(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent in the belief the legislature did not intend the open meetings law to apply to the athletic council. I disagree the athletic council exercises governmental powers.
Neither do I agree the council essentially represents the public in directing and administering intercollegiate athletics at the university. I think the record is clear the council represents the university administration and, through the administration, the students attending the university in maintaining institutional control over the athletic program.
I do not read the record to show state appropriations are a source of revenue for intercollegiate athletics at the university. One basis for such a holding by the majority seems to be salaries paid from appropriations to some physical education department employees who spend a part of their time coaching intercollegiate track, golf, swimming, tennis, wrestling and gymnastics. The other basis seems to be time contributed to the council by members and staff who are salaried university employees. No funds were directly appropriated for the council during the only year described in the record.
Section 28A.1(1) extends the open meetings law to boards, councils, or commissions, “created or authorized by the laws of this state.” Plainly the athletic council was not “created” by the laws of this state. The question then becomes whether the council was “authorized” within the meaning of § 28A.1(1).
The majority points to § 262.12, The Code, to support their claim the athletic council is authorized by statute. That section permits the board of regents to appoint committees, offices and agencies to serve the purpose of the board of regents. But the athletic council is not appointed by the board of regents. I do not agree with the majority’s expressed belief the athletic council could not lawfully exercise its powers if it were not a body authorized to do so under § 262.12. I do not understand that section to prohibit setting up boards and committees in connection with university administration. Rather I understand § 262.12 merely to authorize the board of regents to create committees, offices and agencies for its own purposes.
“Authorized” is generally defined to mean “permitted.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Rev.Ed., p. 169. The definition in turn is susceptible to two interpretations. Authorized might be interpreted to mean either (1) expressly permitted, or (2) not prohibited. The activities of the athletic council are not expressly permitted by any statute.
It follows then for plaintiffs to rely on § 28A.1(1) the term “authorized” has to be interpreted to mean “not illegal.” I do not believe the legislature intended to extend the open meetings law to boards, councils or commissions merely because their operation is not illegal.
Section 28A.1(2) is inapplicable to the present situation because it refers only to *563governing bodies of counties, cities, townships, school corporations, political subdivisions, or tax supported districts. The athletic council is not included in any of these categories.
The last relevant provision in the section, § 28A.1(3), extends the law to “any committee of any such board, council, commission, trustees, or governing body.” Significantly the legislature did not extend the law to committees appointed by such boards, councils, commissions, trustees, or governing bodies. I believe the words “any committee of”, as used in § 28A.1(3), mean committees comprised of the statutory organizations’ own members. The athletic council is not made up of members of any statutory organization. Rather the council members are appointed by a statutory organization.
I do not believe the legislature intended to extend the open meetings law to what are essentially administrative staff meetings. Rather the legislature intended the formulation of recommendations by groups such as the faculty, administration and athletic councils of universities need not be carried on in public.
I would affirm.
MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, J., join this dissent.