dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the petitioner complied with section 7 — 10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7 — 10 (West 2000)), which requires that a candidate’s nominating papers state the office that the candidate seeks.
Specifically, section 7 — 10 of the Election Code provides that the statement of candidacy must state the candidate’s name, his political party, his place of residency, and the office he seeks. 10 ILCS 5/7 — 10 (West 2000). The statement of candidacy must also be notarized. 10 ILCS 5/7 — 10 (West 2000). Additionally, section 7 — 10 of the Election Code provides that a candidate’s petitions for nomination be uniform in size, contain a certain number of signatures, and be fastened together in book form. 10 ILCS 5/7 — 10 (West 2000). Each nominating petition must state the candidate’s name, his address, and the office he seeks. 10 ILCS 5/7 — 10 (West 2000).
In accordance with section 7 — 10 of the Election Code, the petitioner stated, in both his nominating petition and statement of candidacy, that he sought the office of “trustee.” That the petitioner did not designate whether he desired a four-year or two-year term did not render his description of the office insufficient. As noted above, section 7 — 10 of the Election Code sets out the precise form of a candidate’s nominating papers. However, nowhere in section 7 — 10 of the Election Code does it require a candidate to designate the term of the office he desires. See 10 ILCS 5/7 — 10 (West 2000).
The majority’s imposition of such a requirement on a candidate that he state the length of term he desires is, in the present case, superfluous, as the term of office of a trustee is defined by statute. Particularly, the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1 — 25—5 (West 2000)) (the Municipal Code) provides: “In each village incorporated under this Code, the electors of the village shall elect 6 trustees. The term of office of the trustees shall be 4 years ***.”
Although the Municipal Code also provides for trustees to serve less than four years in instances where they fill a vacancy (65 ILCS 5/3.1 — 10—50 (West 2000)), this does not contravene the general rule that a trustee is an elected four-year position. The majority’s position that there was a basis for confusion herein is therefore flawed. It was obvious that the petitioner was not seeking to fill a vacancy. The petitioner’s nominating petition and statement of candidacy clearly indicated that the petitioner was seeking the position of trustee, which by statute is defined with a four-year term. Accordingly, the majority’s suggestion that there was confusion over how long a term of office the petitioner was seeking is unfounded.
Even if section 7 — 10 of the Election Code did require the petitioner to state the length of the term he sought, such an omission was inconsequential, and the Electoral Board should have found that the petitioner substantially complied. It is a fundamental principle that access to a place on the ballot is a substantial right and not lightly to be denied. Nolan v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 329 Ill. App. 3d 52, 55 (2002). The petitioner’s failure to describe the position he sought more precisely was, at maximum, a minor error. A minor error in a candidate’s nominating papers should not result in a candidate’s removal from the ballot. Sullivan v. County Officers Electoral Board, 225 Ill. App. 3d 691, 693 (1992).
I am mindful that compliance with section 7 — 10 of the Election Code has been held to be mandatory and not directory. See Bowe v. Chicago Electoral Board, 79 Ill. 2d 469, 470 (1980). However, substantial compliance has been held, in some circumstances, to satisfy even certain mandatory requirements of the Election Code, including section 7 — 10. See Courtney v. County Officers Electoral Board, 314 Ill. App. 3d 870, 876 (2000) (finding that the candidate had substantially complied with section 7 — 10 of the Election Code even though he failed to simultaneously file his nominating petitions with his statement of candidacy); Panarese v. Hosty, 104 Ill. App. 3d 627, 628-29 (1982) (finding that the candidate substantially complied with section 7 — 10 of the Election Code even though he omitted his street and number from his nominating petition); Madden v. Schumann, 105 Ill. App. 3d 900, 903 (1982) (holding that the candidate’s omission of the phrase “is a registered voter” from the circulator’s oath, as required by section 7 — 10 of the Election Code, was a technical deviation that did not warrant removal from the ballot); Stevenson v. County Officers Electoral Board, 58 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26 (1978) (finding that the candidate’s failure to number his nominating petitions consecutively, as required by section 7 — 10 of the Election Code, was a mere technical deficiency that did not render his nominating papers invalid).
Even Lewis, upon which the majority hangs its hat, establishes that a candidate can satisfy section 7 — 10 of the Election Code with substantial compliance. The Lewis court specifically held that the candidate “substantially complied” with section 7 — 10 of the Election Code even though he failed to describe the particular vacancy that he was seeking in his statement of candidacy. Lewis, 63 Ill. 2d at 53. Although the Lewis court predicated its finding of substantial compliance on the fact that the candidate’s nominating papers as a whole did describe the particular vacancy that the candidate was seeking, describing a particular vacancy in this case was not necessary because, as noted above, the petitioner was not seeking a vacancy. What was required, rather, was that the petitioner state the office he was seeking. This, I believe, the petitioner did.
On a final note, the provisions of the Electoral Code are designed to protect the integrity of the electoral process. Welch v. Johnson, 147 Ill. 2d 40, 56 (1992). Furthermore, villages such as Lakemoor have a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot. Yet, when access to the ballot is involved, the restriction on that access should require the least drastic measure to achieve these ends. In this case, removing the petitioner from the ballot was a drastic measure that did little to protect the integrity of the electoral process. Moreover, the Village of Lakemoor’s interests in this case were far outweighed by the petitioner’s right to access on the ballot and the voters’ right to elect a candidate of their choice. Frank Heabler should have been listed on the ballot for the April 1, 2003, election as a candidate for trustee.
For the above reasons, I believe the Electoral Board’s removal of the petitioner from the ballot was erroneous.