dissenting. This is an action for the usurpation of an office, brought under section 321 of the Code of 1921, by the people upon the relation of the Attorney General, to test the title of the defendant below to the office of adjutant general. There was a judgment for defendant, and the relator brings the cause here upon writ of error.
The defendant was appointed adjutant general in 1922 by the Governor then in office. The defendant duly qualified for the office, and was still lawfully exercising the same on or about January 13, 1925, when the governor removed, or attempted to remove, him from the office, summarily. This action was commenced January 16, 1925.
The defendant’s appointment was authorized by chapter 183, Session Laws of 1921. The first two sections of that act are as follows:
*526“Section 1. That the Governor shall be Commander-in-Chief of the organized militia except when called into the service of the United States, and he shall appoint the Adjutant General who shall be Chief of Staff; Provided, That the Adjutant General shall have served as a field or line officer in the United States Army or National Guard and attained the rank of Major.
“Section 2. The Adjutant General and all general field and staff officers shall be appointed by the Governor. The Adjutant General and all officers shall be appointed as provided for in National Guard Regulations.
“No staff officer, including officers of the Pay, Inspection, Subsistence and Medical Departments, appointed since the 25th day of May, 1917, shall continue to serve as an officer of the National Guard of this State under his present commission unless he shall have had previous military experience previous to the date of said commission.
“All officers hereafter appointed shall have had previous military experience and shall hold their positions until they shall have reached the age of sixty-four years, unless retired prior to that time by reason of resignation, disability, or for cause to be determined by a court martial or efficiency board, legally convened for that purpose, and that vacancies among said officers shall be filled by appointment from officers or members of the National Guard of the State of Colorado.”
The defendant contends that inasmuch as he is still under the age of sixty-four years, he is entitled to remain in, and hold, the office under that clause in section 2, above quoted, which provides that “all officers hereafter appointed * * * shall hold their positions until they shall have reached the age of sixty-four years, * * *.”
The question to be determined is whether section 2 is applicable, or governs, this case; in other words, whether the adjutant general is one of the “officers” referred to, and contemplated, in the clause last above quoted.
If we were to consider only this clause, disassociated from its context and other parts of the Act, the conclu*527sion would be that the adjutant general is one of the “officers” referred to, and, therefore, entitled to hold his position until he “shall have reached the age of sixty-four years.” But words and phrases of a statute are to be understood as used, not in any abstract sense, but with due regard to the context, and in that sense which best harmonizes with all other parts of the statute. 36 Cyc. 1131.
In the early part of section 2, hereinbefore quoted, the legislature twice uses the expression: “The adjutant general and all officers.” If it had intended that the adjutant general is included in the word “officers”, the most apt expression would have been: “The adjutant general and all other officers.” Since the legislature evidently used the word “officers” twice in section 2 in a sense not including the adjutant general, it is to be presumed that when it used the word the next time, in the same section, it used it in the same sense.
“Where the same word or phrase is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout.” 36 Cyc. 1132.
The legislature used the term “officers” in a sense not including the Adjutant General because it was legislating chiefly with reference to the National Guard, and the office of adjutant general is not an office in the National Guard.
It is seen from the concluding part of section 2, hereinbefore quoted, that vacancies among said “officers” shall be filled by appointment from officers or members of the National Guard. This too, shows that the legislature did not intend the word “officers” to comprehend the adjutant general, because being merely an officer or member of the National Guard would not qualify him for the office of adjutant general. It is provided in section 1 of the act that he shall be one who “shall have served as a field or line officer in the United States Army or National Guard and attained the rank of Major.” “For the purpose of determining the meaning, although not the valid*528ity, of a statute, recourse may be had to considerations of public policy, and to the established policy of the legislature as disclosed by a general course of legislation.” 36 Cyc. 1111.
From all the statutes concerning the militia, in force in this state prior to the enactment of the act of 1921, it appears that the policy of the legislature has always been to make the term of the adjutant general practically coterminous with that of the governor appointing him, so that each governor could have or appoint an adjutant general of his own choice. Public policy would result likewise.
In State v. Ingalls, 21 Ariz. 411, 189 Pac. 430, the court, speaking of the office of adjutant general, said: “From the nature and duty of the office, and the intimate association of the officer with the commander-in-chief of the National Guard of the state, every reason and consideration would seem to emphasize the necessity of the Governor having the power at any time to choose for such office a person in whose ability and fidelity he could have implicit confidence; and, before he should be deprived of that power and right, a clear and explicit intention to do so should be made to appear.”
It is stated in the brief of defendant below, defendant in error here, that the act of 1921, being our National Guard Act, was enacted in obedience to the mandate found in section 2, article 17 of our state Constitution, providing that the “organization * * * of the militia shall conform, as nearly as practicable, to the regulations for the government of the armies of the United States.” We do not dispute that statement. But it avails defendant nothing, because no federal statute, and no regulation of the War Department, affects the tenure of the office of the adjutant general of a state. The state of Arizona, like others, has a similar or identical constitutional provision, yet when its legislature revised its Military Code, in 1921, it provided that the adjutant general “shall hold office dur*529ing the will and pleasure of the Governor.” S. L. Ariz., 1921, p. 318.
Section 293 of the National Guard Regulations issued by the War Department of the national government, in 1922, provides that “the commissions of officers of the National Guard are vacated * * * when they reach the age of 64 years.” This does not refer to the office of adjutant general of a state. Other sections of the regulations make this plain, and this situation is not disputed.
We agree with counsel for defendant in error that the General Assembly did intend to conform to federal regulations and to the National Defense Act, when it provided in section 2 of the act of 1921 that “all officers (meaning all officers of the National Guard) * * * shall hold their positions until they shall have reached the age of sixty-four years.” The legislature was, in this clause, dealing only with officers of the National Guard and not the adjutant general, just as the federal regulations refer to such officers and not to the adjutant general “of a state” when they fix the tenure of office as terminating at the age of 64 years. The regulations do not fix any tenure whatever for the office of adjutant general of a state, but in section 146 leave this to the “laws of the state.”
For reasons above indicated, section 2 of the act of 1921, while it fixes the tenure of officers of the National Guard, does not fix the tenure of the office of adjutant general; in other words, the term “all officers” as used in said section excludes the adjutant general. The trial court erred in holding to the contrary.
The act of 1921 expressly repeals former statutes which fixed the tenure of the office of adjutant general. No term is now fixed, and that being the situation, the officer holds at the pleasure of the appointing power. 29 Cyc. 1371, and cases cited in note 73; 29 Cyc. 1396. In section 304 Throop on Public Officers, the author says: “Where an office is filled by appointment, and a definite term of office is not fixed by a constitutional' or statutory provision, the office is held at the pleasure of the appoint*530ing power.” And in section 354 of the same work, it is said the appointing power, in such cases, may make the removal without charges.
The governor was authorized to remove the defendant from his office of adjutant general, without cause, or without the intervention of a court martial or efficiency board. It was therefore error to render judgment for defendant.
The judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff according to the prayer of the relator’s complaint.