In Re Marriage of Edsey

JUSTICE LaPORTA

delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises out of a determination regarding custody of the minor child and regarding a petition for attorney fees in connection with the judgment of dissolution of marriage of the petitioner, Steven Edsey, and the respondent, Lynne Edsey, n/k/a Lynn Yandura. The trial court awarded physical custody of the parties’ eight-year-old son, Douglas, to the petitioner and ruled, in petitioner’s favor at the close of respondent’s case on her petition for attorney fees. Respondent appeals the custody determination regarding Douglas and the ruling on her petition for attorney fees.

The evidence adduced at trial established that the parties were married on March 14, 1971. Steven Edsey, Jr., was born December 6, 1971; David Edsey was born June 3, 1973; and Douglas Edsey was bom March 12, 1980. The parties separated on October 4, 1984, and on March 7, 1985, a judgment for dissolution of the marriage was entered. That judgment incorporated the separation agreement between the parties which provided that they were to maintain joint legal custody of the three minor children and that physical custody was to be shared equally. At that time the parties lived within a mile of each other in Park Ridge, Illinois. Petitioner had physical custody of the children on 8 of 14 nights over a two-week period and on alternating weekends. Respondent had physical custody of the children during the weekdays, on the remaining 6 of 14 nights, and on alternating weekends. This visitation schedule was maintained by the parties until May 1986, when respondent moved to Lake Bluff, Illinois.

Respondent began dating her current husband, Gary Yandura, in September 1985, and subsequently sought an order of protection alleging that petitioner had pursued a course of action to harass, abuse, and annoy her. On December 19, 1985, the court entered an agreed order enjoining petitioner from harassing, annoying, or intimidating the respondent. On March 11, 1986, respondent married Gary Yandura, who was employed by the Lake Forest police department and was required to reside within 10 miles of the Lake Forest Public Safety Building. On May 3, 1986, respondent and Yandura moved into a home in Lake Bluff, Illinois, in accordance with the residence restriction imposed by Yandura’s employment. Prior to her move to Lake Bluff, respondent asked her two older sons whether they desired to move with her or to stay with their father in Park Ridge. Both boys indicated that they preferred to live with her if she remained in Park Ridge. If she moved to Lake Bluff, however, they wished to live with their father so that they could continue at their present schools and be near their friends. Respondent agreed that the two older boys could remain with their father.

Because Douglas was five years old when respondent moved to Lake Bluff with Yandura, she did not offer Douglas a choice as to where he wanted to live. Although she initially considered having all three boys live with their father, respondent subsequently concluded that Douglas should remain in her care because of his young age. On April 28, 1986, petitioner sought an injunction preventing respondent from removing Douglas from his kindergarten class in the Park Ridge school system prior to the completion of the 1985-86 school year, and the court entered an order requiring respondent to keep Douglas in the Park Ridge school system. The order further required respondent to deliver him to and pick him up from school. In accordance with the court’s order, respondent drove Douglas daily to and from his school in Park Ridge from May 1986 until the conclusion of the school term.

During the summer of 1986, all three of the parties’ sons lived with respondent in her home in Lake Bluff. In the autumn of 1986, the two older boys returned to their home with their father and resumed school with their classmates in Park Ridge. Douglas remained with respondent and commenced first grade in Central School in Lake Bluff. Respondent was not employed at that time and cared for Douglas before and after school. She also drove Douglas to his father’s home in Park Ridge every Friday evening so he could spend the weekend with his father and brothers. On April 30, 1987, petitioner brought his petition seeking sole custody of Douglas.

At the hearing on the petition, petitioner testified that during the weekends, he and Douglas played football together and went to bookstores with the two older boys. They sometimes built things together in the basement or went bicycling or to their farm in Wisconsin, where they had good friends. Douglas also played with his brothers and with his friend, Patrick, who lived in the house next to petitioner’s. When he arrived, Douglas was very excited to see his brothers and liked to sleep with petitioner or with one of his brothers.

