dissenting.
I am not in accord with the court opinion. Rather, I am persuaded to the view that, inherently, and legally as well, there is' nothing in common between pension payments and burial benefits. Pensions constitute payments to pensioners, living persons. Burial benefits, upon the other hand, in the sense of the statute here, are for the use of those continuing in life as they go about burying their dead. The foregoing is not equivalent to saying that there may not be legislation, nor that it would not be desirable, carrying general appropriation features calculated to meet the burial burdens. The statutory section of defendants in error’s reliance is not supported by an appropriation out of the general fund, and only by indirection, wholly void of certainty, does it make reference to the pension fund out of which the administrative board would discharge burial costs. But, assuming the statutory intent was to make drafts on the pension fund for funeral expenses involved in burying deceased pensioners, not reasonably to be deduced as I think, still, such enactment is made noneffective by the plain inhibitions of constitutional origin. “All moneys deposited in the old age pension fund,” reads the Con-1 stitution, “shall be paid to those who qualify to receive a pension,” not to other persons for pensioners while living, nor in their memory when deceased. Again it is stated in the organic law: “All the moneys deposited in the old age pension fund shall remain inviolate for the *426purposes for which created, and no part thereof shall be transferred to any other fund, or used or appropriated for any other purpose.” In short, as • may not be gainsaid, the constitutional provisions involved are remarkably clear, of unmistakable import, wholly void of ambiguity, and do not constitute an absurdum. In . the situation thus resulting, the general rule was well stated by Mr. Justice Burke, as follows: “Where the language used is plain, its meaning clear, and no absurdity is involved, Constitution, statute or contract, must be declared and enforced as written. There is nothing to interpret.” People ex rel. v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P. (2d) 894. Addressing ourselves particularly to the provisions of the Constitution involved here, and speaking through our then Chief Justice Young, we said: “Furthermore, section 7 of the old age pension amendment provides that ‘all moneys deposited in the old age pension fund shall remain inviolate for the purposes for which created.’ The clear import of the language following the quoted portion of said section 7 is susceptible of no other interpretation than that the moneys deposited in the fund shall not be transferred to any other fund or used for any purpose other than for administrative expenses and for making the payments to the old age pensioners.” Davis v. Pensioners Protective Ass’n, 110 Colo. 380, 135 P. (2d) 142. Considering the plain language of the portion of the Constitution which the legislature has undertaken to interpret contrary to its patent meaning, and the rule of construction which we have applied in such situations, stated generally in the Hinderlider case, and particularly in the Davis case, I cannot think justification attends the court opinion. Only the people, as I believe, proceeding with the solemnity that attended the adoption of the original constitutional pension amendment, and in the manner thereof, may abrogate or change it.
Likewise, I am not in agreement with the doctrine advanced by the court in its opinion to the effect that *427the rule of contemporary construction may be invoked in support of the attempted legislative diversion of the moneys constitutionally raised and “deposited in the old age pension fund,” no part of which, reads the Constitution, “shall be transferred to any other fund, or used or appropriated for any other purpose.” Emphasizing again that the language of the constitutional amendment involved is plain and void of ambiguity, hence not subject to interpretation, I quote further from Justice Burke’s opinion in People v. Hinderlider, supra, as follows: “Long usage can neither repeal constitutional provisions nor justify their infraction.” Courts in other jurisdictions, and text writers, have discoursed on the rule of contemporary construction. I quote from some of them. “The doctrine of practical construction does not apply where there is no ambiguity.” State ex rel. v. Wiesner, 187 Wis. 384, 204 N.W. 589. “It is the undoubted rule that such- a construction [contemporaneous] may be resorted to in aid of interpretation in case of doubtful meaning. But when the language is unambiguous, its meaning cannot be modified or controlled by practice, however long continued.” Hartness v. Black, 95 Vt. 190, 114 Atl. 44. “While a court should hesitate to declare a statute unconstitutional until clearly satisfied of its invalidity, and where it has been on the statute books for many years the hesitation should be all the greater, yet, if such act is plainly in conflict with the organic law of the state, old age cannot give it life, and when the issue of its constitutionality is properly raised, it must be declared void. We have never ruled to the contrary.” Kucker v. Sunlight Oil & Gasoline Co., 230 Pa. 528, 79 Atl. 747, Ann. Cas. 1912 A. 503. “It is not at all material in the present inquiry that the statute under which the defendant claims immunity has been acquiesced in for many years.” Hamann v. Heekin, 88 Ohio St. 207, 102 N.E. 730. See, also, Fields v. Nickell, 248 Ky. 526, 58 S.W. (2d) 912. Legislative “interpretation should have controlling persuasiveness only in the case of doubtful *428meaning of construction, a condition not here present.” State ex rel. v. Connelly, 38 N.M. 312, 46 P. (2d) 1097, 100 A.L.R. 878. “It should be borne in mind that mere long usage and practical interpretation .cannot control in the interpretation of the Constitution, unless the language is obscure and doubtful. Such usage and interpretation are entitled to no weight if the statutes are in conflict with the plain meaning of the Constitution.” 11 Am. Jur. 706, §83. “A constitutional provision may be said to be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced.” Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.) 121. “Prohibitory provisions in a constitution are usually self-executing to the extent that anything done in violation of them is void.” 6 R.C.L. 62. I regard Bedford v. Sinclair, 112 Colo. 176, 147 P. (2d) 486, cited in the court opinion,, as beside the point. There no statute was involved. On the contrary, in that case, we were called upon to interpret the constitutional pension amendment itself. Paragraph (a) of section 2 thereof provided that certain excise taxes, including imposts on liquors, should “be made a part of said old age pension fund,” and paragraph (b) of the same section, seemingly, made like allocation of all “taxes of whatever kind upon” liquors. Pensioners, proceeding ably, and arguing plausibly, urged such interpretation upon us. We were not a little moved by their strong appeal; but our study, painstakingly indulged, led us to conclude that the constitutional amendment involved did not operate upon ad valorem levies. Having so stated in our opinion in that case, we added, clearly unnecessarily, that since from the beginning, all concerned, including pensioners, “entertained no thought of ad valorem levies,” and that that fact “should be accorded considerable weight.” In any event, and however Bedford v. Sinclair, supra, may be viewed, we were not concerned there, as here, with a statute couched in terms calculated to operate adversely to the plain language of the Constitution. To sustain such *429a statute would be to fly in'the face of all the authorities, and do violence to all reason.
I cannot think, as the court in its opinion holds, that the extent of the pension fund from time to time, or that for a considerable period all pensioners may have enjoyed the full minimum payment fixed by the Constitution, has or can have, to do with the constitutionality of the challenged enactment. A statute thus bottomed, is foundationless.
Considering the present cost of living, well within our judicial ken, and which operates to make present old age pensions inadequate, the suggestion is ventured that the General Assembly, presently to convene, may well give thought to the justice of supporting the statute involved with an appropriation from the plethoric general fund, a condition properly to be noticed.