dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the majority’s reasons for reversing the ruling of the trial court amount to nothing more than a substitution of its factual findings for those of the trial court. It is well established that a trial court’s determination of whether removal is in a child’s best interests should not be reversed unless it is clearly against the manifest weight of evidence and it has resulted in manifest injustice. In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316, 328 (1988). Precisely because removal actions are so fact specific, and because of the trial court’s far superior ability to observe and evaluate the parents and children, the Eckert court enunciated a policy of deference to the trial court ruling as the appropriate standard of review. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 330.
In rendering its decision, the trial court evaluated the Eckert factors. It found no improper motive on either parent’s part in seeking or opposing removal. The court further found that (1) petitioner would substantially enhance her quality of life by moving to Massachusetts and thus the move would indirectly benefit Tyler; (2) petitioner could not find employment in Illinois similar to her employment opportunity in Massachusetts; (3) petitioner’s fiancé could assist petitioner financially but could not relocate his business to Illinois; (4) the school systems in Illinois and Massachusetts are comparable and reasonably close to a large metropolitan area; (5) the “enhanced quality of life” factor shows that the existing joint custody arrangement has already resulted in the separation of Tyler and his brother because they live in separate households, attend separate schools, and have a five-year age difference, which reasonably has or will shortly create a diversity of interest between them; (6) under the proposed visitation schedule, the actual time Tyler would spend with his father would be comparable to that under the existing schedule; and (7) the traveling time involved would not be more than if petitioner were to move to southern Illinois.
In its analysis, the majority fails to demonstrate that the trial court’s findings were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. The majority notes that moving to Massachusetts would benefit Tyler only indirectly through the direct benefit his mother would derive from marrying her fiancé. The majority goes on to say that such an indirect benefit is not determinative. The trial court made note of this proposition as well in its written decision, and there is no indication that it placed too much emphasis on the “indirect benefit” factor. Thus, I fail to see how the court’s treatment of this issue renders its decision contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
The majority also finds fault with the trial court’s determinations regarding the proposed visitation schedule, stating that it would require Tyler to spend too much time away from his new home in Massachusetts. The majority seems to forget that it is not our job to second-guess the trial court’s decisions on such matters, but only to determine whether they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court in this case fashioned a schedule that would give Tyler approximately the same amount of time with his father that he has now. In order to do so, however, Tyler must travel to Illinois during most of his school vacations. While this proposed schedule is more inconvenient than the current arrangement, it is a reasonable and realistic method of handling an obviously disruptive event in Tyler’s life. It also would allow Tyler to maintain a close relationship with his father despite the physical distance between them.
In sum, I would affirm the trial court because the trial court was in the best position to observe Tyler, his parents, and the other witnesses and to evaluate their temperaments, predilections and capabilities in determining Tyler’s best interest. The majority’s reasons for reversing the trial court do nothing more than substitute its viewpoints for those of the trial court and, therefore, violate the requirement that the reviewing court give deference to the trial court’s findings.