In this case the real estate in question was sold for taxes on December 28, 1931, and certificate of sale thereof was issued to Lincoln county. About nine years thereafter, on October 8, 1940, the certificate was assigned to Galbraith. In 1942 Galbraith applied for the *417issuance of a tax deed and on September 17, 1942, tax deed was issued. The majority opinion declares this tax deed void and the only basis for such declaration is that the notice given concerning the application for treasurer’s deed is “uncertain, indefinite, ambiguous and false.” This conclusion is reached solely upon the ground that the notice which was published on May 21, 1942, advised all persons claiming interest in said property that “a tax deed will be issued for said real estate to' the said C. F. Galbraith on the 16th day of September, A. D. 1942, unless the same has been redeemed.” It is said that this notice, relating as it does to an event to take place about four months in the future, is “uncertain, indefinite, ambiguous and false,” because the deed to which the notice relates was not in fact issued until September 17, 1942, or on the day following the time fixed in the notice.
I submit that the only purpose for the publication of the notice is to protect the interest of the fee title owner and afford an opportunity for redemption prior to issuance of the deed. The fact that the deed was issued upon the day following that named in the notice in no manner whatever adversely affected those rights. Upon the contrary, the right to redeem continued for an additional day, and the defaulting tax payer actually had an extension of time for one day within which to redeem. Under the majority opinion he is permitted to capitalize upon this fact and reinstate his title to land which he had abandoned for tax paying purposes for twelve years.
I submit that a notice is either “certain” or “uncertain” at the time of its publication, and that a notice which is “certain” at that time cannot be made “uncertain” by something which happens or does not happen four months later. The same reasoning should be applied to a determination of the “indefiniteness” and the “ambiguity” and the “falsity” of the notice given in May, 1942. Tested in the scales of plain common sense any *418person reading the notice at any time prior to the actual execution of the deed cannot say that there is one “uncertain,” “ambiguous” or “false” word in it. The fact that the deed was issued on the day following that stated in the notice, cannot create “uncertainty,” .“indefiniteness,” or “ambiguity” in a notice which for a period of four consecutive months contained none of these objectionable characteristics.
I am unable to agree that the notice becomes “false” simply because the deed was issued on the day following that named in the notice as being the time for the issuance of the deed. The delay does not give rise to the kind of “false” statement which is recognized in law. It could not possibly adversely affect the rights of the persons for whose benefit the notice was given. The date stated in the notice was a date upon which the tax deed could legally issue. A different situation would be presented if the deed had been issued in advance of the date named in the notice.
The cases relied on in the majority opinion involve an erroneous statement in the notice concerning the expiration of “the time of redemption.” This has been held to mean the expiration of three years from the date of tax sale. Whenever such a date is not correctly stated in the notice, a false statement is made at the very moment of publication, because the statement relates to facts then existing. No such situation exists in the case at bar.
Young v. Rohan, 77 Colo. 70, 234 Pac. 694; and Green v. Halstead, 77 Colo. 578, 238 Pac. 40, cited in the opinion, were decided in 1925. Any support to be found in these authorities for the majority opinion was removed by the subsequent adoption by the legislature of chapter 40, section 151, ’35 C.S.A., which provides in- substance for a liberal construction of laws and documents affecting title to real estate to the end that such titles shall become absolute and free from “technical defects,” and thus more secure and marketable.
*419The defect relied upon in this cause as a basis for voiding the deed is certainly a “technical defect.” It did not in any manner whatever prejudice any right of the plaintiff who is nevertheless permitted to take advantage of it, to the unwarranted prejudice of the grantee in the treasurer’s deed. Thus the majority opinion fails to give effect to the direction of the legislature as expressed in said statute.
In the recent case of Colpitts v. Fastenau, 117 Colo. 594, 192 P. (2d) 524, recognizing the force of the statute above cited, and the trend of modern decisions, we held “technical defects” insufficient to set aside a treasurer’s deed. We there approved the following language quoted from an earlier case: “ ‘The payment of taxes is a duty which property holders owe to the government. If they neglect this duty they have no right to expect relief from the courts on account of merely technical errors on the part of the public officers, where no substantial right has been lost or impaired as in this case.’ ” (Emphasis supplied)
Certainly the “technical defect” here involved deprived- the persons for whose benefit the notice was given of no “substantial right.” Neither was any such right “lost” nor “impaired.” Although they lost nothing by the “technical defect” and were not harmed in any way thereby, it becomes the instrument by which a deed is set aside, the legislative will is disregarded, and the language above quoted from the Colpitts’ case ignored. Thus the facts, showing complete absence of injury, harm or prejudice resulting from a “technical defect” become weak and impotent, and a “technical defect” becomes strong and controlling.
I submit that the tax deed was issued in compliance with the law and that the judgment of the trial court was correct and should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Stone concur in the views expressed in this dissent.