dissenting.
Dissenting Opinion
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority opinion was oriented in its entirety to one consideration and one only. This consideration is the convenience, desires and benefits to the residents of the affected area to be detached and can be considered only in the general statutory terms “. . . whether it is to the best interests of the schools of the area and the educational welfare of the pupils.” The convenience, desires and benefits to the residents of the affected area is only one of the factors affecting those statutory criteria and must, together with other factors, in the first instance, be determined by the County Board of School Trustees which the legislature has said shall be the instrument for that purpose. Much as we might enjoy directing the social progress of the area, we must be limited in that enjoyment by the statutory authority given to the Board and by court decisions construing that authority. This authority and those constructions have been used in the majority opinion. However their use has been subverted to the support of an unwarranted conclusion.
My colleagues have relied heavily on Oakdale Community Consol. School District No. 1 v. County Board of School Trustees, of Randolph County, 12 Ill2d 190, 45 NE2d 736, as authority for their decision but in quoting extensively from the case they have ignored its substance. Abundant evidence of the convenience, desires and benefits to the residents of the affected area were found insufficient to support the order of the Board. In the instant case similar evidence is now found sufficient to reverse the order of the Board. The Oakdale case says specifically, “The rule which accords a prima facie validity to administrative decisions does not relieve a court of the important duty to examine the evidence in an impartial manner and to set aside an order which is unsupported in fact.” This statement very clearly recognizes the prima facie validity of the Board’s order and that such order will be set aside only upon a determination that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. To this end it is necessary to examine the evidence impartially to see whether any disparity in weight between the opposing sides is so manifest as to necessitate the substitution of this Court’s opinion for that of the Board. My learned brothers have concluded that since they do not consider significant the evidence adduced by Appellant it must therefore have no weight and consequently the Board’s opinion must be against the manifest weight of the evidence. The majority opinion does not examine or compare the evidence but states as a conclusion that there was in effect no substantial competent evidence to support the Board’s finding.
I certainly agree that the evidence shows no appreciable benefit to the Richwoods District and that a substantial benefit in education and extra-curricular benefits would accrue to the eleven children and families of the area affected. I cannot however agree that the proximity of the area to Richwoods or the speculative increase in real estate values should be controlling and I most emphatically cannot agree that the evidence shows no substantial detriment to the Dunlap District. The very essence of the argument of Petitioners is that the smaller student enrollment and assessed valuation of the Dunlap District does not permit the variation of activity, both educational and otherwise, of the larger Richwoods District. They would therefore prefer to send their children to the larger school. Perhaps the decrease in assessed valuation, standing alone, would be no substantial detriment, however I cannot see how the loss of student enrollment, present and future, could fail to add to the problems already complained of and seriously handicap the pupils of the losing district. In view of this and by application of the very authorities cited in the majority opinion, I cannot see how a condition which is of no benefit or detriment to 2,045 students, of considerable detriment to 269 students and of considerable benefit to 11, can be said to be one in which, “the benefit derived from the annexing and affected areas out weighs the detriment resulting to the losing district and the surrounding community as a whole.” Trico Community School District v. County Board of School Trustees, of Randolph County, 8 Ill App2d 494, 131 NE2d 829 and Oakdale School District No. 1 v. County Board of School Trustees of Randolph County, 12 Ill2d 190, 145 NE2d 736. Nor can I say that the record discloses no substantial, competent evidence covering these points.
It is unfortunate that all school districts cannot offer the same variety of education but this must necessarily be true where there is disparity in size between districts. It is perhaps even more unfortunate that two such districts should adjoin but this again is a matter which it is not within the power of this Court to control.
The record discloses evidence on the part of the Dunlap district showing that the education available at Dunlap met the standard of accreditation for the State of Illinois and the North Central Association of Secondary Schools and Colleges. This evidence is undisputed. There is nothing in the record to suggest any higher rating by Bichwoods but only that more than is necessary is offered.
School boundaries must be established somewhere and it would be patently unsound to urge that a district, by locating at its extreme corners could effect an automatic boundary change. It is equally unsound to suggest that a family wishing to live within one district may change its boundaries by orienting the family interests in the direction of another district.
In attempting to minimize the weight of the evidence adduced by Appellant, the majority opinion suggests that “none of the families in this area objected to the original petition . . . Dunlap being the only objector.” It is not to be assumed that this Court would uphold the argument that the number of witnesses is any substitute for the quality of testimony. The testimony for Petitioners consisted of families living within the affected area, the Principal and Business Manager of Richwoods and a planner associated as Executive Director of the Tri-County Planning Commission. The three latter witnesses did not give an opinion as to the educational welfare of either district or the affected area while the families living within the affected area gave an opinion only as to the effect such annexation would have on the families and real estate of that area. The testimony of the educators and school board members of the Dunlap District which this Court now states to be negligible is the only and best testimony one should expect under the circumstances. That which affects a school district is the business of the educators and Board of Trustees of that district. To take action on what affects that district is what they are hired and elected to do. The fact that the majority refers to the plan of the Tri-County Planning Commission as being in support of its decision illustrates their disregard of the central issue of this case. As is suggested by the plan, the boundary between the Dunlap and Eichwoods Districts should be moved. However the plan presupposes the reduction in the number of school districts in Peoria County from the present 50 districts to 9 districts and ultimately to 7 districts and does not purport to propose or suppose that a boundary change as presented to us will not seriously injure a losing district.
In analyzing the record I suggest that this is a case in which the County Board could have found either way and either finding would have been supported by substantial competent evidence. Since this is my position I fail to see how the finding which it did make can be “against the manifest weight of the evidence” and believe that the Circuit Court of Peoria County should be reversed.