Petitioner testified further that Douglas expressed feeling lost at respondent’s home and as though he lived with strangers. He also told petitioner of having several nightmares in which he was chased by snakes or people who were trying to kill him. In one such nightmare, Douglas dreamt that respondent and Yandura had turned into green monsters and killed him. In another, he dreamt that respondent had left him at a grocery store and that there was no one around to help him. After each of these nightmares, petitioner assured Douglas that they were just dreams and that he was in no danger. Petitioner also indicated that Douglas had made several statements about the possibility of his own death. On each of these occasions, petitioner assured Douglas that he was not going to die. Petitioner indicated further that Douglas appeared very depressed when it was time to return to his home in Lake Bluff after spending the weekend in Park Ridge and that Douglas had told him many times that he wanted to live with him and his brothers in Park Ridge. In response, petitioner had told Douglas that he would do everything he could to have Douglas reside with him in Park Ridge.

Petitioner acknowledged that he had not attended any school functions or parent-teacher conferences for Douglas, but explained that he avoided these events because he had previously been threatened by Yandura. He also acknowledged that since September 1986, respondent had provided him with each of Douglas’ report cards. He stated further that although he had called Douglas’ school and requested notice of parent-teacher conferences, he had received no response.

Respondent testified that after her marriage to Yandura, she and Douglas moved to their home in Lake Bluff, Illinois. During the summer of 1986, all three of her sons lived with her, and respondent was able to observe them together. Yandura’s two children from a prior marriage also lived in their Lake Bluff home at that time. Respondent observed that Douglas spent much more time playing with Brad Yandura, her husband’s six-year-old son, than he did with his older brothers. Steven Jr. and David spent a lot of time watching television together and frequently teased Douglas, instigating arguments. Respondent indicated that her three sons spent very little time together and fought a lot when they were together.

From September 1986 through June 1987, respondent saw her two older boys approximately once a month and when they had days off school or on holidays. Respondent stated that she had requested more time with Steven Jr. and David, but petitioner refused to allow her to take them on additional weekends and told her that if she wanted to see them more, she would have to drive to his home in Park Ridge during the week. From January 1, 1987, through the end of the school term, petitioner did not offer respondent any weekend visitation with either of her two older sons. In the summer of 1987, petitioner requested that respondent take custody of all three boys during the week and allow him to take them on the weekends. After some discussion, the parties agreed that the boys would stay with petitioner from Friday evening through Tuesday and with respondent from Wednesday to Friday. During that time period, Douglas spent most of his time playing with his friends in Lake Bluff and spent very little time with his brothers.

Respondent testified further that Douglas had grown very close to Brad Yandura and that they got along very well together. During the week, respondent cared for Douglas before and after school, including preparing his breakfast, lunch, and after-school snack. When Douglas returned from school, she spent time with him before he went out to play with his friends or to attend other activities. While living in Lake Bluff, Douglas became involved in a Cub Scout troop and attended CCD classes. Respondent drove him to and from these activities. During the summer of 1987, Douglas took swimming lessons for four weeks, attended summer school for two weeks, and took tennis lessons for two weeks. During the 1986-87 school year, Douglas received the “Student of the Month” award in his class. Douglas had done very well in school that year and had worked very hard when compared to his performance at the Park Ridge school.

Respondent testified that she did not learn until February 1987 that petitioner required Douglas to wear diapers because of bed wetting. When she became aware of this situation, respondent immediately spoke to petitioner about it, indicating that Douglas should not be wearing diapers at his age and that he had to take responsibility for his actions. She stated further that Douglas very rarely wet the bed in her home and that it usually only occurred on Sunday nights after Douglas had spent the weekend at petitioner’s home in Park Ridge. Other than those rare occasions after he had stayed with petitioner, Douglas did not wet the bed at all in her home. Respondent also stated that Douglas had not had any nightmares about snakes when he slept in her home and did not talk about death to her. He did, however, have two nightmares in August 1987 and one in January 1988.

