Attorneys representing Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association (herein called “the company”) filed in the district court of Mahaska County application under sections 141.22 to 141.25, Code, 1950, for an order for disinterment of the dead body of Dr. Fred J. Jarvis for the purpose of holding an autopsy. The application was resisted by Doctor Jarvis’s widow. After hearing evidence offered by both applicant and resister the district court granted the application and Mrs. Jarvis has appealed to us.
Decedent, a retired physician, age 77, was injured in an automobile accident on January 20, 1952. His right leg was broken at the knee, his right arm and shoulder and the right side of his chest were bruised and perhaps otherwise injured. The following day he was taken to a hospital in Iowa City where he died at 12:47 p.m., January 24. That afternoon his body was returned to Oskaloosa where it was embalmed by a licensed embalmer in late afternoon or early evening. He was buried January 28.
*1027The widow is beneficiary in two accident insurance policies for a total amount of $12,250. One policy was issued by the company represented by applicant, the other was assumed by it. The former policy insures against loss of Doctor Jarvis’s life, limb, sight or time resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries sustained through purely accidental means. Terms of the other policy are generally similar.
The certificate of death made by Dr. Arthur Steindler, attending physician, gives “cerebral hemorrhage” as the condition directly leading to Doctor Jarvis’s death and gives no antecedent causes. Doctor Steindler’s signed statement, part of the beneficiary’s proof of claim furnished the company, states “cere-brovascular accident” was the primáry cause of death, and “pneumonitis” was the secondary or contribnting cause. The former term is the substantial equivalent of cerebral hemorrhage and does not mean a traumatic injury. Pneumonitis is another name for pneumonia.
The beneficiary contends and the company denies death was accidental within the meaning of the policies. On June 16, 1952, the company commenced action against Mrs. Jarvis in the United States District Court at Ottumwa asking that its liability and the beneficiary’s rights under the policies be declared and adjudged. In this action the company contends it is liable only for accidental disability benefits and not for insured’s death.
While this application for disinterment was pending Mrs. Jarvis commenced action against the company in the district court of Mahaska County to recover the full amount of the policies on account of her husband’s death. This action was transferred to the United States court and consolidated with the action there commenced by the company. The consolidated causes remained undisposed of when the disinterment application was heard and decided in September 1952.
Section 141.22, Code, 1950, states: “Disinterment for autopsy. No person shall disinter the dead body of a human being for the purpose of holding an autopsy thereon in order to determine the canse of death without obtaining for that purpose either:
*1028“1. An order of the district court of tbe county in which the body is buried, or
“2. A special permit from the state department of health.”
Section 141.24 provides:- “Application for court order. An application for a court order for a disinterment for the purpose of holding an autopsy may be made by the county attorney, coroner, or any attorney representing any party in any criminal or civil proceedings. * * *.”
Section 141.25 states: “Granting of application. No application for a permit to disinter for the purpose of holding an autopsy shall be granted * * except under circumstances such as to cause the belief that someone is criminally or civilly liable for such death. A proper showing shall be made in every case and due consideration shall be given to the public health, the dead, and the feelings of relatives and friends. * * *.”
In re Disinterment of Tow, 243 Iowa 695, 53 N.W.2d 283, a proceeding like that now before us, considers these statutes and holds our review of such a proceeding is not de novo but is rather “somewhat in the nature of certiorari.” Pursuant to this Tow decision counsel for appellant, Mrs. Jarvis, conceded upon submission of this appeal it is not reviewable de novo and if there is competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings they are conclusive upon us. The Tow case also holds (at page 700 of 243 Iowa, page 286 of 53 N.W.2d): “It is sufficient to show there is reasonable likelihood that an autopsy would either confirm or negative the claim of the insurer-applicant.” The cited case affirms an order for disinterment although some questions were there raised by the widow which we do not have here.
I. The trial court found there is reasonable likelihood an autopsy would determine the cause of death and thereby confirm or negative the respective claims of the litigants. Appellant argues in substance no proper showing was made that warrants this finding. We think, however, there is substantial evidence to support the finding and it is therefore conclusive upon us.
