Filed 9/25/23 Garcia v. Harris CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ROBERT D. GARCIA et al., D080385
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants, and
Appellants,
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
v. 00061532-CU-OR-NC)
RHONDA F. HARRIS et al.,
Defendants, Cross-complainants,
and Respondents.
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert P. Dahlquist, Judge. Affirmed.
Hall Griffin, Howard D. Hall, Valerie J. Schratz and Jeremy T. Katz for
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Appellants.
Hilbert & Satterly and Joseph A. LeVota for Defendants, Cross-
complainants and Respondents.
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, Robert and Paulette Garcia bought a six-acre horse ranch
(Parcel 20) in Warner Springs, a small unincorporated rural community in
northern San Diego County that sits on the Pacific Crest Trail. Their
neighbors, Rhonda and Sean Harris, owned an adjacent three-acre parcel
(Parcel 30) that included a dirt driveway along the western edge of their land.
The driveway provided ingress and egress to another, land-locked three-acre
parcel (Parcel 31) owned by a third party. Neither of the parcels owned by
the Garcias and Harrises are land-locked because they are each adjacent to
the main road.
In the early 1950s, all three parcels were owned by the same owner.
Over time, the three parcels were sold separately to various individuals. In
1966, in connection with the sale of Parcel 31, an express easement was
created to give the new owner of Parcel 31 use of the driveway to access their
land-locked parcel. In 1969, the owner of Parcel 31 acquired Parcel 20.
Common ownership of Parcel 20 and Parcel 31 continued until 2018, when
Patricia Phelps sold Parcel 20 to the Garcias and Parcel 31 to the third party.
Parcel 31 continued to have an express easement to use the driveway, while
the Garcias’ land did not.
When the Garcias bought their land, their purchase agreement
contained a provision requiring “[c]onfirmation of recorded shared driveway
easement” before close of escrow. They also received Phelps’s disclosure
advising them that “entrance drive is easement across [the Harris’s
property]” and “Seller does not guarantee access to the property over the
current driveway.” Phelps tried to have the Harrises execute documents to
create an express easement for use of their driveway for the benefit of Parcel
20 before she sold it to the Garcias. The Harrises declined. Undeterred,
Phelps conveyed Parcel 20 to the Garcias with a grant deed that purported to
contain an express easement for use of the Harrises’ driveway. When the
2
Garcias moved onto their land, the Harrises told them they did not have an
easement to use the driveway.
This lawsuit followed. The Garcias sued the Harrises, asserting three
causes of action for prescriptive easement, equitable easement, and judicial
declaration in favor of their right to use the driveway. The Harrises counter-
sued to quiet title in favor of no express easement benefitting the Garcias’
land. Following a two-day bench trial, the trial court found for the Harrises
on all three causes of action in the Garcias’ complaint, as well as on their
cross-complaint to quiet title. We affirm both judgments in favor of the
Harrises.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
Evidence at Trial
During the two-day bench trial, the trial court received a written
stipulation of facts regarding the historical ownership of the three parcels.
But as the court noted in its statement of decision, the stipulated facts did
not contain “all of the facts” the court considered relevant to the outcome of
the case. The court received trial testimony from seven witnesses, including
the Garcias and Harrises, the deposition testimony of Phelps, and numerous
exhibits. The court also conducted a site visit with the parties’ consent. The
evidence before the court established the following facts.1
1 “ ‘In general, in reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, “any conflict in the evidence or reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the
determination of the trial court decision.” ’ ” (Lui v. City and County of San
Francisco (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 962, 969.) “ ‘We may not reweigh the
evidence and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.
3
A. The Properties and Current Ownership
Warner Springs is a rural area in northern San Diego County. There
are three separately assessed parcels of land in Warner Springs at issue in
this lawsuit. The Garcias own six acres of land in Parcel 20. The Harrises
own three acres in Parcel 30. Randall McKee owns three acres in Parcel 31.2
[Citations.] Moreover, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the
judgment.’ ” (Ibid.)
2 McKee is not a party to this litigation.
4
The following satellite image from the trial evidence shows the general
locations of the three parcels:3
Fig. 1
Paradise Valley Road runs east-west along the southern boundary of Parcel
20 (the Garcias’ land) and Parcel 30 (the Harrises’ land). Parcel 31 (McKee’s
land) abuts the northern boundary of Parcel 30 and the upper eastern
boundary of Parcel 20. Parcel 31 is land-locked, while Parcel 20 and Parcel
30 are not.
3 The written annotations are by the parties. We have added the yellow
dashed lines to make clearer the general demarcation of the three parcels.
5
B. 1966: Creation of the Express Easement for the Benefit of Parcel 31
As of 1951, Herman Silveria owned all three parcels. In that year,
Silveria sold Parcel 20. In 1966, Silveria sold Parcel 31 to the Tobins.
In connection with the sale to the Tobins, Silveria created an express
easement “ ‘generally located on the [w]estern 30-foot section of Parcel 30’ ”
for the benefit of Parcel 31 (the Easement). The 1966 grant deed to the
Tobins specifically defined the Easement as:
“PARCEL 2:
“An easement for ingress and egress, repairs, installation and
maintenance of water, gas, sewer, and power lines and conduit,
installation and maintenance and repairs of poles, guide wires
and lines for transmission of electrical energy over [legal
description omitted].”
6
The Easement appears as the yellow-striped portion of the following
excerpted and annotated parcel map from the trial evidence:
Fig. 2
Within the Easement’s boundaries is a dirt driveway that runs south-
north along the property line with Parcel 20 for the entire western side of
Parcel 30 and terminates at Parcel 31 (the Driveway). The Driveway, at
issue in this appeal, is the sole route of access to Parcel 31 from any public
road.