Respondent indicated that petitioner had not participated in any of Douglas’ school activities and did not request to be included in them. Petitioner had never asked her about parent-teacher conferences or requested the names of Douglas’ teachers or counselors. Although petitioner never requested copies of Douglas’ report cards, she provided them to him. When respondent requested that petitioner send her the report cards of Steven Jr. and David, petitioner responded that he did not even know that the report cards had been issued. Respondent subsequently obtained copies of these report cards directly from the school attended by her sons. Respondent acknowledged that she had not advised petitioner of conferences at Douglas’ school or that Douglas had been receiving counseling from Naomi Zimmerman.

Respondent stated that Douglas had established ties with children in Lake Bluff and that she had been providing a very good, loving, and emotionally secure environment for Douglas. In addition, she had provided all of his clothing and school supplies over the previous two years. She believed that her three sons were happy with the current custody arrangement. Finally, respondent acknowledged that she had never sought the court’s permission to modify the joint custody agreement, but testified that she would have adhered to the previous schedule if petitioner would have shared in the responsibility for transporting Douglas to and from the parties’ homes.

Steven Edsey, Jr., testified that he was 16 years old and was a sophomore in high school. He was employed part time at the YMCA and worked three afternoons each week as well as Saturday mornings. He also played music with a band and practiced his guitar for one hour each night. He practiced with the band on Mondays after school, on Friday nights, and on Saturdays. Steven Jr. did homework for approximately one-half hour each night, then took a shower and went to bed about 10 p.m.

He indicated that he missed Douglas a lot and spent all of Sunday and most of Saturday with him. Douglas had told him more than once that he wanted to live with his father and brothers in Park Ridge. Steven Jr. stated that petitioner appeared unhappy when respondent remarried and had expressed sadness to him about the fact that Douglas did not live with them.

David Edsey testified that he was 14 years old and was a freshman in high school. He indicated that he took care of their new dog, which was acquired for Douglas on March 12, 1988. He stated further that he usually had dinner with Steven Jr. and their father. David then did his homework and watched television with his brother. On weekends, Douglas played with his friend, Pat, who lived in the house next to theirs. David said that he often played football or computer games with Douglas and Pat. He usually spent Friday night and all of Saturday morning with Douglas.

David also testified that Douglas had said that he wanted to go to Field School in Park Ridge and that he liked it when he was around his brothers. David indicated that he was sad that Douglas did not live -with him and missed him a lot. He would rather have Douglas live with him and talked to him almost every night on the telephone. David also stated that petitioner talked to him every couple of days about how sad he was that Douglas did not live with them.

Douglas Edsey testified that he felt fine while staying with respondent in the Lake Bluff home and indicated that everything was perfect there. He played with Brad a lot, watched television, and did things with respondent and Yandura. He indicated that when he stayed at petitioner’s home, he played with his new puppy and with his friends, Patrick and Kevin. Douglas stated further that he sometimes played computer games with his brothers. When he was at petitioner’s home, he most liked being with his brothers and with petitioner. Douglas stated that the best place for him to live was with petitioner so he could visit with his brothers.

Gary Yandura testified that he shared joint custody of his two children, Brad, age 6, and Amy, age 9, with his former wife. Although his children lived with their mother, he saw them once during the week and on alternating weekends. Yandura indicated that Douglas got along well with both of his children and had a close relationship to Brad. During the summer of 1986, Yandura observed that Douglas sometimes watched television with Steven Jr. and David, but that most of his time was spent playing with Brad and Amy. Yandura stated that he had participated in activities with all of the children, including swimming and a trip to Great America amusement park.

Yandura testified further that he met with Douglas’ first-grade teacher for conferences and accompanied respondent to two school assemblies. He also attended two school functions during the 1987-88 school year and went to two parent-teacher conferences. Yandura indicated that he participated with Douglas in the Cub Scout troop and felt good about his ability to communicate with Douglas.

Douglas’ first-grade teacher, Delores Januik, and his second-grade teacher, Patricia Quade, both testified that Douglas had done well in their classes, was well liked by the other children, and had developed friendships with his peers. Both teachers indicated that they became acquainted with respondent and Yandura at conferences and other functions. Neither of the teachers had ever met petitioner. Januik stated that the school honored requests by parents for information regarding a student’s progress or regarding dates of parent-teacher conferences.