Appellee offered the testimony of Doctor Birge of Des Moines, a pathologist of wide experience.' Appellant offered the *1029evidence of Doctor Phelps of Ottumwa, apparently younger and less experienced. The testimony of each witness fills some sixty pages of the record. We shall not attempt to review it. It is apparent Doctor Birge feels it is reasonably probable an autopsy would disclose the condition that caused decedent’s cerebral hemorrhage. In effect he so testifies more than once.
Doctor Phelps expresses the opinion an autopsy would not in all probability establish the cause of death. “I doubt very seriously that an autopsy at this time would be conclusive.” However, Doctor Phelps admits in effect that if the embalming was adequate the autopsy would probably reveal any one of several recognized causes of cerebral hemorrhage such as brain tumor, arteriosclerosis, and traumatic injury to the brain. He also admits in substance that autopsies are very frequently performed for the purpose of determining the cause of death of persons who die under somewhat similar circumstances and says it would be advisable to have an autopsy upon one who dies from cerebral hemorrhage with no clinical symptoms present. Near the end of his cross-examination Doctor Phelps concludes it is very definitely possible an autopsy could show the cause of death.
Much of appellant’s argument as to the claimed lack of evidence to support the trial court’s finding is based on some of the cross-examination of the undertaker who did the embalming. He testifies on direct examination by appellee that he is a licensed embalmer and followed the usual procedure of embalming here. On cross-examination he says in part Doctor Jarvis’s “circulation wasn’t what I would call real good. * * * I wouldn’t say we had a good embalming job.” He adds that deterioration or decomposition of the body would be more rapid than if there was a good embalming job.
However, the undertaker testifies on redirect examination that the embalming fluid was inserted into the carotid artery which directly serves the.brain and he has no way of knowing that a satisfactory job of embalming was not done in the brain. Appellant’s witness Doctor Phelps testifies he would not say Doctor Jarvis’s leg fracture would obstruct circulation of the embalming fluid — it would require only entering the blood ves-*1030seis beyond tbe fractured place. He also says there would be no reason to question the circulation through the brain of embalming fluid inserted into the carotid artery.
We deem further discussion of the evidence unnecessary.
II. Appellant contends appellee’s application should have been denied because it is said to be unreasonable and not seasonably made. The contention cannot be sustained under the circumstances here.
There are several answers to appellant’s argument the company should have asked for an autopsy before burial. The policies are not before us. There is no evidence either policy gives the company any right to an autopsy at any time. It seems apparent any request by the company for an autopsy would probably not have been granted. Appellant did not furnish the company a claim for accidental death benefits until about February 22, 1952 (burial was on January .28). So far as shown this claim is the first information the company had that death was caused by cerebral hemorrhage. Before then there was no reason for the company to doubt that death was accidental and hence no reason to seek an autopsy.
This application was filed under Code sections 141.22 et seq. Unless such an application is made by the county attorney or coroner it may be made only by an “attorney representing any party in any criminal or civil proceedings.” (Section 141.24.) It is apparent from these statutes and In re Disinterment of Tow, supra, 243 Iowa 695, 53 N.W.2d 283, that the proceedings referred to are those which involve the cause of death. Such proceedings are frequently not commenced until at least some little time after death.
Here no such proceeding was started until the company commenced its action in the federal court on June 16, 1952. Before then no one representing the company was entitled to apply for' a court order for disinterment. Appellant commenced no action against the company until after, this application was filed on July 8.
This application was set for hearing July 22 but appellee was unable to get service of notice upon appellant because of her absence from the jurisdiction, and the hearing was not held until September 10 and 11. The matter was promptly decided. *1031After tbe appeal to tbis court, one of tbe justices issued a stay-order on October 13 which appellee resisted. Any delay that occurred after tbis application was filed seems not to be chargeable to appellee.
One of tbe principal reasons for resisting this application is, in appellant’s words, “I just don’t like tbe idea” of an autopsy. Tbis objection, wbicb is of course understandable, would seem to have no stronger appeal than if tbe application bad been filed earlier. In re Disinterment of Tow, supra, 243 Iowa 695, 53 N.W.2d 283, considers an application for disinterment filed about three months after death where tbe widow bad promptly commenced what we there bold was a eiyil proceeding involving tbe cause of death. As previously stated we affirmed tbe order for disinterment.
