dissenting:
Because the majority acts beyond its jurisdiction, I cannot join its opinion. Defendants’ notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the court resolved the parties’ postjudgment motions and was thus untimely and ineffective to invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, we should dismiss the appeal. Instead, the majority saves the appeal by erasing posttrial practice as it has existed in this state for years and inventing a new rule that is unsupported by any authority. Indeed, the policy rationale the majority offers to support its judicial legislation proves why the majority’s new rule is both ill-conceived and unwise. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
The majority’s holding is as follows: anytime a trial court makes any modification to its judgment in response to a posttrial motion, the entire judgment is open to a new round of posttrial motions, even those solely raising issues that either have been or could have been raised in the first motion. This rule is contrary both to the plain language of the supreme court rules and the common law of this state.
SUPREME COURT RULE 303
A timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Childers v. Kruse, 297 Ill. App. 3d 70, 73 (1998). The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of final judgment or, “if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion.” 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). Importantly, “[n]o request for reconsideration of a ruling on a post-judgment motion will toll the running of the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed.” 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2).
The proper resolution of this case under Rule 303 is simple. The trial court issued a final judgment on April 25, 2000, and both parties filed timely postjudgment motions. The court resolved both motions in an order entered on May 12, 2000. In this order, the court modified its judgment in two respects and otherwise denied the motions. On May 18, defendants filed a motion to reconsider, raising one issue that they raised in the first motion and one that they could have raised. The court denied this motion on June 19, 2000, and defendants filed their notice of appeal on June 26.
Because the court ruled on the postjudgment motions on May 12, 2000, the notice of appeal had to be filed within 30 days of that date. Defendants apparently believed they could extend the time for appeal by filing a motion to reconsider. They were mistaken. Rule 303(a)(2)’s proscription could not be more clear: “No request for reconsideration of a ruling on a post-judgment motion will toll the running of the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed under this rule.” 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2).
Also irrelevant is the fact that the second postjudgment motion was filed within 30 days of the original order. As we explained in Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Gary-Wheaton Bank, 203 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676-77 (1990), the time for appeal is not extended by a successive postjudgment motion filed within 30 days of the original order if the second motion is filed only after the court disposes of the first one.
Faced with the unmistakably clear language of Rule 303(a)(2), the majority is forced to say that the rule does not apply because the trial court’s May 12 order was not a ruling on a postjudgmnent motion. The court’s order begins, “This cause coming to be heard on plaintiffs motion to reconsider, defendant’s motion to reconsider and defendant’s motion for fees, due notice having been given, the court being fully advised in the premises[,] it is hereby ordered ***.” Following this opening clause are three dispositive rulings on the postjudgment requests. The trial judge obviously believed that he was ruling on the parties’ postjudgment motions, and his order disposed of them.
The majority asserts that, because the court’s ruling included a modification of the judgment, there was then a new final judgment. That may be true, but there is no authority for the proposition that the entire posttrial process began anew.
It has long been the rule that a party is entitled to one posttrial motion. In jury trial cases, posttrial motions are mandatory to preserve issues for review. The applicable statute specifically provides that all relief sought after trial must be requested in a single motion. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1202(b) (West 2000). Postjudgment motions are not mandatory following bench trials, but the statute applicable to such motions (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1203 (West 2000)) has also been interpreted to allow only one motion. See Benet Realty Corp. v. Lisle Savings & Loan Ass’n, 175 Ill. App. 3d 227, 234 (1988); People ex rel. McGraw v. Mogilles, 136 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71-72 (1985); Rose v. Centralia Township High School District No. 200, 59 Ill. App. 3d 606, 607-08 (1978).
As the Historical and Practice Notes to Rule 303 recognize, when the supreme court added to Rule 303(a)(2) the language relating to reconsiderations of rulings on postjudgment motions, it essentially codified what was already established by case law:
“When subparagraph (a)(2) was adopted, the Court also included language to give expression to the principle that requests for reconsideration of a ruling on a post-trial motion will not toll the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. This again was a familiar rule, but one that had continued to cause difficulty and therefore bore repeating. It was always the rule that a party was entitled absent some highly unusual circumstances to only one post-trial motion which would serve to extend the time for appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, R. 303, Historical & Practice Notes, at 94 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
The majority’s holding — that any action of the trial court on a postjudgment motion, other than an outright denial, restarts the entire posttrial process — is an impermissible rewriting of Rule 303(a)(2). The majority is rewriting the rule to read, “No request for reconsideration of a denial of a postjudgment motion will extend the time in which a notice of appeal must be filed under this rule.” The rule does not say “denial,” it says “ruling,” and we have no authority to rewrite the supreme court rules by judicial fiat. Defendants’ request for the court to reconsider its rulings on the postjudgment motions did not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.