Peggy Edsey, petitioner’s mother, testified that she was employed as a social worker and intended to commence working on a part-time basis when she reached 62 years of age in July 1988. Mrs. Edsey stated that she and petitioner had discussed the possibility of her caring for Douglas after school if petitioner was awarded custody. Mrs. Edsey acknowledged that she told Dr. Bussell that respondent was a quality mother and testified that she still believed that.

Lynn McGain testified that she lived in the house next to petitioner’s. She indicated that her son, Patrick, was very close to Douglas and that they usually play together when Douglas visits petitioner on weekends. McGain stated further that she had agreed to care for Douglas before and after school in the event that petitioner’s mother was unavailable.

Naomi Zimmerman testified that she was a psychiatric social worker, family therapist, and child therapist employed by the Family Services of South Lake County in Highland Park and had been involved in this type of social work for 50 years. She first met respondent, Yandura, Douglas, Brad, and Amy on June 30, 1986, when they requested guidance in blending their two families. Zimmerman met with the individual family members and with the family as a unit on 25 occasions during a two-year period.

During September 1986, Douglas went through a period in which he refused to talk to Yandura or to Brad or Amy. This behavior was radically different from that exhibited by Douglas on prior visits. Previously, Zimmerman had observed all three children playing remarkably well together. During an individual interview with Douglas, Zimmerman questioned him about his change in attitude. Douglas responded that he was not supposed to play with strangers and that Yandura and his children were strangers. He explained that both his brothers and petitioner had told him that he should not live with strangers. After this meeting with Zimmerman, Douglas’ attitude improved considerably until December 1986, when he said that people were asking him too many questions such as with whom he wanted to live. Zimmerman noted that Douglas appeared very upset on another occasion during the autumn of 1987 because he had wanted to attend a friend’s birthday party in Lake Bluff but was unable to do so because petitioner was unwilling to wait two additional hours before picking him up.

Zimmerman related that Douglas had been very happy living with respondent and Yandura when she began her sessions with the family. In August 1986, Douglas told her that he liked living with respondent and Yandura and he was able to see his brothers and petitioner every weekend. Zimmerman’s last visit with Douglas was on December 14, 1987. She saw no further reason to see him because he had been making excellent adjustment to his school and friends.

Although she had never met Steven Jr. and David, Zimmerman knew that Douglas loved his brothers. She also indicated that she thought that petitioner had been a good father based upon Douglas’ responses about him. Zimmerman stated that she believed respondent’s marriage to Yandura was a sound one and recommended that respondent maintain custody of Douglas. Although this meant separating him from his brothers, Zimmerman testified that in her opinion it was more important for him to remain in the stable home environment established by respondent than to be with his brothers and be cared for by a “substitute mother” when petitioner was unavailable. Finally, Zimmerman stated that she was aware of the large age difference between Douglas and his two older brothers and indicated that in a short time their interests would be very different from his.

Dr. Robert Bussell, who was retained by petitioner, testified that he had been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Illinois since 1958 and had been eligible to practice psychiatry for 25 years. He specialized in the field of adult and child psychiatry. Bussell interviewed petitioner, respondent, their three sons, and Gary Yandura. As a result of these interviews, Bussell found no significant psychopathology in either petitioner or respondent. He also found nothing which would interfere with the ability of either party to be an appropriate parent to Douglas.

Bussell did, however, detect what he considered to be a significant psychopathology in Douglas. He believed that Douglas suffered from reactive depression, which is frequently experienced when one suffers a loss. Bussell found Douglas to be confused about the instant custody battle. He testified that Douglas demonstrated confusion in terms of his loyalty to respondent as opposed to his brothers and petitioner. Douglas exhibited separation anxiety and did not feel secure in his setting. Bussell concluded that Douglas demonstrated a depressed affect.

