dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that probable cause did not exist to support the warrant to search Lloyd’s apartment. However, I cannot agree that the good faith exception applies here because the testimony is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render an official belief in the validity of the warrant unreasonable. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21; Everroad, 590 N.E.2d at 571; IND. CODE § 35-37-4-5.
The majority acknowledges that Deputy Sanders did not establish Buckley’s credibility, the reliability of her information, or that she had firsthand knowledge that Lloyd possessed marijuana in his apartment. Op. at 73-74. The majority also concedes that Buckley never identified Lloyd as her source. Op. at 74. Nevertheless, the majority holds that the evidence seized under the authority of the warrant is admissible because “Deputy Sanders had firsthand knowledge that Buckley once attempted to obtain marijuana from Lloyd’s apartment for the purpose of selling it to Deputy Sanders.” Op. at 75. I disagree. Buckley’s representation that she attempted to obtain marijuana from Lloyd cannot be attributed to him. On one occasion Sanders observed Buckley go to Lloyd’s apartment, but Sanders had no firsthand knowledge of any other fact related to Lloyd. The majority miseharacterizes as a “fact” that “Buckley previously attempted to obtain marijuana from Lloyd.” Op. at 75. No reliable evidence supports that characterization.
The “firsthand knowledge” perceived by the majority is based upon the following: Deputy Sanders gave Buckley money and observed her go to an apartment that Sanders later learned belonged to Lloyd. After visiting the apartment, Buckley told Sanders that “he’s not home right now, he doesn’t have anything.” Record at 8. There was nothing that Deputy Sanders personally observed which provided him with firsthand knowledge of a connection between Lloyd’s apartment and the sale of marijuana. These facts show only that Buckley took Sanders to Lloyd’s apartment stating that she would obtain marijuana and then reported that she could not. Sanders’ presence outside the apartment did not convert Buckley’s hearsay statements into Sanders’ knowledge. The testimony demonstrates that Sanders proceeded entirely on a hunch that Lloyd was the source rather than from any reliable hearsay or firsthand knowledge of probable criminal activity attributable to Lloyd.
Deputy Sanders testified that he believed Buckley had obtained the marijuana which she sold to him from Lloyd. According to Sanders, Buckley told him that if he wanted more of the drug she “could run back to Bloomington” where “her source still had some marijuana.” Record at 7, 8. These *78hearsay statements attributed to Buckley do not provide any nexus with Lloyd unless one makes the improbable inference that Lloyd was the only source of marijuana in Bloom-ington. Here, the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the good faith exception delineated in Leon should not apply. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21 (well-trained officer would not manifest objective good faith in relying on warrant based on affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”) (citation omitted).
For the same reason, the evidence from Lloyd’s apartment could not have been obtained in good faith by a law enforcement officer as required by Indiana Code § 35-37-4-5. Under the relevant statutory provision, evidence obtained by an unlawful search or seizure may not be excluded where the search warrant was properly issued upon a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate and was reasonably believed by the law enforcement officer to be valid. I.C. § 35-37-4-5(b)(l)(A). As previously discussed, no probable cause supported the warrant, and Sanders could not have had a reasonable belief in its validity.12
Further, Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides an adequate and independent ground for excluding the evidence. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In order to develop an independent Indiana constitutional jurisprudence, we must look to our constitution as an independent source of rights. See Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 Ind. L.Rev. 635 (1987). Article I, Section 11 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of Article I, § 11 is to protect those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private from unreasonable police activity. Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind.1994). The provision must receive a liberal construction in its application to guarantee the people against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. Houses and premises of citizens receive the highest protection under Article I, § 11. Id.
Lloyd’s Indiana constitutional rights were violated when the search warrant was issued on a hunch. The groundless warrant used as authority for an unreasonable search was precisely the type of abuse which the framers intended to prevent. See id. at 539. The majority contends that this conclusion would eradicate the good faith exception. On the contrary, previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have held that the exception is unavailable when the evidence is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render an official belief in the validity of the warrant unreasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21; Everroad, 590 N.E.2d at 571. If a mere hunch were sufficient to support an official belief in the validity of a warrant, the good faith exception would swallow the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search or seizure, and no Indiana citizen would be secure in his person, house, papers and effects.
Our supreme court recognized the Leon good faith exception in Blalock v. State, 483 N.E.2d 439 (Ind.1985), and the exception applies to Article I, § 11. See also Mers v. State, 482 N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). However, the good faith exception should not be allowed to save an otherwise invalid warrant based on a chain of inferences connected only by unreliable hearsay. See Everroad, *79590 N.E.2d at 570-71 (affidavit relied upon hearsay without requisite information establishing credibility, factual basis and corroboration; warrant lacked indicia of probable cause). A hunch may lead to probable cause but is not a substitute for it. Neither can a hunch support an official belief in the validity of a warrant. Article I, Section 11, Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21, and Indiana Code § 35-37-4-5 require more. The search of Lloyd’s apartment was unreasonable as a matter of law on all three grounds. I would reverse the trial court’s denial of Lloyd’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, I dissent.
. Lloyd did not preserve or raise the issue of Sanders' qualification to testify under Indiana Code § 35-37-4-5, which requires that, in addition to good faith, the law enforcement officer must have satisfied applicable minimum basic training requirements adopted by the law enforcement training board. I.C. § 35-37-4-5(b)(2). Thus, we must assume on this record that Sanders was qualified to testify. Having met the training requirements, Sanders could not have had a reasonable belief that a hunch was sufficient to support the issuance of the warrant.