joined by Justice OWEN, concurring in the judgment.
I can join in the Court’s judgment but not in its opinion. The simple reason why National Union cannot be charged with the expenses Rocor incurred in defending itself against wrongful death claims after they should have been settled is because, as the Court concludes, there is no evidence that settlement should, or could, have occurred before it did. The most that can be said from the record in this case is that when the claimants’ lawyer testified in November 1995, years after the claims were settled, that he “believe[d]” that it was “more likely than not” that he would have accepted a $6.3 million offer in April 1990 if there had been “any communication” between the parties, even though his only written offer at the time was for the total insurance coverage of $10 million. A belief in the probability of a hypothetical based on facts that never occurred is not evidence.
So given this failure of proof, there is no good reason for deciding, theoretically, whether if Rocor had met its burden of proof it could recover under the version of article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code that was amended seven years ago,1 nor is there good reason for dismissing the plain words of the Court’s opinion in American Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Garcia2 as misstating the Court’s intent in 1994 when the case was decided. In Garcia, an insurer, APIE, had refused to settle a medical malpractice suit against its insured, Garcia, on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims were not covered by the policy.3 The plaintiffs reached an agreement with Garcia, obtaining a judgment against him to be enforced only against APIE and taking an assignment of his rights against APIE.4 The plaintiffs then sued APIE solely as Garcia’s assignees, alleging that APIE’s failure to settle was negligent and violated article 21.21 and the DTPA.5 Based on jury findings that APIE’s failure to settle was negligent and “an unfair practice in the business of insurance”, the trial court rendered judgment against the insurer under the version of article 21.21 that was in effect in 1985, *266and the court of appeals affirmed.6 We held that APIE’s failure tó settle the plaintiffs’ claims against Garcia could not be a violation of article 21.21:
Although Garcia argues that this case is not solely a Stowers lawsuit because remedies under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21 are cumulative of other remedies, and the judgment below is couched in terms of a violation of article 21.21, all of the jury issues that form the basis for the judgment against APIE in the Stow-ers case involve the breach of either the duty to defend or the duty to settle the malpractice lawsuit. Breach • of the Stowers duty does not constitute a violation of article 21.21 or the DTPA. Moreover, APIE is not responsible for any separate DTPA or Insurance Code violation because the record in this case is devoid of evidence that APIE ever engaged in any unfair or deceptive act or practice as defined in the relevant statutes. See Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 21.21, §§ 4, 16(a) (Vernon Supp.1994). We hold that there was no violation of article 21.21.7
We specifically rejected Garcia’s argument based on Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.8:
Garcia contends that Vail ... supports] his contention that jury findings to the effect that a failure to settle involves an unfair or deceptive practice should entitle him to recover under article 21.21. Vail, however, involved an insurer’s bad faith refusal to pay a claim under a first-party property insurance policy. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 130. A Stowers action, by definition, involves an insurer’s duty to settle a covered lawsuit — a situation that can only arise under a third-party liability insurance policy. Thus Vail is inapposite.9
Plainly, Garcia limited Vail ⅛ applicability to first-party claims. This limitation is consistent with Vail ⅛ alternative holding that article 21.21 makes actionable a breach of the common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing. That duty covers only first-party claims.10
The Court now dismisses these passages as no “indication] that we intended to limit an insured’s statutory claims against its own insurer for unfair claim settlement practices to first-party insurance claims,”11 but if they do not both plainly say that an insurer has no statutory duty to settle third-party claims against its insured, then what do they say? No answer. It would be better to simply overrule Garcia as wrong than to pretend as if its words mean nothing. The Court cannot hold the Legislature strictly to the language of statutes and parties to the language of contracts and then fudge on the language of its own opinions. I doubt the Court would indulge a court of appeals’ opinion that said, well, yes, the Supreme Court did say such and so, but we don’t think that was its intent. Yet the Court can hardly expect the lower courts to follow its opinions if it is so dismissive of them itself.
