(concurring specially).
I concur in the result only.
I. I am satisfied the showing that defendant breached the statute proscribing the operation of double-bottom trucks 1730 times in a 15-month period justified the trial court’s granting of an injunction. A stronger case could have been made by the State by showing damage to highways resulting from the operation of such vehicles, or the potential hazards to the motoring public due to their operation.
II. However, I cannot, in reflecting upon the broad sweep of the opinion, fail to express my concern over the preceden-tial effect of our affirmance of the trial court here, in future cases where equitable jurisdiction is invoked to enjoin conduct which lies within the proscription of our criminal statutes.
III. In general, injunction is not available to enforce the criminal law. In Martin v. Beaver, 238 Iowa 1143, 1149, 29 N.W.2d 555, 558 (1947), this court enunciated the following general proposition:
“Courts do not ordinarily issue injunctions to prevent criminal acts. Moir v. Moir, 182 Iowa 370, 165 N.W. 1001; 43 C.J.S., Injunctions, § 150. In said section 150 it is said: ‘Except where there is express statutory authority therefor, equity has no criminal jurisdiction, and acts or omissions will not be enjoined merely on the ground that they constitute a violation of law and are punishable as crimes. Under ordinary circumstances a complete and adequate remedy for the violation of the criminal statutes of a state and of municipal ordinances is afforded by the courts of law; and, if a criminal prosecution will constitute an effectual protection against the acts or omissions complained of, no grounds exist for relief by injunction.’ The case then enumerates a number of objections to ‘criminal equity’.
“In 28 Am.Jur. 336, § 148, the same doctrine is announced and it is there stated: ‘It may be observed at the outset that equity is in no sense a court of criminal jurisdiction, and its reluctance to intervene in matters purely criminal or penal is recognized universally. * * * The rule which prevents courts of chancery from interfering with the administration of the criminal laws of the state is a wise one, founded upon sound principles of public policy. Any other rule would result in much confusion and embarrassment in preserving peace and order and in enforcing the police powers of the state generally.’ ”
The policy reason for the rule is found at 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 150, p. 762:
“The objections to ‘criminal equity’ are that it deprives defendant of his jury trial; that it deprives him of the protection of the higher burden of proof required in criminal prosecutions; that, after imprisonment and fine for violation of an equity injunction, defendant may be subjected under the criminal law to punishment for the same acts; that it substitutes for the definite penalties fixed by the legislature whatever punishment for contempt a particular judge *293may see fit to exact; that it is often no more than an attempt to overcome by circumvention the supposed shortcomings of jurors; and that it may result, or induce the public to believe that it results, in the arbitrary exercise of power and in government by injunction. The possibility that many persons will violate the law and that many suits will be required to enforce it, the mere fact that the officers charged with the duty of enforcing the provisions of the criminal law neglect or refuse to perform their duty in this regard, the failure of local juries to convict, or the fact that the punishment for the crime is inadequate does not warrant relief by injunction.”
I would not depart in the usual case from the above pronouncement in Martin v. Beaver, siipra. Sound public policy dictates that equity should not interfere with the administration of our criminal laws.
MOORE, C. J., joins this special concurrence.