In their petition for a rehearing herein defendants (appellants) Walter J. Lewis and Annie Lewis complain that the opinion of this court is based sub*33stantially upon defaults of defendants in the payments of rents, thus leaving room for the operation of section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure, giving them five days after judgment within which to pay the unpaid rents and reinstate the lease. Defendants also contend that the findings and judgment of the trial court in terminating the lease for violation of its covenants binding defendants to keep the demised premises in good order and condition, reasonable use excepted, to make no alterations or changes therein without the written consent of the lessors, to keep the premises as fully and well furnished as when leased, and to make the necessary restorations and replacements and to keep it so furnished, constituted prejudicial error.
In regard to those findings and the facts upon which they were based, this court said: “The findings are supported by substantial evidence.”
The lease provides that the lessors shall have a first lien on the furnishings to secure the rents and certain other covenants of the lease, and that “should any of the rents herein provided for be due and unpaid ... or should the lessee be in default in any other condition or covenant of this lease, the lessors may at their option and upon ten (10) days written notice . . . re-enter and take possession of the premises and remove all persons therefrom, . . . and . . . terminate this lease.”
The testimony quoted in the briefs of the parties, and reported in the transcript of the evidence, satisfactorily shows that each of the covenants herein mentioned was violated by the defendants, and that each of the findings relating to those matters had substantial support.
The notice to terminate the tenancy recited that certain alterations had been made by defendants in the leased premises without the consent of the lessors, that the premises had not been kept as fully and well furnished as at the date of the lease, and other defaults which need not be mentioned here, and demanded that each of the defaults be remedied within ten days or the lease would be forfeited and possession of the premises retaken by plaintiff.
The three days’ notice to quit referred to the ten days’ notice, recited the defaults mentioned in that notice and that none of them had been cured, and demanded that they *34be cured within three days or possession be given or legal proceedings would be instituted for possession.
One who seeks the summary remedy allowed by the must bring himself clearly within its terms (Harris v. Bissell, 54 Cal. App. 307, 313 [204 Pac. 453]; Opera House Assn. v. Bert, 52 Cal. 471; Iburg v. Fitch, 57 Cal. 192); but where, as in this case, the breaches are shown and proper notices of forfeiture given, the court is authorized to grant the relief prayed for (sec. 1161, subd. 3, Code Civ. Proc.; Pfitzer v. Candeias, 53 Cal. App. 737 [200 Pac. 839]).
The finding of the lower court to the effect that failed to keep the premises in repair, if erroneous for the reason that the notices made no mention of such default, was not prejudicial to the rights of defendants. The failure of defendants to fulfill the other covenants not to alter the premises without consent and to keep the premises furnished are sufficient to sustain the judgment terminating the lease with no right of reinstatement.
Petition for rehearing is denied.
A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on February 23, 1928.
All the Justices present concurred.