My point, though, is that it does not matter in this case what the Court’s opinion in Garcia means or what the Court intended or whether it was right because *267today’s decision would be the same regardless. Rocor cannot prevail on any claim under article 21.21 because it has not proved that National Union should have settled the wrongful death claims sooner.
The dissent’s position, which Rocor does not urge itself, is truly remarkable. According to the dissent, once liability becomes clear, article 21.21 imposes on an insurer a duty to settle even if the amount of damages is not clear. It is certainly true that National Union could always have settled the claims against Rocor for the $10 million the plaintiffs demanded, but to penalize an insurer for negotiating $8.7 million off the demand is a twisted application of the law. In the dissent’s view, if the amount of damages is stipulated but liability is uncertain, an insurer has no duty to settle, but if liability is stipulated and damages are uncertain, the insurer must settle. This perverse view of settlements cannot be ascribed to the Legislature in enacting article 21.21.
Justice BAKER filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice HANKINSON joined.
Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code defines an insurer’s unfair settlement practice as:
[F]ailing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim with respect to which the insurer’s liability has become reasonably clear.
Today, the Court interprets this statutory claim to mean:
[T]hat an insurer’s liability is not reasonably clear, and liability may not be imposed under article 21.21, unless the insured shows that (1) the policy covers the claim, (2) the insured’s liability is reasonably clear, (3) the claimant has made a proper settlement demand within policy limits, and (4) the demand’s terms are such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it.
See 77 S.W.3d 262.
Does anyone see anything wrong with this, interpretation? I do, and I dissent.
I. APPLICABLE LAW
A. STATUTORY DUTY TO ATTEMPT TO SETTLE
Article 21.21 defines insurer conduct that constitutes unfair competition methods or unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21. Before the Legislature last amended section 16 of article 21.21, the provision read:
Any person who has sustained actual damages as a result of another’s engaging in an act or practice declared in Section 4 of this Article or in rules or regulations lawfully adopted by the Board under this Article to be unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance ... may maintain an action against the person or persons engaging in such acts or practices.
Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21, § 16 (emphasis added) (amended by Act of June 8, 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 414, § 13, 1995 Tex. Gen. Law 3000-01).
State Board of Insurance Order No. 18663, adopted under article 21.21, prohibits unfair or deceptive practices “as defined by the provisions of the Insurance Code.” Tex. Bd. of Ins., Bd. Order No. 18663 (codified at 28 Tex. Admin. Code § 21.3). The Insurance Code, in article 21.21-2, defines an unfair practice as “[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear.” Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4).
Notably, the 1995 amendments to article 21.21 section 16 eliminated the language *268“or in rules or regulations lawfully adopted by the Board under this Article” and added a detrimental reliance requirement for certain claims. Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21, § 16. Moreover, as shown above, the Legislature amended article 21.21 in 1995 to define an insurer’s unfair practice to include “failing to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim with respect to which the insurer’s liability has become reasonably clear.” Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21, § 4(10)(a)(ii). Accordingly, article 21.21 now expressly incorporates the unfair settlement practice defined in article 21.21-2, with some limiting language, rather than incorporating that practice through the Insurance Board order and article 21.21-2.
B. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. National Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex.2000); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.1998). We must first look at the statute’s plain and common meaning. Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex.1999). This is because we presume the Legislature intended the plain meaning of its words. Allen, 15 S.W.3d at 527. If the statute is unambiguous, we typically adopt the interpretation the plain meaning of the statute’s words and terms support. Fitzgerald 996 S.W.2d at 865. Consequently, when a statute’s language unambiguously establishes the Legislature’s intent, we do not use extrinsic aids to find an intent the statute does not express. See Allen, 15 S.W.3d at 527; Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865. Statutory construction issues are legal questions we review de novo. Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex.1989).
Courts must determine a statute’s intent to give full effect to all its terms. Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 25 (Tex.1984). However, “[courts] are not the law-making body. They are not responsible for omissions in legislation.” Simmons v. Arnim, 110 Tex. 309, 220 S.W. 66, 70 (1920); see also RepublicBank Dallas, N.A v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.1985). Courts must enforce the laws as the Legislature enacts them, because, “when [courts] stray from the plain language of a statute, we risk encroaching on the Legislature’s function to decide what the law should be.” Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 866.