Our statutes fix no time limit for filing such an application. We should not write one into tbe statutes here. Conceding any right to a court order for disinterment may be lost by unreasonable delay in applying for it, there is insufficient basis for reversing tbis order on tbe ground there was such delay here.
Tbe public policy of tbis state in tbe matter of disinterment has been declared by the legislature in tbe above statutes and it is our duty to take them as we find them. See State v. Bruntlett, 240 Iowa 338, 355, 356, 36 N.W.2d 450, 460 (“Tbe legislature, and not tbis court, declares the public policy of tbis state. * * * We are limited both by law and conscience to tbe judicial function of faithfully interpreting and applying tbe law as we find it.”); Vilas v. Board of Assessment and Review, 223 Iowa 604, 620, 273 N.W. 338; Brutsche v. Coon Rapids, 223 Iowa 487, 501, 502, 272 N.W. 624; Kuhn v. Kuhn, 125 Iowa 449, 453, 101 N.W. 151, 2 Ann. Cas. 657; 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, section 139, page 815 (“* * * tbe rule has become securely settled that all questions of policy áre for tbe determination of tbe legislature, and not for tbe courts.”); 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, section 154, page 477.
Appellant cites Robertson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 232 Iowa 743, 755-757, 6 N.W.2d 153, 159, 160; United States F. & G. Co. v. Hood, 124 Miss. 548, 87 So. 115, 15 A. L. R. 605, and annotation 614; McCulloch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New *1032York, 4 Cir., W. Va., 109 F.2d 866; annotation 88 A. L. R. 984; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, sections 1128, 1129, for tbe proposition a demand for an autopsy must be reasonable and seasonably made. We have carefully considered these and like authorities. We find no fault with them but they have little application here.
The cited authorities consider policy provisions for an autopsy where it is sought to avoid liability on the policy because of refusal, to grant the insurer’s request for an autopsy. Such policy provisions are construed most strongly against the insurer, courts are slow to hold a policy is forfeited by refusal to consent to an autopsy and sometimes reject such a contention on the ground the demand for the autopsy was unreasonable or not seasonably made.
III. The trial court’s order provides the pathologist who performs the autopsy “may remove such organs or parts of organs from the body * * * as may be required to effectively perform such autopsy, provided, however, such organs or parts of organs so removed, except only such portions thereof as may be necessary to be subjected to microscopic examination, shall be restored to their normal place in the body prior to reburial.”
Appellant contends chapter 141 does not authorize a party to remove and retain any organ or part of a body. The only portion of the order which could be vulnerable to this contention is that italicized by us. Doctor Birge testifies if he were to perform the autopsy it would be his purpose to shave the brain' and also to keep some slivers of tissue for microscopic examination. In making the part of the order we have italicized the trial court evidently had in mind this testimony.
All appellee claims for the italicized provision is that it relieves the pathologist from any duty to replace shavings or slivers of tissue necessary to subject to microscopic examination. To remove any doubt in this regard, however, the trial court’s order is hereby modified by striking therefrom the above quoted italicized language and inserting in lieu thereof: “except only shavings or such slivers of tissue as may be necessary to subject to microscopic examination.”
The rest of the order is proper. Code sections 141.22 et seq. provide for an autopsy in order to determine the cause of death. *1033“Autopsy” has a recognized meaning. Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Ed., defines it as “Inspection, and usually partial dissection, of a dead bpdy which has been opened so as to expose ■ important organs either to ascertain the cause of death, or, if this is known, the exact nature and extent of the lesions of the disease, and any other abnormalities present; * * « »
Painter Fertilizer Co. v. Boyd, 93 Fla. 354, 359, 114 So. 444, 445, states, “An autopsy is a post-mortem examination, a dissection of a dead body to determine the cause, seat or nature of the disease; * * 7 C. J. S., page 1298, says autopsy is “An examination of a dead body by dissection, to ascertain the cause of death; * * #.”
The testimony of both Doctors Birge and Phelps indicates an autopsy has a recognized meaning among pathologists and it includes removal and replacement of organs and at least partial dissection thereof if reasonably necessary to ascertain the cause of death. The order here as above modified is within the recognized definitions, láy, legal and medical, of autopsy.