THE COMMON-LAW EXCEPTION
As the majority notes, the appellate court has recognized a limited exception to the rule against successive postjugment motions when the court modifies its judgment in response to a postjudgment motion and the second motion attacks the modified judgment and raises something that could not have been raised in the previous motion. See Jeanblanc, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10; Aetna, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 575-76; Viehman, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 319-20. The rationale of these cases is essentially that a party should have at least one chance to ask the court to reconsider each part of its ruling.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that this exception was created by the appellate court and that a party still proceeds at its own risk by filing a second postjudgment motion. The Illinois Institute of Continuing Legal Education thus cautions attorneys as follows:
“Successive post-trial motions are not permitted in nonjury cases. Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253 (1981). A narrow exception to this rule has been recognized when new or additional relief is granted against a party for the first time in an order disposing of a timely filed post-trial motion. See Jeanblanc v. Mellott, 152 Ill. App. 3d 801 (1970); Viehman v. Viehman, 91 Ill. App. 3d 315 (1980); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. H.W. Stout & Associates, Inc., 112 Ill. App. 3d 570 (1983). This exception has not been ruled on by the Supreme Court. Thus, extreme caution should be used before relying on it.” J. Torshen & A. Spreyer, Post-Trial Notions in Illinois Civil Practice § 14.29, at 14 — 11 (Ill. Inst. For Cont. Legal Educ. 1997).
Assuming that the exception is legitimate, defendants’ second postjudgment motion did not fall within it. Although the trial court modified its judgment in response to the first postjudgment motions, defendants’ successive motion attacked the first judgment.
The gravamen of the second postjudgment motion is paragraph four, which provides: Thus, defendants contended in the second motion that the court had used the wrong figure as its starting point in the April 25 order. As the majority notes, defendants also raised an issue that they had raised in their previous motion. These issues either were or could have been raised in the first postjudgment motion, and defendants did not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal by raising these issues in a subsequent motion. See Jeanblanc, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10.
“The problem with the prior order, and conduct of counsel in adjusting the proper amount, lies in the erroneous premise that Plaintiffs paid Defendants an original down payment of $64,615.46 (April 25, 2000 Order, paragraph C). The undisputed amount paid was $53,990.00 which should have been used for the starting point.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority now repudiates the commonsense exception recognized in these cases in favor of a rule with no foundation in the law. According to the majority, these cases reached the right result for the wrong reason. Because the court modified its judgment in these cases, the majority asserts, both parties could file new posttrial motions raising any issues they wished, and the time for appeal would be extended until the court disposed of these new motions.
It has always been the rule, however, that successive redundant posttrial motions are not allowed. A second motion attacking the original judgment and containing nothing that could not have been raised in the first motion does not extend the time for an appeal. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 258; Deckard, 44 Ill. 2d at 418-19; Bernhauser, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 988-89; Rose, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 607. The majority claims that . these cases are inapplicable because they involved a single judgment. Nevertheless, the court offers no authority that the mere modification of a judgment has a talismanic effect that opens up the entire original judgment to a new round of posttrial attacks. Curiously, even the majority recognizes this. The majority states, “Other successive postjudgment motions attacking the identical final judgment will not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.” 326 Ill. App. 3d at 50. Here, the second postjudgment motion attacked the original judgment, and therefore the majority should conclude that it did not extend the time for an appeal.
The Viehman line of cases established a reasonable rule that has been the law in this state for 20 years. We should not repudiate it in favor of a rule that favors successive and redundant postjudgment motions.
POLICY
The majority offers two unpersuasive policy reasons for repudiating Viehman in favor of a rule that allows redundant successive post-judgment motions. First, the majority claims that its new rule is consistent with the purposes of Rule 303. I could not disagree more. I believe that Rule 303 is designed to promote the finality of judgments and the efficient administration of justice. The supreme court explained in Sears:
“Permitting successive post-judgment motions would tend to prolong the life of a lawsuit — at a time when the efficient administration of justice demands a reduction in the number of cases pending in trial courts — and would lend itself to harassment. There must be finality, a time when the case in the trial court is really over and the loser must appeal or give up. Successive post-judgment motions interfere with that policy. And justice is not served by permitting the losing party to string out his attack on a judgment over a period of months, one argument at a time, or to make the first motion a rehearsal for the real thing the next month.” Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 259.
The second policy justification the majority offers is even more curious, as it supports the Viehman rule. The majority repudiates Viehman because the new rule “allows the trial court to reconsider and correct any defects in the new final judgment before the need for appeal arises.” 326 Ill. App. 3d at 50-51. But that was already the rule under Viehman. Under the Viehman line of cases, any new matters in the modified judgment could be attacked in a new postjudgment motion. Thus, as to every dispositive ruling by the trial court, the losing party had one chance to ask the court to reconsider. Under the majority’s rule, the modification of the judgment permits the losing party to raise not only new matters in response to the modification but also those already raised or that could have been raised. The majority permits a modification of a judgment to allow the losing party to file new attacks against the previous judgment. Thus, the majority misstates its own holding when it states that, “where a trial court amends its initial final order, the clock is reset regarding the filing of posttrial motions attacking this new final judgment.” 326 Ill. App. 3d at 50. That is the Viehman rule, not the majority’s rule.
In sum, I would not repudiate Viehman and its progeny. Those cases have been the law for 20 years and represent a reasonable exception to Rule 303’s prohibition against successive postjudgment motions. I express no opinion on the majority’s resolution of the merits of this case, as those issues are not properly before the court.