C. JNOY Standard
A trial court may grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if there is no evidence upon which the jury could have made the findings relied upon. Exxon Corp. v. Quinn, 726 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex.1987); Dowling v. NADW Mktg., Inc., 631 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex.1982); Dodd v. Texas Farm Prods. Co., 576 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex.1979). In reviewing a trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the trial court entered the judgment, and we indulge “every reasonable intendment deducible from the evidence ... in that party’s favor.” Dowling, 631 S.W.2d at 728; see also Exxon Corp., 726 S.W.2d at 19; Dodd, 576 S.W.2d at 814. When more than a scintilla of competent evidence exists to support the jury’s findings, the reviewing court should reverse a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex.1990).
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Statutory Liability Standard
The pre-1995 version of articles 21.21 and 21.21-2 apply in this case. Under *269those provisions, the Court correctly concludes that an insured, such as Rocor, has a cognizable claim under article 21.21 against National Union, Rocor’s insurer, for unfair settlement practices. See 77 S.W.3d at 258-59 (discussing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 876 S.W.2d 145, 147-50 (Tex.1994); Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex.1994); American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Tex.1994)).
However, the Court’s holding about the elements necessary to prove an insurer’s unfair settlement practice is clearly wrong. See 77 S.W.3d at 60. In determining the statutory liability standard, the Court im-permissibly leaps into the legislative realm and completely eliminates a duty and claim the Legislature expressly created. See Simmons, 220 S.W. at 70; RepublicBank Dallas, 691 S.W.2d at 607.
National Union contends that, because article 21.21 does not define the liability standard, the Legislature intended that courts apply the common-law Stowers standard. See Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21, §§ 4(l)(a)(ii), 16; art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4). Stowers provides that an insured may sue its insurer for negligently failing to settle a third party’s claim against the insured. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Comm’n App.1929, holding approved). However, an insurer’s common-law Stow-ers duty is triggered only when: (1) the claim against the insured is within the scope of the policy’s coverage; (2) the suing third party makes a settlement demand within the policy limits; and (3) the demand’s terms are such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it, considering the likelihood and degree of the insured’s potential exposure to an excess judgment. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 849 (discussing Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547).
Remarkably, the Court embraces National Union’s position that the Stowers standard applies to the statutory claim raised here. Specifically, the Court holds that:
[A]n insurer’s liability is not reasonably clear, and liability may not be imposed under article 21.21, unless the insured shows that (1) the policy covers the claim, (2) the insured’s liability is reasonably clear, (3) the claimant has made a proper settlement demand within policy limits, and (4) the demand’s terms are such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it, considering the likelihood and degree of the insured’s exposure to an excess judgment.
See 77 S.W.3d at 262. Thus, the Court engrafts onto the statutory liability standard the Stowers liability standard as necessary elements to prove that the insured’s liability is reasonably clear and that liability may be imposed.
I agree that article 21.21 implies that the policy must cover the claim and that the insured’s liability to the third party must be reasonably clear to trigger the statutory duty. However, the Court's basis for determining that the other Stowers factors apply is not persuasive and exceeds the statute’s boundaries. The Court should apply our well-established statutory construction rules to ascertain the Legislature’s intent and to interpret and apply article 21.21. See Allen, 15 S.W.3d at 527; Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865; Liberty Mut. Ins., 966 S.W.2d at 484. And, if the statute unambiguously demonstrates the Legislature’s intent and thus the statute’s meaning, the Court must not resort to extrinsic aids to hypothesize about an intent the statute does not express. See Allen, 15 S.W.3d at 527; Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865.
When Rocor sued National Union, article 21.21-2 prohibited insurers from “not *270attempting in good faith”- to effectuate settlement when “liability has become reasonably clear.” Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4) (emphasis added). The statute’s plain and common language evidences the Legislature’s intent to impose a duty on insurers to take good faith action when liability becomes reasonably clear. See Tex. Ins.Code art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4); Allen, 15 S.W.3d at 527; Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865. In other words, the statute requires insurers to take good faith affirmative steps to effectuate a settlement once liability becomes reasonably clear. I believe the statute’s plain language limits the statutory liability standard to these elements.
