dissenting.
The majority holds that defendant Buddy Randolph should have been permitted to present rehabilitation evidence to the trial court following the Appellate Division’s remand. Its decision is premised upon a broad construction of the Appellate Division’s order directing the trial court to conduct a new sentencing proceeding. The majority concludes that the Appellate Division intended that the trial court conduct an unlimited resentencing on remand, and that defendant consequently was entitled to offer evidence of his post-conviction rehabilitation at his resentencing hearing.
I agree with the majority that the introduction of post-conviction rehabilitation evidence is permissible when a sentence is vacated or an appellate court orders a remand that is unlimited in scope. I also agree with the majority’s observation that when an appellate court orders a limited remand for resentencing, that remand should be conducted on the record that was before the trial court when it conducted the original sentencing.
My difference with the majority concerns the application of those principles to this case. I do not interpret the Appellate Division’s remand order as expansively as it is construed by the majority. Based on the procedural setting of the remand, the colloquy between the court and counsel during oral argument of defendant’s appeal, the language of the Appellate Division’s remand order and another Appellate Division panel’s subsequent affirmance of the trial court’s resentencing, I conclude that the panel directed a remand limited in purpose and scope. That remand was intended to ensure the trial court’s compliance with *356two of this Court’s decisions guiding sentencing courts considering consecutive sentences pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a): State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44, 498 A.2d 1239 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1193, 89 L.Ed.2d 308 (1986), which sets forth the standard for determining whether sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively, and State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122, 527 A.2d 1362 (1987), which provides guidelines for the imposition of two or more consecutive sentences, each of which represents the maximum term for the offense committed by the defendant.
Accordingly, I agree with the holdings of the trial court and the Appellate Division that defendant was not entitled to present evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation to the trial court at the time of his resentencing, and I respectfully dissent.
I.
The Appellate Division entered the order of remand at the center of this case in a familiar legal framework, applying the deferential standard of review that governs the sentencing determinations of trial courts. Even if an appellate court would have arrived at a different result, it must affirm a sentence “ ‘as long as the trial court properly identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by competent credible evidence in the record. Assuming the trial court follows the sentencing guidelines, the one exception to that obligation occurs when a sentence shocks the judicial conscience.’ ” State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180, 966 A.2d 473 (2009) (quoting State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215-16, 564 A.2d 1202 (1989)).
New Jersey’s sentencing scheme “envisages an important function for appellate courts in clarifying relevant standards, promoting consistent interpretation of sentencing guidelines, and enhancing uniformity in the application of statutory standards to similar facts under similar circumstances.” State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 400-01, 555 A.2d 559 (1989). In State v. Both, 95 N.J. 334, *357364-65, 471 A.2d 370 (1984), this Court defined three distinct appellate functions in sentencing review:
[The appellate court] can (a) review sentences to determine if the legislative policies, here the sentencing guidelines, were violated; (b) review the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether those factors were based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; (e) determine whether, even though the court sentenced in accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless the application of the guidelines to the facts of this case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.
When appellate review results in a reversal, Rule 2:10-3 authorizes the reviewing court to impose a corrected sentence as an exercise of original jurisdiction under Rule 2:10-5, or to “remand the matter to the trial court for proper sentence.”
As the majority indicates, appellate orders remanding to the trial court for resentencing may be expansively phrased or precisely tailored to correct a given defect in the sentence. Appellate courts intending to set aside an illegal sentence typically convey that intent with an order expressly vacating the sentence or using similarly broad language. See, e.g., State v. Lawless, 423 N.J.Super. 293, 298, 32 A.3d 562 (App.Div.2011), leave to appeal granted, 209 N.J. 230, 36 A.3d 1062 (2012); State v. Pennington, 418 N.J.Super. 548, 550, 14 A.3d 790 (App.Div.2011), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 595, 39 A.3d 199 (2012); State v. Tindall, 417 N.J.Super. 530, 572, 10 A.3d 1203 (App.Div.2011); State v. Felsen, 383 N.J.Super. 154, 164-65, 890 A.2d 1029 (App.Div.2006).
Other remand orders are more limited in scope. An appellate court may remand a case to the trial court for resentencing because of specific concerns, such as the trial court’s failure to specifically set forth the factual basis for its determination under a statutory standard. See, e.g., State v. Thoms, 191 N.J. 313, 313, 923 A.2d 228 (2007) (remanding to trial court to place on record its factual basis for imposing consecutive sentences); Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 122, 527 A.2d 1362 (same). Such a limited remand may be appropriate when an appellate court questions a sentencing court’s application of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a). The statute affords to trial courts discretion to determine whether multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively, but requires the sentenc*358ing court to undertake a careful weighing of factors identified in Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 643-44, 498 A.2d 1239.1 Similarly, before imposing consecutive sentences that represent the maximum term for the defendant’s offenses, the sentencing court must undertake the analysis required by Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 122, 527 A.2d 1362. See, e.g., State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 514-15, 878 A.2d 746 (2005) (requiring trial court to indicate on record its rationale in imposing consecutive maximum sentences in accordance with Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 122, 527 A.2d 1362).
