dissenting.
In this ease, an experienced police detective, qualified by the court as an expert in the field of narcotics distribution, offered his opinion that defendant was an accomplice to the crime of posses*520sion with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. Cloaked with the mantle of authority, the police expert delivered to the jury his own verdict that defendant was guilty of the crime charged. Such testimony coming from an authority claiming to have superior knowledge and experience must have had a profound impact on the thinking of the jury. See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir.1979) (discussing “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness” surrounding expert testimony); State v. Wheeler, 416 So.2d 78, 82 (La.1982) (explaining that risk of prejudice to defendant is exacerbated “when the witness expressing the opinion is one, such as a police officer, in whom jurors and the public repose great confidence and trust”). I cannot agree that such testimony did not have the capacity to cause an unjust result. It was for the jury, not a law enforcement expert, to make the credibility and factual calls that decided guilt or innocence. For that reason, I must part from the majority, which finds Detective Harris’s testimony harmless error. I therefore dissent.
Although clearly prejudicial, Detective Harris’s testimony did not draw an objection from defense counsel. Ante at 507, 888 A.2d at 473-74. Such a procedural default ordinarily would weigh heavily against defendant, see R. 1:7-2, R. 2:10-2, but in these circumstances I find counsel’s lapse perfectly understandable. The precedents of this Court have signaled acceptance of the almost unlimited use of expert testimony to supplant the common knowledge of jurors in drug cases.
The Court has relied on legal fictions to justify the expanded use of police expert testimony in drug cases that would not fly in other cases. In our leading decisions on the subject, we have held that a police narcotics expert cannot express an opinion that a defendant is guilty of possession of drugs with intent to distribute, but can opine that a defendant possessed the drugs with intent to distribute. State v. Summers, 176 N.J. 306, 314-16, 823 A.2d 15 (2003); State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65, 78-81, 560 A.2d 1198 (1989). There is no semantic difference between those two expert opin*521ions, except by the commandments of this Court. See Summers, supra, 176 N.J. at 318, 823 A.2d 15 (Albin, J., dissenting). In addition, the majority in this case states that “the phrasing of a hypothetical should not track too precisely the exact language of the criminal statute with which a defendant has been charged.” Ante at 517, 888 A.2d at 480 (citing Odom, supra, 116 N.J. at 82, 560 A.2d 1198). However, the majority still would permit a police expert to testify that, in his opinion, the defendant possessed drugs with intent to distribute when that defendant is charged with possession with intent to distribute. See ante at 511-15, 888 A.2d at 476-79.
I do not question the need for expert testimony on arcane subjects that would enlighten the jury. An average juror will not know the meaning of code language used by drug distributors or the importance to be attached to the packaging, quantity, and quality of drugs. An expert could edify jurors concerning the customary use of scales and other drug paraphernalia by drug traffickers, as well as the methods used by drug dealers to ply their trade. See Summers, supra, 176 N.J. at 322-23, 823 A.2d 15 (Albin, J., dissenting). In those instances, the specialized knowledge and training of the expert is of assistance to the jury in understanding the evidence before it. See N.J.R.E. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).
However, the jury is capable of making simple deductions from straightforward facts based on commonsense and ordinary life experience. After an expert explains the significance of the methods and means of drug dealing—matters outside common knowledge—jurors are well equipped to answer questions such as whether the defendant possessed drugs with intent to distribute, or whether the defendant was an accomplice in a drug transaction, without further expert guidance. This is not rocket science. As *522the majority notes, jurors do not need experts to explain the obvious. Ante at 507-08, 514, 888 A.2d at 474, 478. Jurors have the capacity to reason through to correct conclusions, as they do in other eases, including highly complex ones. They can do so in drug cases as well. I continue to adhere to my dissent in Summers. See 176 N.J. at 318-24, 823 A.2d 15; see also Thomas M. Fleming, J.D., Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Opinion Allegedly Stating Whether Drugs Were Possessed with Intent to Distribute—State Cases, 83 AL.R. 4th 629 (2005) (showing that substantial minority of jurisdictions bars expert opinion testimony that defendant possessed drugs with intent to distribute).
I am confident that the common wisdom of ordinary jurors will not allow otherwise guilty drug offenders to escape the net of justice. It is not necessary to strain the operation of our evidence rules to convict drug traffickers. There is consolation to be found in the majority’s conclusion that the police expert’s testimony here went too far. Ante at 518-19, 888 A.2d at 480-81. In the best light, the message from the majority opinion will be that there are limits to the use of expert opinion testimony in drug cases. That would be a positive step forward in our jurisprudence.
However, I would find that the admission of Detective Harris’s testimony was plain error. In failing to object to Detective Harris’s testimony, defense counsel may have believed—based on this Court’s case law—that there were few restrictions limiting the use of police expert testimony in drug cases.
Because I cannot agree that this defendant received a fair trial, I would reverse the Appellate Division. I therefore dissent.
Justice LONG joins in this opinion.
For affirmance in part/reversal in part—Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO—5.
For reversal—Justices LONG and ALBIN—2.