In contrast, the common-law Stowers duty requires insurers to accept reasonable settlement demands within policy limits that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept, considering the insured’s potential exposure to a judgment exceeding the policy limits. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 848-49. Thus, the Stowers standard does not impose an affirmative duty on insurers until the suing party makes a settlement demand that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept. See Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 849. Moreover, under Stowers, the insurer only has a duty to accept a settlement demand if an ordinarily prudent insurer would do so under the circumstances. This purely objective standard differs significantly from the good faith standard that expressly applies to the insurer’s statutory duty. Indeed, this Court has defined “good faith” differently in other contexts after recognizing that a good faith standard differs from a negligence standard. See, e.g., Wichita County, Texas v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex.1996) (holding that “good faith” in the Whistle-blower Act context encompasses subjective and objective components); Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 285-86 (Tex.1998) (discussing “good faith” definitions in various contexts); see also Tex. Bus. & Com.Cobe § 2.103 (defining a merchant’s “good faith” in the sales context as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade”).
Despite the obvious distinctions between an insurer’s common-law Stowers duty and article 21.21’s statutory duty, the Court holds that the Stowers liability standard applies regardless of which duty the insurer allegedly breached. Thus, the Court flagrantly disregards our rule that, when a statute unambiguously expresses the Legislature’s intent, as it does here, we must not use extrinsic aids, such as the common law, to find an intent the statute does not express. See Allen, 15 S.W.3d at 527; Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 865. Under the Court’s holding, when liability is reasonably clear, as the jury concluded in this case, the insurer does not risk statutory liability if it fails or refuses to solicit a settlement (read: fails or refuses to attempt in good faith to effectuate settlement). Rather, the insurer need only wait until the suing party makes a settlement demand within policy limits that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept under the circumstances. The Court’s holding thus renders the statutory duty meaningless.
The Court explains that applying the Stowers liability standard to the statutory duty “promotes uniformity and prevents insurers from facing conflicting liability standards.” See 77 S.W.3d at 261. But the Court’s rationale lacks a firm foundation and instead rests on “sinking sand.” This is because the Court’s rationale ignores the separate and distinguishable duties an insurer has under the statute and Stowers. And it fails to acknowledge that the statutory duty and Stowers duty clearly serve different purposes.
*271On one hand, the statutory duty prohibits insurers from sitting back, prolonging a dispute’s resolution, and causing an insured to sustain actual damages — such as the additional defense costs Rocor incurred here — once liability becomes reasonably clear. The statutory standard also protects an insured from suffering substantial reputation, business, and personal damages that pending litigation may cause.
On the other hand, the Stowers duty mandates that insurers accept a reasonable settlement demand that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 848-49. Whether liability became reasonably clear is of no moment for triggering the Stowers duty. Thus, the Stowers standard protects an insured from litigating a claim that may or may not have merit, but, because of the circumstances, could expose the insured to significant liability that exceeds the policy limits. Indeed, an insured who establishes that an insurer breached the Stowers duty may recover, as a matter of law, the amount in the judgment rendered against the insured that exceeds the applicable policy limits. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 606 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).
Furthermore, the Court’s holding that the Stowers liability standard applies to the statutory duty flies in the face of this Court’s statement in Garcia that “breach of the Stowers duty does not constitute a violation of article 21.21 or the DTPA.” Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 847. The Court attempts to negate this statement’s importance. But the Court does so only when discussing Garcia’s impact on whether an insured has an article 21.21 claim for damages it incurred, because its insurer engaged in unfair settlement practice regarding a third party-claim. See 77 S.W.3d at 260. The Court does not, and cannot, explain why this statement from Garcia does not preclude the Court from now conflating the distinguishable Stowers and statutory duties.