Winkler v. Hawkes & Ackley, 126 Iowa 474, 477, 478, 102 N.W. 418, 419, tends to support our conclusion. We there held a widow’s consent to a post-mortem examination for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of death implies “a permission to the surgeons to conduct such examination in the approved and usual manner practiced by their profession; and, if the removal of some of the organs for microscopic examination was necessary or proper to effect the purpose of the post-mortem, then the defendants would not be guilty of an actionable wrong in so doing, unless such permission was expressly withheld * *
Robertson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, 232 Iowa 743, 757-759, 6 N.W.2d 153, 159, 160, cited by appellant, is not in point. There the insurer sought to avoid liability on the policy because of the widow-beneficiary’s refusal of its demand for an autopsy and permission to remove from the body “and to retain such organ or organs or other portions of the body as may be necessary.” We held this defense to the policy was not good because the demand was unreasonable and exceeded the policy provision for an autopsy. It is apparent such demand *1034went much further than the court’s order here. And, as previously explained, we are not now concerned with a policy provision construed most strongly against the insurer.
IV. The record does not support appellant’s complaint that the trial court did not give due regard to the feelings of the family and friends and the public health.
Code section 141.25, above-quoted, requires that “due consideration shall be given to the public health, the dead, and the feelings of relatives and friends.” There is no indication it will adversely affect the public health to carry out the trial court’s order. The court evidently considered very carefully the feelings of relatives and friends who are naturally reluctant to have decedent’s body disinterred. Its Conclusions of Law state: “* * * the Court is not unmindful of the very natural feeling of abhorrence that exists in the minds of the widow and relatives * * * to the proposed disinterment and autopsy, but in circumstances such as here present there is an overriding and overpowering consideration. The quest of the law is ever to ascertain the very truth, and where a means is provided which is reasonably calculated to aid in such quest, the feelings and sentiments of the individual, however sincere and justifiable they may be, cannot .be interposed to defeat the ascertainment of the truth. The Court has given due consideration to the feelings of the widow and relatives and as against a natural reluctance on its part to disturb the quiet and sanctity of the grave, has been compelled to conclude that the exercise of ‘a sound legal discretion’ requires granting the application.”
In re Disinterment of Tow, supra, 243 Iowa 695, 700, 701, 53 N.W.2d 283, 286, considers “the universal sentiments and feelings of mankind as to their dead” and holds, “Our statute has carefully defined the limits within which our legislature thought those sentiments should be disregarded. * * * The result reached has the advantage that its effect is to broaden rather than narrow the search for truth as to the cause of death — a tendency to reveal rather than conceal possible facts bearing on the respective rights of the parties.”
In some instances court orders for disinterment and an autopsy, even without statutory authorization, have been upheld *1035where they are essential to the demands of justice, notwithstanding objections of relatives, “* * * the right to have the body remain undisturbed * * * is not absolute, and must yield where * * * the demands of justice require such subordination.” 25 C. J. S., Dead Bodies, section 4b, page 1023. See also Kusky v. Laderbush, 96 N. H. 286, 74 A.2d 546, 21 A. L. R.2d 536 (where it was held unreasonable to deny a litigant’s motion for an autopsy under proper safeguards), and annotation 538; Gray v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. App. 90, 114 S.W. 635, 22 L. R. A., N. S., 513, 521; Painter v. United States F. & G. Co., 123 Md. 301, 91 A. 158, 160; Ullendorff v. Brown, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So.2d 37, 40; Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Griesa, C. C., Kan., 156 F. 398; 15 Am. Jur., Dead Bodies, section 19.
Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed., section 2221, pages 210, 211, states: “The exhumation or the autopsy of a corpse, when useful to ascertain facts in litigation, should of course be performed. Reverence for the memory of those who have departed does not require us to abdicate the high duty of doing justice to the living * * See also Id., section 2216(d), page 170. Idem, note 4, section 2221, page 210, and the additions thereto in the 1951 Pocket Supplement summarize decisions and statutes on the right to an autopsy.
Appellant’s remaining claim of error is largely a combination of those previously considered and requires no further discussion.
We hold the trial court’s order as modified in Division III hereof is not erroneous in any respect urged by appellant. As so modified it is affirmed. — Modified and affirmed.
SMITH, C. J., and Bliss, Wennerstrum and Larson, JJ., concur. Thompson, Oliver, Mulroney, and Hays, JJ., dissent.