Opinion on Petition to Rehear
Petitioner has filed a very forceful and earnest petition to rehear.
Petitioner insists we misconceived his theory. He argues he relied upon the case of McGhee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W. 509, 18 A.L.R. 103 (1921), for the proposition the only difference between an estate by the entirety and an estate held as a tenant in common is the right of survivorship; and that in all other respects tenants by the entireties are equal owners of the property. That the right of survivorship was terminated by *273the voluntary conveyance of Murray to his wife of his interest in the property.
Petitioner states his theory is, after the conveyance was made and the original bill filed in this cause, the wife took the fee simple title to the property subject to the lien in favor of the husband’s creditors, which lien extended to his interest in the property, and which was a one-half interest.
• It is then arg-ued since the deed from Murray to his wife is good as between them, neither Murray’s Executor nor Mrs. Murray can say the conveyance did not destroy the tenancy by the entireties. This being true, applying T.C.A. Section 64-317 to the facts of this case, the conveyance is “set aside to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim; the lien of the creditor is satisfied only to the extent of the interest of the husband to the property.”
■ T.C.A. Section 64-317 provides:
“Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a purchaser, (a) have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or (b) disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property conveyed.”
We said in our original opinion the rights of the creditors of the deceased in the property prior to the conveyance to his wife were only a contingent interest in the husband’s right of survivorship.
*274The lien created by the filing of the bill could only attach to the interest owned by the deceased as a tenant by the entirety; and the doctrine of estoppel could not create a greater right.
In the event the deed was set aside or annulled as provided by T.C.A. Section 64-317 at the insistence of the creditors then, as to them, the deed creating the tenancy by the entireties would be restored.
The lien of the creditors on the right of survivor-ship of Murray was extinguished by his death.
In Sloan v. Sloan, 182 Tenn. 162, 184 S.W.2d 391 (1945), the Court said:
“The purchaser of a husband’s interest in an estate by the entirety where the wife does not join, stands in the husband’s shoes so far as ultimate survivorship be concerned.”
The deed, though fraudulent as to the creditors of the deceased, did not create a greater right in his creditors than that which existed prior to its execution.
The petition is denied at the cost of petitioner.