Additionally, the Court mischaracterizes my position when it states that, under my view, liability is reasonably clear within the statute’s meaning if the insured “clearly caused the third party’s injuries.” See 77 S.W.3d at 262. The Court explains that, under my view, “an insurer could be held liable for failing to settle even if the amount of the injured third party’s damages were unknown or unclear.” See 77 S.W.3d at 262. This is absolutely incorrect. First, the Court’s analysis fails to appreciate the distinct difference between liability and damages. No language in the statute suggests that the exact' amount of damages due must be reasonably clear before the insured has a duty to attempt in good faith to effectuate settlement. Second, as discussed above, the statute expressly imposes a duty on the insured to take affirmative steps when “liability has become reasonably clear,” while the Stow-ers duty only requires insurers to accept reasonable settlement demands. The Court claims that its holding that the Stowers liability standard applies to the statutory standard “is consistent with the statutory purpose the dissent identifies, because it is expressly intended to encourage swifter dispute resolution.” See 77 S.W.3d at 262 (citing Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 851 & n. 18). But this statement wholly disregards that my position encourages dispute resolution even more than the Court’s holding, because the Court entirely eliminates a separate and distinct statutory settlement duty on the insurer.
In sum, despite the statute’s unambiguous, plain language, the Court assumes it can carte blanche reinvent the liability standard for violating the statutory duty. Courts must enforce laws as the Legisla*272ture enacts them. See Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 866; Simmons, 220 S.W. at 70. To do otherwise, as the Court does here, is to encroach on the constitutional provisions endowing the Legislature with the sole authority to create our law. See Tex. Const, art. 2, § 1; art. 3, § 1; Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 866; Simmons, 220 S.W. at 70. I would hold that an insured establishes liability under the statute if, under the statute’s plain language, the insurer did not attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement once liability became reasonably clear.
B. JNOV Review
There is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that National Union failed to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement once liability became reasonably clear. See Exxon Corp., 726 S.W.2d at 19; Dowling, 631 S.W.2d at 728; Dodd, 576 S.W.2d at 814. There is evidence that the attorneys for Rocor and National Union agreed, from very beginning, that the suit exposed Rocor to significant liability. Further, in January. 1990, National Union advised Rocor that liability would likely reach the excess insurance coverage it provided. From that time, National Union decided it would take over the settlement efforts. And there is evidence that one year before the settlement, National Union’s attorney assessed liability at almost exactly the amount for which the case eventually settled. Consequently, there is evidence to support the jury’s finding that liability became reasonably clear as the statute requires to establish an insurer’s liability.
Furthermore, though National Union took over settlement negotiations once it acknowledged Rocor’s liability would trigger the excess policy coverage, National Union halted mediation efforts after it assumed settlement authority. And, then, National Union made settlement offers in amounts significantly below the assessed liability. In fact, National Union’s first settlement offer reflected that National Union would not have to pay any money, because Rocor’s other insurers would have covered the smaller amounts National Union offered. Moreover, there is evidence that Rocor’s defense attorney advised Ro-cor and National Union that detrimental evidence existed, and thus, National Union should quickly settle to avoid defense costs. National Union’s attorney acknowledged that National Union benefitted from the delayed settlement because it continued to earn interest on investments. Assuming the good faith standard encompasses both an objective and subjective element, this evidence supports a jury finding that National Union lacked both. And, though no ideal time period in which parties must reach settlement exists, there is evidence that Rocor incurred legal expenses to prepare for trial because National Union delayed settling long after liability became reasonably clear. Therefore, viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to Rocor, the jury could conclude that National Union failed to attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement. See Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 228.
There is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that National Union violated the statutory duty article 21.21 clearly establishes. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 228; Exxon Corp., 726 S.W.2d at 19; Dowling, 631 S.W.2d at 728; Dodd, 576 S.W.2d at 814.
