dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The evidence in this case was more than sufficient to prove that the defendant committed an act of attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to commit an act of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and that he took a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we should not retry the defendant. People v. Jamesson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 446, 458 (2002). Rather, we should consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Patterson, 314 Ill. App. 3d 962, 968-69 (2000). Indeed, the trial court’s judgment shall not be set aside unless the proof is so unsatisfactory, improbable, or implausible as to justify a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374-75 (1992); People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989). Great deference must be given to trial judges when they hear the evidence and observe the witnesses. People v. Austin, 328 Ill. App. 3d 798, 804 (2002). The majority gives brief lip service to this standard and then surreptitiously overlooks it when reaching its erroneous conclusion that the defendant lacked intent.
In this case, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant intended to commit aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Intent, in attempt cases, is a mental state seldom susceptible of direct proof, but which often must be inferred from circumstantial evidence. People v. Williams, 295 Ill. App. 3d 663, 665 (1998). Such evidence existed in this case. The defendant here, a 24-year-old man, corresponded via e-mail with a 16-year-old girl. Many of the e-mails were sexually explicit. In one such e-mail, the defendant fantasized about meeting an Internet “pen-pal” in a restaurant and then having sex with her in a movie theater and again later in a hotel room. In another e-mail, the defendant described a sexual encounter that he would like to have with the victim, involving condoms, oral sex, and showering together. In yet another e-mail, the defendant talked about being the victim’s first sexual partner and having sex with both the victim and her friend at the same time.
After inappropriately corresponding with the victim for a month, the defendant arranged to meet the victim and her friend at a McDonald’s restaurant. In preparation for the meeting, the defendant obtained the names and telephone numbers of a hotel and a motel near the restaurant. He called the hotel for price information. In one of his e-mails, the defendant suggested to the victim that he would be willing to spend more than a couple of hours with her. On the scheduled date and time, the defendant arrived at the restaurant with condoms that he had purchased that morning. The defendant admitted to the police that he had bought the condoms “just in case” he had sex with the victim that day. Given these facts, the trial court found that the defendant intended to have sex with the victim. The trial court’s finding was not improbable or implausible.
Furthermore, a rational trier of fact certainly could have found that the defendant took a substantial step toward committing aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The defendant asked the victim to meet him, he arrived at the agreed-upon meeting place at the arranged time, and he came prepared to have sex with the victim.
In summary, the evidence was more than sufficient to prove that the defendant committed an act of attempted aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The record reveals that the defendant both intended to commit the offense and took a substantial step in its commission. The trial court’s finding of guilt should not be disturbed.