Bussell perceived Douglas as a sensitive youngster who exhibited exaggerated fear and anxiety relative to separation. He stated that these fears and anxieties were expressed in a relatively active fantasy life replete with themes of loss, separation, and death. Bussell felt that Douglas would need ongoing therapy regardless of which parent had custody, but believed that Douglas’ emotional stability would be increased if custody was awarded to petitioner.

Bussell noted that Douglas never expressly verbalized his preference about where he wanted to live. Bussell believed, however, that his preference was manifested during a game in which Bussell played the role of a judge and showed Douglas one piece of paper which said “Mom” and another which said “Dad.” Bussell asked Douglas to give him the piece of paper indicating with whom Douglas wanted to live. Douglas selected the piece of paper which said “Dad.” Bussell later told Douglas that he intended to suggest to the court that Douglas live with his father and inquired whether Douglas wanted that suggestion changed. Douglas said he did not and that he wanted the suggestion to get to the judge soon.

Bussell found no evidence that respondent had abandoned Douglas or that he was not perfectly cared for by her. He also found no psychopathology in Yandura which would preclude him from being an appropriate step-parent to Douglas. Bussell noted that Douglas got along well with both of Yandura’s children and was especially close to Brad. When Bussell questioned Douglas about his bed wetting, Douglas stated that he thought it was caused by the fact that he drank more water when he stayed with petitioner and that his mother gets more upset when he wets the bed. He also indicated that he preferred that petitioner not put diapers on him and that he would like to try to see if he can go without wetting the bed in petitioner’s home.

Bussell concluded that Douglas had a very close relationship with his brothers and was confused as to why he was not living with them. He indicated that Douglas did not want to be disloyal to either parent. Bussell stated that in his opinion, it was in the best interest of Douglas to have custody transferred from respondent to petitioner. Bussell believed that this would afford Douglas a better feeling of stability and that it would be detrimental to Douglas’ mental health to keep him separated from his brothers. Although Bussell could not be certain, he did not believe that Douglas’ responses had been influenced by petitioner or by his brothers.

Dr. Margaret Wein testified that she was a licensed psychiatrist associated with the Cook County Psychiatric Institute. In accordance with the Institute’s established procedures, Mary J. Fleming, a social worker, evaluated Douglas, David, and Steven Jr. as well as Gary Yandura. Wein examined petitioner and respondent.

Upon consideration of Fleming’s report and her own observations, Wein concluded that it was in the best interest of Douglas to continue the current arrangement whereby the parties shared physical custody of Douglas. This conclusion was based in part upon the fact that respondent had always been the primary caregiver and a very good parent. In addition, respondent was willing to agree to visitation with petitioner each and every weekend. Wein noted that Douglas expressed very positive feelings toward respondent and liked the fact that she was there when he came home from school. Wein also found it significant that Douglas’ main focus in his interviews was not that he missed petitioner, but was that he missed his brothers.

Wein stated that although it was usually not preferable in a custody case to separate siblings, this case was different because the two older boys chose to stay in their old neighborhood with their friends and father. Wein also found it significant that there was a great age difference between Douglas and his brothers and, consequently, the two older boys were in an entirely different social group with different interests and activities.

Wein indicated that she focused on which party was the better parent to have custody rather than on how many hours Douglas would spend with his brothers. She stated further that she believed Douglas would be unhappy regardless of which party had physical custody because he would not be able to live with both of his parents together. Wein noted that during one interview Douglas indicated that he wanted to live with respondent, but in another interview he stated that he wanted to live with petitioner. Wein was not surprised that Douglas’ statements were contradictory because he wanted to be with both of his parents. Wein also explained that Douglas appeared to have experienced a lot of pressure from his brothers and petitioner to side with them against respondent.

Dr. Karen Smith testified that she was an attorney and a clinical psychologist employed by the circuit court of Cook County. Smith interviewed and evaluated both petitioner and respondent. Based upon her evaluation of the parties, Smith indicated that petitioner exhibited mood instability and believed that it would not be in Douglas’ best interest to be in petitioner’s custody. Smith indicated further that respondent exhibited a conventional outlook within the bounds of reality and was in touch with her emotions. Smith also noted that respondent appeared to be a caring and involved parent with no gross psychopathology that would interfere with her ability to care for Douglas. Smith concluded that there was no need to alter the current living conditions of Douglas.

Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that there had been a fundamental change in the geographic location of the parties which required a modification in custody of Douglas. The trial judge then indicated that she had considered all of the required statutory factors and concluded that it was in Douglas’ best interest to grant custody to petitioner. The judge stated that a child’s preference as to his custody was important and indicated further that she was satisfied that Douglas’ preference was to live with his brothers who lived with his father. The trial judge specifically stated, however, that she had not based her decision to modify custody upon Douglas’ separation from his brothers.

Respondent subsequently filed a petition for attorney fees, and at the hearing on her petition, she testified that she had incurred legal expenses totalling $24,810, of which she had already paid $20,412. She stated that she had taken out a home equity loan in order to pay her counsel $15,000 of that amount in June 1988. She had also borrowed $5,300 from her parents to pay counsel and she had repaid her parents about 50% of that amount. She had also paid her appellate counsel the sum of $7,000 plus an additional $2,300 for the payment of trial transcripts.

Respondent testified further that she had an equity line of credit against her home in the amount of $23,000 of which she had used $15,000 to pay counsel in June 1988. Her various savings and checking accounts reflected balances totaling $4,088. Respondent also indicated that she was working as a crossing guard five days each week during the school term, earning a net salary of $159 each two weeks. She stated that she had no other source of income and that she was a housewife. She also indicated that she had been employed throughout her marriage to petitioner and had last worked on a full-time basis in 1969.

The parties stipulated that respondent’s counsel was an expert in the field of matrimonial law and that his hourly fees were reasonable for divorce specialists in the Chicago community given his level of competence. The parties further stipulated that the summary of hours expended in these proceedings by respondent’s counsel correctly set forth all of the time expended by him in representing respondent.

Petitioner testified that he owned a corporation of which he was president. The evidence disclosed that petitioner earned gross wages of $60,000 in 1986, $70,000 in 1987, and $78,000 in 1988. His corporation paid for his health insurance and for the health insurance for his three sons. His corporation purchased a 1987 Chevrolet Suburban vehicle in 1987 which was used by petitioner for his personal needs. Petitioner testified further that he owned a home in Park Ridge, a farm in Wisconsin, and had various other investments having values totaling $180,000. He stated that he had paid legal fees for representation in these proceedings in the amount of $19,500.

At the close of respondent’s case on her petition for fees, the trial judge indicated that respondent had an additional equity line of credit of $8,000 and found that she could not determine what respondent’s income would be. In a verbal ruling, the court denied respondent’s petition for fees. Thereafter, the court on its own motion entered a written order which augmented her verbal ruling. The written order reflected that respondent had not shown her inability to pay her attorney fees in that there had been no showing as to why she was not capable of gaining full-time employment.

Approximately six months after the trial court awarded physical custody of Douglas to petitioner, respondent filed a petition for modification of the court’s custody order in which she asserted that there had been changes in circumstances which adversely affected the physical, mental, and emotional health of Douglas. Respondent’s petition requested that physical custody of Douglas be returned to her. The record indicates that this matter was referred to the mediation program of the domestic relations division of the circuit court of Cook County, but does not disclose the ultimate disposition of respondent’s petition for modification.

Initially, we note that the trial court’s ruling on the custody of Douglas was entered on May 6, 1988. The record reveals that the order of May 6, 1988, denied petitioner’s request for sole custody of Douglas, reaffirmed the prior order of joint custody, but altered the place of residence of Douglas. This order also stated that the issue of visitation with Douglas was reserved for the parties’ agreement or for further determination by the court, specifically provided for the filing of petitions for attorney fees by both parties, and reserved judgment on those issues. The order entered on May 6, 1988, did not contain a finding that it was final and appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). On November 17, 1988, the trial judge entered a verbal ruling denying respondent’s petition for attorney fees. On November 30, 1988, the trial court on its own motion entered a written order which augmented the prior verbal ruling on respondent’s petition for attorney fees. The written order indicated only that respondent had not shown her inability to pay her attorney fees in that there had been no showing as to why she was not capable of gaining full-time employment. This order did not reflect that it was final and appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). On December 20, 1988, the court entered an order disposing of all pending issues, including visitation with Douglas, child support, and attorney fees. This order stated that it was final and appealable. The notice of appeal was timely filed on January 5, 1989.

