dissenting.
Although I agree that Justice Vande Walle has properly stated much of the law applicable to determinations of the width of prescriptive roads, I think he has misapplied it to this case. First of all, I believe that the Minnesota case, Barfnecht, cited and relied upon in the majority opinion should be distinguished and should not apply here. A roadway through flatlands does not require the lateral support that is obviously required when the roadway is traversing a slope, such as is shown on the photographs in evidence in this case.
Secondly, findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness under Rule 52(a), NDRCivP. See, 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2585. Rask did not overcome any presumption. He failed to criticize any of the findings of fact. Appellate courts ought to let the attorney for the appellant state what issues he raises on appeal. Only then can appellees respond appropriately.
After answering both of Rask’s questions — as they have been, in effect, answered in the majority opinion — the judgment should be affirmed. (1) Was it reversible error to admit into evidence Exhibit Number 27? The answer is “no.” (2) Does the Mandan ordinance determine the width of all roads in Mandan? The answer is “no.” If Rask’s comment that the trial court treated the Mandan ordinance as overriding — really also raises a separate issue — I would dispose of that without comment because it is not borne out in the findings of fact or conclusions of law.
' The finding of fact that the maintenance of the Keidel-Rask road requires a 60-foot right-of-way is not based on a misinterpretation of the ordinance. There is engineering opinion that that is the minimum needed. I do not agree that trial judges should have to make negative findings in order to prove to us that the decision is not based upon an erroneous view of the law.
The Keidel-Rask road is a short road. It would be impractical to require witnesses to *412say that a varying right-of-way width is required for maintenance. Likewise, it would be inappropriate for them to testify that the width should be 59 feet or 61 feet merely to prove that the ordinance was not being misapplied.
Finally, it is my opinion that the majority opinion fails to afford appropriate consideration to the effect on appellate review when there has been a viewing of the premises. If viewing witnesses make the trial judge the final judge of the credibility of their testimony, certainly a view of the premises gives the trial judge some advantages that we do not have when the lay of the land is a significant factor. See, Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510, 514 (N.D.1973); Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603, 607 (N.D.1957); Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622, 626 (1921); 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts, § 40; 76 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 1247; 83 CJS, Stipulations, § 26a, n. 17; and 18 A.L.R.3d 572.
Neighborly road disputes, like Hatfield v. McCoy, have a tendency to continue from one generation to the next. This one ought to end here and now.