When a sentencing court fails to consider Yarbough or Miller, or its rationale for imposing consecutive sentences cannot be discerned on appeal, an appellate court may remand for resentencing so that “the record is clear enough to avoid doubt as to the facts and principles the court considered and how it meant to apply them.” State v. Dashawn Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 130, 13 A.3d 873 (2011); see also Thoms, supra, 191 N.J. at 313, 923 A.2d 228; Abdullah, supra, 184 N.J. at 514-15, 878 A.2d 746; Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 122, 527 A.2d 1362; State v. Hannigan, 408 N.J.Super. 388, 400, 975 A.2d 466 (App.Div.2009). As the Court noted, such a remand is appropriate when the appellate court “cannot sufficient ly discern the trial court’s reasoning,” but the appellate court should not suggest the result of the sentencing court’s Yarbough analysis, because “the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences rests in the first instance with the trial court.” Dashawn Miller, supra, 205 N.J. at 130, 13 A.3d 873.
As the majority holds, the scope of the remand order determines the admissibility of rehabilitation evidence in the resentencing that follows. Ante at 350, 44 A.3d at 1125-26. The majority *359adopts the principles articulated by the Appellate Division in State v. Towey, 244 N.J.Super. 582, 595, 583 A.2d 352 (App.Div.1990). In Towey, the Appellate Division held that there was an important distinction between the information to be considered in the setting of that case—in which the Appellate Division vacated the trial court’s sentence—and “the material to be considered in determining whether the original sentence was in accord with accepted guidelines.” Id. at 594 n.2, 583 A.2d 352. In the latter case, “only the evidence before the sentencing judge is appropriate for consideration.” Ibid.
This cautious approach to the admission of post-conviction rehabilitation evidence following a limited remand is consistent with the Legislature’s “ ‘dominant, if not paramount, goal’ ” in enacting the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice: the promotion of uniformity in sentencing. State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485, 878 A.2d 724 (2005) (quoting State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345, 352, 744 A.2d 640 (2000)). Although several of the aggravating and mitigating factors identified in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(a) and (b) focus on the defendant as an individual, “the sentence imposed must reflect the Legislature’s intention to focus on the degree of the crime itself as opposed to other factors personal to the defendant.” State v. Hodge, 95 N.J. 369, 377, 471 A.2d 389 (1984); see also State v. Hartye, 105 N.J. 411, 418, 522 A.2d 418 (1987); Lawless, supra, 423 N.J.Super. at 298, 32 A.3d 562; State v. Mosch, 214 N.J.Super. 457, 462, 519 A.2d 937 (App.Div.1986), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 131, 526 A.2d 197 (1987). The aggravating and mitigating factors “do not have equivalent value. The qualitative assessment must always have the severity of the crime as its principal consideration.” Towey, supra, 244 N.J.Super. at 595, 583 A.2d 352 (citing Hodge, supra, 95 N.J. at 377-79, 471 A.2d 389; State v. Gerstofer, 191 N.J.Super. 542, 546-47, 468 A.2d 436 (App.Div.1983), certif. denied, 96 N.J. 310, 475 A.2d 599 (1984)).
Accordingly, limiting evidence of post-conviction rehabilitation evidence to cases in which the appellate court vacates an illegal sentence, or orders a general remand for resentencing, furthers *360the Legislature’s purpose when it enacted its sweeping reform of New Jersey’s sentencing law.
II.
Given these legal principles, the scope of the Appellate Division’s remand in this ease is central to the inquiry, and the history of defendant’s sentencing proceedings is critical.
During defendant’s original sentencing hearing, on October 18, 2002, the trial court imposed three consecutive sentences totaling twenty years of imprisonment with eight and one-half years’ parole ineligibility. The sentencing judge commented that the imposition of consecutive sentences “realizes the goal,” to which defense counsel agreed, but the judge made no findings under Yarbough. Although each of the consecutive sentences imposed represented the maximum term available for the offense, the sentencing judge similarly did not undertake the analysis required by Miller, swpra, 108 N.J. at 122, 527 A.2d 1362. After the Appellate Division remanded the case for resentencing pursuant to Nótale, a different sentencing judge imposed the same sentence as the defendant’s original sentence in an amended judgment of conviction, but the record again lacked an analysis of the Yarbough factors or the Miller standard. Thus, the consecutive sentences which prompted this appeal were given by the original sentencing judge without the findings compelled by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a) and our case law.