We next address respondent’s contention that the trial court erred in awarding petitioner custody of Douglas.

Section 610(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) provides that a court shall not modify a custody judgment unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence, upon facts that have arisen since, or were unknown at the time of, the prior custody order, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 610(b).) This provision reflects an underlying policy favoring the finality of child custody judgments and creates a legislative presumption in favor of the present custodian, thereby promoting the stability and continuity of the child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be overturned lightly. In re Custody of Sussenbach (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 489, 499, 485 N.E .2d 367, 371; In re Marriage of Wechselberger (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 779, 786, 450 N.E .2d 1385, 1389.

In child custody proceedings, the best interest of the child is of paramount concern (In re Marriage of Hazard (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 61, 69, 520 N.E.2d 1121, 1126), and section 602 of the Act sets forth certain factors which must be considered by the court in determining the best interest of the child, which include the wishes of the child’s parents, the wishes of the child, the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his sibling and any significant others, and the child’s adjustment to his home, school and community (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 602(a); Shoff v. Shoff (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 178, 184, 534 N.E.2d 462, 466).

In the instant case, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s move to Lake Bluff altered the geographic location of the parties and constituted a fundamental change in circumstances which required a modification in custody of Douglas. With respect to the best interest of the child, the court found Dr. Bussell’s testimony persuasive and indicated that Douglas’ preference was important, finding that Douglas preferred to live with his brothers who lived with his father. The trial judge stated that she was clearly convinced that it was in Douglas’ best interest to award custody to petitioner. Although the judge indicated that she had considered all of the required statutory factors, the record does not reflect that these factors were analyzed within the evidence before the court. Rather, it appears that the court’s decision was predicated primarily upon the testimony of Dr. Bussell and upon Douglas’ in camera statement that the best place for him to live was with his brothers who lived with his father.

The court’s primary reliance on these factors attributed to them undue importance where the evidence revealed that Douglas had in other interviews expressed a preference for residing with the respondent and that his main focus was not that he missed the petitioner, but that he missed his brothers. We find it significant that Bussell testified that Douglas never verbally expressed a preference for living with the petitioner and that this testimony corroborated other evidence indicating that Douglas wanted to live with both of his parents together and was very confused about where his loyalties should lie. There was also evidence that Douglas had been pressured by his brothers and by petitioner to side with them against respondent, and Bussell acknowledged that he could not be certain that Douglas’ responses had not been influenced by his brothers or by petitioner.

This evidence indicates that Douglas’ in camera statement and his responses during his interview with Bussell were less than reliable indicators of his desires as to which party should have custody. Moreover, it has been held that a court need not ascribe controlling weight to a child’s preference where the child is not mature or where there is no indication that the preference was based on sound reasoning. (Shoff, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 185, 534 N.E.2d at 467.) A court may find that the child’s preference is not in the child’s best interest (In re Marriage of Leff (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 792, 810, 499 N.E.2d 1042, 1054), especially where the child’s reasons are not related to his best welfare (Shoff, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 185, 534 N.E.2d at 467; In re Marriage of Jones (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 593, 597, 513 N.E.2d 1181, 1184). In addition, it has been held that it may sometimes be in the best interest of the child to separate him from siblings. Hazard, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 70, 520 N.E.2d at 1127; In re Marriage of Slavenas (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 581, 587, 487 N.E.2d 739, 742.

In the instant case, it is clear that eight-year-old Douglas cannot be considered mature and that his responses were not related to his best welfare, but were motivated solely by his desire to be with his brothers.

