigation, even within one state, would differ according to the time trial was held. “Choice of the law * * * at the time of trial * * * is contrary to stability and fundamental justice.” Stimson, Conflict of Laws, 3 (1963). Thus in a Minnesota trial concerning a Minnesota collision involving Minnesota people, the Minnesota courts apply the Minnesota substantive law as of the time of the collision, just as in an Iowa trial concerning an Iowa collision involving Iowa people, the Iowa courts apply Iowa substantive law as of the time of the collision. Schultz v. Gosselink, 260 Iowa 115, 148 N.W.2d 434.
II. Law "As of Occurrence” According to Minnesota Courts. The difficulty is *237that the law in force as of the time of a collision does not necessarily remain the law which is applicable to that time. Although the law as of the time of the occurrence governs claims arising from that occurrence, the legislature can at a later time retroactively change that law. Then the law applicable to the occurrence is the new law. 50 Am.Jur. Statutes §§ 478 at 494, 479 at 501, 482 at 505; 82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 415 at 990, 421 at 996.
Judicial decisions have traditionally operated retroactively (as well as prospectively). Thus a decisional change in the law relating to consortium, such as in Thill, would normally be retrospective, so that recovery could be had for loss of consortium in trials after Thill based on occurrences before Thill. The subsequent decision “relates back” to prior occurrences. Formerly this result was based on the thought that judges merely “discover” common law rules. When a prior rule is changed by decision, “the subsequent judges do not pretend to make new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. They do not decide that the former decision was bad law, but that it was not law.” Blackstone, Commentaries, 41-42 (Gavitt Ed.1941).
Blackstone’s theory is no longer recognized, and today courts sometimes restrict the application of a decision to future occurrences. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360. As stated in Annotation, Overruling Decision—Application, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1377-1378:
Under the classical view that the courts merely discovered and announced existing law, which they had no hand in creating, no issue of restricting the rule of an overruling case to prospective operation could be presented, since the act of overruling was a confession that the earlier rule had been erroneous and should never have been applied at all; but the modern decisions, taking a more pragmatic view of the judicial function, have recognized the power of a court to hold that an overruling decision is operative prospectively only and is not even operative upon the rights of the parties to the overruling case. As a matter of constitutional law, retroactive operation of an overruling decision is neither required nor prohibited.
This court has recognized that judicial decisions may be limited to prospective operation. State v. Wisniewski, 171 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa).
What did the Minnesota Supreme Court do here? In Thill, it recognized a wife’s claim for loss of consortium and overruled its prior decisions, but it restricted the new rule to future occurrences. Consequently according to the Minnesota Court, the law in force at the time of a prior claim, such as we have here, remains the same as when the collision took place. Mrs. Berg-hammer’s claim for consortium, if asserted in the Minnesota courts, would fail.
III. Law "As of Occurrence” According to Iowa. We apply Minnesota law in this case. Do we apply the Minnesota law on the nonretrospectivity of Thill ?
The law of a state as to the applicability of its own laws temporally would appear to be part of the substantive law of that state. Thus if the Minnesota legislature enacted a statute creating or abolishing liability for loss of consortium, and expressly provided the act is prospective only, could the courts of another state applying Minnesota law disregard that express provision of the statute? So with judicial decisions can a claimant cite Thill in support of her consortium claim and disregard Thill’s restricted application as to time ?
The law of a state as to prospectivity or retrospectivity of its laws is not a part of the conflict of laws rules of that state. We ordinarily understand conflict of laws rules to relate to the applicability of laws geographically. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 1, Comment c; 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, 1 (1935); Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, 309 (1962). When we apply the *238law of another state, we do not apply its conflict of laws rules, but we do apply its other relevant substantive law. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 7(b); 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws, 55 (1935); Leflar, American Conflicts Law, 11 (1968). Such other relevant substantive law would seem to include its law on prospectivity and ret-rospectivity.
Any other conclusion would mean additional uncertainty in the already uncertain conflict of laws principles, and “certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result” are important objectives in the conflict of laws field as in other branches of law. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267, 279. If we should say, we will apply Minnesota law to an incident but not the law the Minnesota courts apply, we would not be applying Minnesota law; we would be applying some law of our own. If the Minnesota legislature provides or the Minnesota courts hold that a statute or decision operates prospectively only but we apply it retrospectively, saying we are applying Minnesota law, then Minnesota must have two laws — the Minnesota law in Minnesota and the Minnesota law in Iowa. A litigant in Minnesota would get one result; another litigant suing in Iowa because of some fortuitous circumstance, such as acquisition of jurisdiction of the defendant here, would get another result — although Minnesota law is supposedly applied in both cases. Such is the situation which Stimson describes as “contrary to stability and fundamental justice.” Stimson, Conflict of Laws, 3 (1963).
Decisions which involve the problem indicate that laws of another state applied prospectively there are so applied by the state of the forum. Spriggs v. Dredge, 74 Ohio Law Abst. 264, 140 N.E.2d 45 (Ohio App.) (Ohio applying Alabama law denying death claims as of time of the death, not Alabama law allowing such claims as of time of the trial); Livermore v. Planet Corp., 12 App.Div.2d 25, 208 N.Y.S.2d 1 (New York applying Michigan law recognizing common law marriages as of time of the marriage, not Michigan law outlawing such marriage as of time of the trial); Clews v. Stiles, 181 F.Supp. 172 (D.N.M.) (federal court applying New Mexico Law denying jurisdiction over nonresidents as of time of the incident, not New Mexico law assuming such jurisdiction as of time of the trial).
Iowa courts applying Minnesota substantive law should apply the Minnesota law pertaining to the applicability of Minnesota laws as to time. The present claim for loss of consortium would be dismissed in Minnesota and should be dismissed here.
The motion to dismiss appeal should be overruled and the judgments for plaintiffs should be affirmed, except the judgment for plaintiff Lillian J. Berghammer, which should be reversed.
MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, J., join in this special concurrence and dissent.