concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the part of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court was empowered to do equity in the case sub judice; however, I dissent from the part of majority opinion which, even so, reverses the trial court’s grant of injunctive relief in this case.
The granting of injunctive relief is within the discretion of the court. (Regional Transportation Authority v. Burlington Northern Inc. (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 779, 784, 426 N.E.2d 1143.) For the reasons which follow, we should hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the instant case.
In reversing the trial court because of disagreement with the trial court’s interpretation of sections 194 and 235 of the Revenue Act, the majority expresses the view that the noncompliance by the Foundations with section 235 caused a judgment for delinquent taxes to be entered against the parcels in question and that, after the property was sold, the taxpayer’s remedy was limited to a legal remedy of redemption. The majority further expresses the view that, although the circuit court was empowered to do equity, the court was, nevertheless, powerless in this case because of specific provisions in section 235 of the Revenue Act. I disagree.
The provisions of section 235 do not require reversal of the trial court’s order in this case. Also, although the appellant, Oak Park, neither briefed nor argued a section 2 — 1401 issue, the majority expresses the view that the circuit court improperly granted injunctive relief tolling the statute because, pursuant to section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if the administrative review proves successful, the Foundations have an adequate statutory remedy to challenge any tax deed ultimately issued to Oak Park. Relative to the availability of relief which might be sought in a post-trial proceeding, it is my view that we should not decide issues on appeal which have been neither briefed nor argued. Also, even were the matter properly before us, the majority’s view that proceedings pursuant to section 2 — 1401 provide an adequate remedy in the case sub judice is mistaken in my opinion.
Then, too, even assuming arguendo that the Foundations have an adequate remedy at law, we should affirm the trial court’s injunction because the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly decided that the only exceptions to the bar against equitable or declaratory relief where an adequate legal remedy exists are complaints that the tax is unauthorized by law or is exempt property. (See First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Rosewell (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 388, 392, 444 N.E.2d 126.) In the First National Bank case, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote:
"This court has consistently held that independent grounds for equitable jurisdiction in cases involving real estate taxes exist only when an unauthorized tax is levied or when exempt property is taxed ***. [Citations.] In all other situations, equity will assume jurisdiction only when no adequate legal remedy is available.” (Emphasis added.) (First National Bank, 93 Ill. 2d at 392.)
Thus, even the availability of an adequate remedy at law is no basis for denying equitable relief when exempt property is taxed.
Finally, the learned trial court judge issued a comprehensive and proper order, some of the pertinent provisions of which state:
"The court, balancing the interests of the parties, further finds that entry of an injunction will cause substantially less harm to the Count II and III Defendants than the withholding of injunctive relief will cause to the Plaintiff[s], and that there is a public interest, expressed by the [Gjeneral [Assembly, in permitting tax exemption for properties being used for charitable purposes. The court further finds that, in the circumstances of this case, no bond is necessary.
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against the Count II and Count III Defendants is therefore hereby granted. It is hereby ordered that Defendants *** be, and they are hereby enjoined and restrained from taking any action whatever (1) to cause or procure the forfeiture of Plaintiffs[’] rights regarding the tax proceedings which are the subject hereof, or (2) to cause or procure the issuance of a tax deed respecting the subject property or any part thereof, pending and until resolution of this cause. This order tolls and stops the running of Plaintiffs’ period of redemption respecting tax sales of the subject property, pending and until resolution of this cause.”
It is the opinion of the majority in the instant case that the trial court lacked authority to issue this stay order. I disagree. I disagree because the circuit court has the discretionary power to stay the decision of an administrative agency pending final review of that agency pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Review Law. The Administrative Review Law provides:
"§ 3 — 111. Powers of circuit court, (a) The Circuit Court has power:
(1) with or without requiring bond (except if otherwise provided in the particular statute under authority of which the administrative decision was entered), and before or after answer filed, upon notice to the agency and. good cause shown, to stay the decision of the administrative agency in whole or in part pending the final disposition of the case.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 111 (West 1992).
Also, see Group Securities, Inc. v. Carpentier (1958), 19 Ill. App. 3d 513, 530-31, 154 N.E.2d 837. Accordingly, I dissent.