dissenting:
The majority concludes that a judgment awarding attorney fees to withdrawing counsel that is entered prior to a judgment of dissolution cannot be a final order because the court retains the power to modify it until the dissolution is finalized. This conclusion is based on a faulty construction of the plain language of section 508(c) of the statute. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes that use of the phrase “a distinct cause of action” appearing in section 508(c) does not confer finality on judgments for attorney fees pursuant to petitions filed under that section. Instead, the majority reasons that the phrase merely contemplates that a fee petition may still be pending at the time a final judgment of dissolution is entered and that the appeal-ability of that order is not affected by an unresolved and unrelated fee dispute between attorney and client. 208 Ill. 2d at 341. However, section 508 relates to three distinct types of fee issues: (1) interim attorney fees and costs under section 501(c — 1) (750 ILCS 5/50l(c — 1) (West 2000)); (2) contribution of parties to attorney fees and costs under section 503(j) (750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2000)); and (3) the resolution of fee issues between a client and withdrawing counsel under section 508(c) (750 ILCS 5/508(c) (West 2000)). 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2000). The majority’s analysis is entirely appropriate as to orders entered in the first two categories, but not the third.
The judgment in question in this case was entered as the result of a final hearing for the assessment of a withdrawing attorney’s fees and costs held pursuant to section 508(c). That hearing is allowed only after the attorney has been granted leave to withdraw as counsel of record (750 ILCS 5/508(c)(l) (West 2000)) and then only after five conditions precedent are met. These are: (1) a written engagement agreement; (2) the filing of an affidavit of counsel with a copy of the agreement attached; (3) entry of judgment in a contribution hearing on behalf of the client or waiver of the right to contribution; (4) counsel’s withdrawal of record; and (5) a request in the petition to resolve all remaining claims for fees and services between the counsel and client. 750 ILCS 5/508(c)(2) (West 2000).
Once these conditions precedent are satisfied, no issues remain between the client and withdrawing counsel affecting the ultimate resolution of the dissolution proceeding. The court is then able to deal with the limited issue of the amount of fees and costs to be awarded to the attorney.
The majority notes that the trial court did not adjudicate any claim of Samuel King for contribution. 208 Ill. 2d at 343. Thus, it must be assumed that no such claim was made. It would further appear that all of the conditions precedent under section 508(c)(2) were met and that there was no impediment to a final hearing. The fact that the legislature has characterized these proceedings as “final hearings” means that it intended a final resolution of all issues within the scope of the proceedings, including the entry of a final judgment awarding fees and costs.
The record discloses that the Muller law firm’s petition for leave to withdraw as counsel was granted on July 31, 1998. At that time, Muller was granted leave to file a petition for fees. The hearing on the fee petition was not held until more than five months later, on January 5, 1999. These dates are significant because section 508(e)(1) expressly provides that a former counsel may pursue an award and judgment against a former client for legal fees and costs in an independent proceeding at any time subsequent to 90 days after the entry of an order granting counsel leave to withdraw, even during the pendency of the dissolution action. 750 ILCS 5/508(e)(l) (West 2000).
Simply stated, it defies logic that the legislature would allow an independent lawsuit for fees against a former client when the dissolution action is pending, while maintaining that judgments entered in final hearings authorized by the Act to be held within the dissolution action cannot be final. Once the statutory conditions precedent are met and the attorney and former client are at arm’s length, there should be no impediment to a final judgment on the only issue in controversy between them — the award of fees and costs.
Here, the majority disposes of this case based on its incorrect conclusion that the Muller fee judgment was not final. In reaching that conclusion, the majority does not address the other issues raised by the parties, including the effect of the language in the January 5, 1999, judgment restricting enforcement to certain described bank accounts belonging to Samuel King and the propriety of the procedures used in conducting the judicial sale. Resolving those other issues may well produce the same result, but without the logical inconsistency created by the majority’s final order analysis. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.