dissenting:
The majority holds that Savage’s press was multifunctional and therefore not unreasonably dangerous for lack of safety guards at the point of operation. With this holding, the majority opinion stands for the proposition of law that a press without safety guards at the point of operation is not unreasonably dangerous if it is multifunctional. However, this is not the law. In Illinois, the manufacturer is under a nondelegable duty to produce a product which is reasonably safe and such duty is not obviated because a product is multifunctional. (Medina v. Air-Mite Devices, Inc. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 502, 508, 515 N.E.2d 770, 774; Scott v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 971, 986, 326 N.E.2d 74, 84.) Although the multifunctional nature of a product may be a factor to consider in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, it is not, as the majority opinion indicates, determinative of that issue. Rios v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 79, 86-87, 319 N.E.2d 232, 236.
In the instant case, the plaintiff’s expert testified that based on the documents he reviewed as well as his experience in selling presses, Savage knew that the press would be used to press bushings. Savage also knew the press required several ram dimensions in order to fit the existing tooling which Chrysler intended to attach to the ram. The expert concluded that based on this information, Savage could have guarded the point of operation with one of four types of guards used throughout the press industry. According to the expert, these guards were suitable for the subject press and would have protected the operator as well as others in the area of the press from coming in contact with the point of operation. In his opinion, the press was unreasonably dangerous without one of these guards. The expert acknowledged that at the time of the incident the press was being used for a different purpose. However, the expert testified that the modification of a press to perform a different function did not change his opinion that the press was unreasonably dangerous for failure to properly guard the point of operation.
Although the defendant’s expert disagreed with the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, a jury verdict should not be set aside merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences and conclusions from conflicting testimony. (Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co. (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 524, 530, 504 N.E.2d 772, 776.) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, I cannot say that the jury verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Ford v. City of Chicago (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 408, 412, 476 N.E.2d 1232, 1236.) Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.