In defendant’s second appeal, considered by an Excessive Sentencing Oral Argument panel of the Appellate Division on April 24, 2007, defense counsel requested a remand to address the consecutive sentences. Defense counsel told the Appellate Division panel that the appeal was premised on the argument that the trial court had imposed three consecutive sentences, each representing the maximum penalty in the statutory range, without appropriate findings as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a) and the case law:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Basically, Your Honors, my main challenge is to the consecutive nature of the sentences. Mr. Randolph received an aggregate 20 year *361term with an eight and a half year parole bar. I think the notice of appeal is incorrect, by the way. I think it says ten, it should say 20. Just an oversight, I guess.
Basically the Judge got to that number by running three separate indictments together. The aggravated assaults is one consecutive to a gun charge, consecutive to a gun charge. And I would just point out that there were no reasons given for running three consecutive sentences. Each of them is a maximum. And Miller and Pennington all say that ordinarily you shouldn’t run that many together, or if you do they shouldn’t be maxed out every count. And even if you do that there has to be some justification. No justification—
After a brief colloquy with the panel to clarify the sentence imposed for each count of the indictment, defense counsel continued to press for a remand for the sentencing court to provide the “justification” required by the case law:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s three separate indictments or three separate events run consecutive. And the only justification really given for three consecutive sentences [is] on sentencing transcript on Page 25 the Judge says well, stop there because that realizes the goal, right? So in essence the Judge was just trying to add up numbers to get to 20. And I would just suggest that that’s not what the code says he’s supposed to do. It’s not what Miller or Pennington, Yarbough, all the consecutive sentencing cases say you’re supposed to do. He is only 20. These were his first indictable convictions although obviously he has a pretty atrocious juvenile record.
He’s been a drug addict since he was about 12 years old. So I think given all those circumstances, given the lack of reasoning there should at least be a remand for the Judge to determine whether or not the aggravating factors justify three consecutive maximum terms.
Thus, defense counsel clearly requested that the Appellate Division remand to the sentencing court for a limited purpose: an analysis of the imposition of consecutive sentences, each representing a maximum term, under Yarbough and Miller. The panel’s anticipation of a limited remand was underscored in the same hearing by a colloquy between a member of the panel and the prosecutor:
[THE COURT]: Isn’t it clear from the case law that even where the sentence is the result of a plea negotiation the Court still has to justify the various elements of the sentence? The terms, the parole ineligibility, consecutiveness, and I think that [defense counsel] is correct the cases say that there needs to be some fairly special considerations when you’re doing more than two consecutive terms. That’s—all of that is correct. Correct?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Well, Your Honors, with regard to the consecutive terms it is clear from the record that these are all separate acts involving three other *362eases involving three separate victims. So the Court could affirm the consecutive sentence in its discretion when it is very clear. However, if—
[THE COURT]: But it needs to make it clear on the record, doesn’t it?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. If the Court feels that these should be remanded the state will concede only for the limited purpose of the trial court putting on the record the reasons for the consecutive purpose.
[THE COURT]: Okay. Thank you.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Nothing further, Your Honor. Thank you.
[THE COURT]: The matter will [b]e remanded for reconsideration and justification of three consecutive maximum terms.
The limited purpose of the remand was confirmed by the language of the panel’s written order: “[w]e remand for reconsideration and justification for the sentence of three consecutive maximum terms.”2
It is, in my view, abundantly clear that the Appellate Division’s remand to the sentencing court was intended to serve a limited purpose: to prompt the trial court to undertake the analysis required by statutory and case law with respect to its imposition of consecutive sentences. This limited remand was requested by defendant, consented to by the State and reflected in the oral and written orders of the Appellate Division panel. Nothing in the record suggests that the Appellate Division intended to vacate the sentence or remand for a comprehensive resentencing; indeed, it included the term “justification” in the remand order to direct the trial court to set forth the basis for its sentence. In the language of Towey, cited with approval by the majority, the remand at issue here was for a determination “whether the original sentence was in accord with accepted guidelines.” Towey, supra, 244 N.J.Super. at 594 n.2, 583 A.2d 352. Accordingly, the sentencing court relied only on the evidence that had been before the trial judge when he conducted defendant’s sentencing, and did not consider post-conviction rehabilitation evidence offered by defendant. See *363ibid. The limited scope of the Appellate Division’s remand order was further confirmed by a second panel’s October 18, 2010 affirmance of the trial court’s sentence. Given the parameters of the remand, the trial court’s limitation of the evidence on resen-tencing was, in my view, correct.
Accordingly, I would affirm, and I respectfully dissent.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN and HOENS—4.
For affirmance—Justices PATTERSON and WEFING (temporarily assigned)—2.
The criteria include: "(a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other; (b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence; (c) the crimes were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior; (d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims; (e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be imposed are numerous.” Yarbough, supra, 100 N.J. at 644, 498 A.2d 1239.
In an apparent drafting error, the Appellate Division’s order cited State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 902 A.2d 1195 (2006). Pierce addresses the standard of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) for sentencing under the persistent offender statute, and is irrelevant to this case.