(concurring specially).
I concur in the result but perhaps for somewhat different reasons than the majority. I believe our statement in Tiffany I that “defendants’ merger defense is, at the present time, meritorious,” 400 N.W.2d at 578, was only intended to place that issue back in the case for whatever role it deserved to play. The merger issue was not before this court for final decision in Tiffany I. It was up to the district court to first consider it on remand following the first appeal. I submit the result reached by the district court was correct.
I differ with the majority concerning its conclusions that, as a general proposition, the debt should survive the entry of the in rem judgment. As a general proposition, it should not. If a personal judgment is entered against the debtor, the debt survives as embodied in the judgment. Ordinarily, however, in a case where the court has personal jurisdiction over a debtor, the entry of a judgment which is only in rem cancels the debt and replaces it with a lien on the property against which the in rem judgment is entered. As we indicated in Tiffany I, ordinarily a judgment given for less than the full relief available will be interpreted as a denial of further relief. Id. Consequently, the bar aspects of the res judicata doctrine are implicated as well as the merger aspects.
There is, however, room for some flexibility in applying the res judicata doctrine. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Iowa 1981). The *589reasons the plaintiff should not be subjected to that result in the present case lie in (a) the paramount role the federal bankruptcy court played in the transaction, and (b) our statutory prohibition against joinder of the mortgage foreclosure action and the replevin action.
The orders of the bankruptcy court in the present case precluded any personal judgment against the debtor. In plaintiffs effort to achieve satisfaction from the collateral which the bankruptcy court made available, it had no choice but to seek in rem satisfaction against different property in separate actions. Under the circumstances, it would be inequitable to give preclusive effect to the judgment in either action as against the claims in the other action, except as necessary to preclude a double recovery.