dissenting:
The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act is in derogation of the common law action against local public entities. It must therefore be strictly construed against the public entity involved. Aikens v. Morris, 145 Ill. 2d 273, 278 (1991). Applying this strict construction, I would hold that plaintiff may proceed against defendants pursuant to sections 6 — 106(c) and 6 — 106(d) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/6— 106(c), (d) (West 1992)). Sections 6 — 106(c) and 6 — 106(d) specify that public entities and their employees are not exonerated from liability for injuries proximately caused by their negligence in prescribing or administering treatment for physical illness. There is no question that defendants prescribed and administered treatment for the decedent’s illness in the case before us. The problem with their conduct, and the reason they are not immune, is that after they ascertained that the decedent was afflicted with a physical condition that posed a hazard to her health, they prescribed a course of care that was fatally deficient. Instead of ordering mammograms and biopsies, chemotherapy or surgery, defendants relegated the decedent to a passive régimen of waiting and watching, and they waited too long.
Because the wrong remedy was wrongly administered, defendants’ conduct falls squarely within the terms of subsections (c) and (d) of section 6 — 106. Any other conclusion is inconsistent with the public policy underlying that statute, which “militates in favor of holding public employees liable for negligently prescribing or administering treatment which causes injury.” O’Brien v. Township High School District 214, 83 Ill. 2d 462, 468 (1980). Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed, and the cause should be remanded for further proceedings. I therefore dissent.