C. Other Issues And Disposition
1. Election of Remedies
Rocor pleaded more than one recovery theory. But under the election-of-reme*273dies doctrine, Rocor could elect to recover the greatest relief under any theory that the verdict supports. See Bradley’s Elec., Inc. v. Cigna Lloyds Ins. Co., 995 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex.1999). Here, Rocor has elected to recover under article 21.21, which affords greater recovery than ordinary negligence. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be reversed on this basis, and the Court need not consider National Union’s argument that the court of appeals erred in rendering judgment on the jury’s negligence finding.
2. Charge Error
National Union argues that, even if the Court concludes that Rocor has a statutory claim, it should remand the case for a new trial based on the alleged erroneous jury charge. National Union contends that the broad-form liability question submitted two unfair deceptive act theories — misrepresentation and unfair settlement practice — and the misrepresentation theory is legally invalid.
But National Union did not object to the charge on the basis that it included an invalid legal theory. Instead, National Union argued only that Rocor lacked standing to maintain a claim under article 21.21 for unfair settlement practices. A party’s objection to the charge must be timely and specific. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388-89 (Tex.2000). Accordingly, National Union did not preserve its argument that the broad-form liability question improperly submitted an invalid legal theory. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a).
However, National Union did object to the trial court’s submitting the misrepresentation theory because it lacked an evi-dentiary basis. Applying a traditional harm analysis, I conclude that the record — including the pleadings, the evidence, and the entire charge — does not demonstrate that the unsupported misrepresentation theory probably caused rendition of an improper judgment or prevented National Union from properly presenting the case on appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 61.1; see also Reinhart v. Young, 906 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1995) (A charge with an erroneous instruction was not harmful because nothing in the record showed the jury based its verdict on the instruction.); Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass’n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex.1986) (In determining if an alleged charge error is reversible, the reviewing court must determine if, under the entire case’s circumstances, the error was reasonably calculated and probably did cause an improper judgment.).
3. Attorney’s Fees
When Rocor sued National Union, article 21.21 section 16 permitted, as it does today, a plaintiff to recover reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. See Tex. Ins. Code art. 21.21, § 16. The jury awarded Rocor reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees on a percentage basis-forty percent.
While Rocor’s appeal was pending in the court of appeals, we decided Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.1997). In that case, we held that a plaintiff seeking attorney’s fees under the DTPA must prove the attorney’s fees were reasonable and necessary to the case’s prosecution and must ask the jury to award the fees in a specific dollar amount, not as a percentage of the judgment. Arthur Andersen Co., 945 S.W.2d at 818-19. Consequently, National Union argued in the court of appeals that Arthur Andersen applied to preclude Ro-cor’s recovering the percentage attorney’s fees awarded.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, an appellant must object and ob*274tain a ruling from the trial court. TexR. Civ. P. 274; Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a). Here, National Union did not object to the form of the attorney’s fees question or to an award of attorney’s fees on a percentage basis. Accordingly, National Union waived any objection to the percentage attorney’s fee question, and thus, Rocor may recover the attorney’s fees awarded.
4. Disposition
Rocor has a cognizable claim under article 21.21 section 16 for unfair settlement practices, and the evidence' supports the jury’s liability finding on this claim. Additionally, Rocor has elected to recover under this theory, which affords greater relief than the negligence theory the court of appeals upheld. Thus, the Court should reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the trial court to enter judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict and the applicable statute.
III. CONCLUSION
Today, the Court combines two distinct duties for insurers — one from the common law and the other from a statute — to create a cause of action that exists neither in the common law nor in the statute. In doing so, the Court ignores the statute’s plain meaning, engrafts language into the statute that does not exist, and refuses to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Well over one hundred years ago, this Court recognized the long-standing rule: “It is the duty of a court to administer the law as it is written, and not to make the law.” Turner v. Cross, 83 Tex. 218, 18 S.W. 578, 579 (1892). This legislative act from the bench eviscerates the statutory claim. Accordingly, I dissent.
. Act of May 19, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 11, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2988, 2997-3000.
. 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994).
. Id. at 844.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at 845-846.
. Id. at 847 (footnotes omitted).
. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.1988).
. 876 S.W.2d at 847. n. 10.
. Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Tex.1996) (per curiam).
. Ante at 260.