In making her ruling, the trial judge specifically noted the length of Dr. Bussell’s report and stated that she found that report persuasive. We do not believe that the length of a psychiatrist’s report, the number of issues addressed, or the number of persons interviewed are necessarily controlling factors in consideration of a custody case, and we note that the witnesses for respondent also addressed all of the relevant issues.

In addition, some of the evidence which could have impacted upon the court’s analysis of the statutory factors was apparently overlooked or greatly discounted. Specifically, the evidence established that Douglas experienced nightmares and a problem with bed wetting when he stayed with petitioner. Even though he had occasionally experienced these problems in respondent’s home, it was rare, and they occurred with much greater frequency at petitioner’s home. Although petitioner had reassured Douglas that he need not fear nightmares or death, his response to the bed-wetting issue was to put diapers on his son, which Douglas told Bussell he disliked. There was no evidence that petitioner had ever attempted or even considered obtaining some form of counseling or guidance to help Douglas overcome these obstacles.

Moreover, the evidence indicated that Douglas had, in fact, become integrated into his home, family, school, and community in Lake Bluff. He had grown very close to Brad Yandura, had developed ties and friendships with peers, and was involved in Cub Scouts and CCD classes. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of respondent, Yandura, Zimmerman and Douglas’ teachers. Yet, in entering her decision, the trial judge made no reference to the testimony of Zimmerman and that of Douglas’ teachers. Thus, the record does not reflect what weight, if any, the court ascribed to this evidence.

Additionally, we note that Douglas is seven years younger than David and nine years younger than Steven Jr. The record indicates that the two older boys are both in high school and are involved with extracurricular activities and part-time employment after school. Because the trial judge made no comment in her ruling as to the disparity in the ages of the three brothers and what interests they might share, even if living in the same household, we believe the court failed to consider this important factor in reaching her decision.

In custody cases, the question for the reviewing court is whether the trial court’s decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Sussenbach, 108 Ill. 2d at 499, 485 N.E.2d at 371.) A court of review may consider the entire record before it. (Foxcroft Townhome Owners Association v. Hoffman Rosner Corp. (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 150, 155, 449 N.E.2d 125, 127; La Salle National Bank v. Edward M. Cohon & Associates, Ltd. (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 464, 474, 532 N. E.2d 314, 321.) Regardless of the view expressed in the dissent, we find that no fair-minded trier of fact would conclude that the evidence in this case was overwhelming in favor of the petitioner. Rather, we find that consideration of the entire record indicates that the trial court’s determination was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

We next consider whether the trial court erred in ruling in petitioner’s favor at the close of respondent’s case on her petition for attorney fees.

Section 508(a)(3) of the Act provides that the trial court may order either party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney fees necessarily incurred by the other party in any proceeding under the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 508(a)(3).) An award of attorney fees is justified where the spouse seeking relief demonstrates (1) financial inability to pay, and (2) the ability of the other spouse to pay. (Hazard, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 520 N.E.2d at 1128.) Proof of financial inability does not require a showing of destitution and will be demonstrated where payment would strip the person of the means of support and undermine her economic stability. (Hazard, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 520 N.E.2d at 1128.) The award or denial of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Hazard, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 520 N.E.2d at 1128.

In the instant case, the evidence established that there was a great disparity between the earning abilities of the parties. We believe that the trial judge erred in denying respondent’s petition for fees. Due to this disparity in earning abilities, we find that the trial court’s ruling on respondent’s petition for fees was an'abuse of discretion and that further proceedings on respondent’s petition for attorney fees are required to determine what fees are reasonable.

In addition, we believe that the trial court relied upon inappropriate reasons to justify her ruling on the petition. In ruling in petitioner’s favor at the close of respondent’s case, the trial judge found that she was unable to determine what respondent’s income would be. The written order that was subsequently entered reflected that respondent had not shown her inability to pay fees in that there had been no showing as to why she was not capable of gaining full time employment. Neither of these reasons provides a sufficient basis to deny attorney fees under section 508(a)(3) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 508(a)(3).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the circuit court of Cook County are reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

EGAN, J., concurs.