C. 1969 to 2005: Common Ownership of Parcels 20 and 31
In 1969, the Tobins acquired Parcel 20 to add to their ownership of
Parcel 31, for a total of nine acres. The two parcels, however, remained at all
times separately assessed.
7
In 1975, the Tobins sold Parcels 20 and 31 to the Johnsons. Parcels 20
and 31 continued to be held under common ownership by a series of owners
between 1975 and 2018.
From 1976 to 2003, Caroline Showman and her husband owned the two
parcels after purchasing them from the Johnsons. The Showmans used the
nine-acre property as a weekend and vacation destination until 2002, at
which time they made it their primary residence. The Showmans lived in a
house on Parcel 20. To access their house on Parcel 20, the Showmans would
turn north from Paradise Valley Road onto the Driveway. Importantly, they
would travel down the Driveway over Parcel 30 until the Easement
terminates at Parcel 31; and once at their property on Parcel 31, they would
cross over to Parcel 20. Mrs. Showman used the Driveway at least once or
twice each week when she lived there full-time, without ever encountering
any issues.
In 2003, Valerie Schmidt and her then-husband purchased the two
parcels from the Showmans. Schmidt bought the nine-acre property to set up
a horse business on it. She added horse-related facilities to Parcel 20,
including a barn, pens, a hay shed, and wash racks. Customers of the horse
business visited the property once every month or two. Like the Showmans,
Schmidt lived in the house on Parcel 20. She used the Driveway in the exact
same manner as the Showmans to access the house, including going to Parcel
31 before crossing over to Parcel 20, without any issues.
D. 2005 to 2018: Phelps’s Ownership of Parcels 20 and 31
In 2005, Phelps became co-owner of Parcels 20 and 31 with Schmidt.
In 2008, she established her sole ownership of both parcels. Phelps operated
the nine-acre property as a horse ranch and in 2008 hired Dawn Bayuk to
manage it. Phelps and Bayuk both lived on Parcel 20, with Phelps in the
8
main house and Bayuk in a separate small house until she left the ranch in
2015.
By 2006, Parcels 20 and 31 were entirely fenced around their
boundaries, aside from the boundary between them. At the end of the
Driveway was a gate in the fence between Parcels 30 and 31. Like the
Showmans and Schmidt, Phelps and Bayuk used the Driveway to get to
Parcel 31 and, after entering the gate onto Parcel 31, they would cross over to
Parcel 20.
In addition to Phelps and Bayuk, other people also used the Driveway
to access the ranch during Phelps’s ownership. This included Bayuk’s family
members who lived with her at various times, Phelps’s guests, and ranch
customers. Periodic hay and feed deliveries were made to the ranch using the
Driveway, and a veterinarian, farrier, and horse dentist also came to the
ranch from time to time.
In 2006, shortly after Phelps became co-owner of Parcels 20 and 31, the
Harrises purchased Parcel 30. Both Sean and Rhonda Harris saw Schmidt,
Phelps, and Bayuk use the Driveway to access the houses on Parcel 20.
Mr. Harris did not have any concerns about their use of the Driveway. As to
Phelps specifically, he did not object to her use of the Driveway because she
“accesse[d] the parcel that ha[d] the valid easement” (i.e., Parcel 31), “and
from there she can go wherever she wants. She’s on her property.”
Mrs. Harris reviewed the Harrises’ 2006 grant deed after she had a
conversation with Phelps about the Driveway. Based on that review,
Mrs. Harris believed the Easement over Parcel 30 benefitted Parcels 20 and
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31 together as a single, undivided property.4 For her part, Phelps did not
believe her use of the Driveway was hostile to the Harrises. Only once did
Phelps obtain permission from the Harrises in connection with the Driveway,
and that was to widen the entrance to the Driveway so Phelps and Schmidt
could get a manufactured home onto Parcel 31.
E. June 2018: Phelps Sold Parcel 20 to the Garcias and Parcel 31 to
McKee
As early as 2009, the Harrises heard Phelps was considering selling her
nine-acre property and was “test[ing] the waters” to see if she could sell
Parcels 20 and 31 together. In early 2018, they learned Phelps intended to
sell the two parcels separately. At that time, the Harrises considered
purchasing Parcel 31 to extinguish the Easement over Parcel 30. They had
“casual” conversations with Phelps about purchasing some portion of her
nine-acre property. But in March 2018, Phelps had agreed to sell Parcel 31 to
McKee and Parcel 20 to the Garcias.
Both McKee and the Garcias closed escrow the same day in June 2018.
The parties agree that Parcel 31 benefits from the Easement created in 1966,
which allows McKee to use the Driveway to access his property.
The Garcias’ purchase agreement with Phelps, however, contained a
provision requiring “[c]onfirmation of recorded shared driveway easement”
before close of escrow. Additionally, Phelps provided the Garcias with a
disclosure advising them that the “entrance drive is easement across [Parcel
30]” and “Seller does not guarantee access to the property over the current
driveway [and through] the existing gate.” The Garcias both admitted the
4 Mrs. Harris was incorrect, as the Harrises’ 2006 grant deed does not
mention any easement.
10
escrow company never gave them written confirmation of any easement. Nor
did they contact Phelps or the Harrises about any easement.
Mr. Harris testified that before the sale to the Garcias closed, Phelps’s
attorney “came to [them] with paperwork saying we don’t have a valid
easement, we need you to sign this so we can sell [P]arcel 20.” Mrs. Harris
understood the proposed paperwork would give Phelps “rights to the
[D]riveway so she could sell the property.” The Harrises refused to sign. As
Mrs. Harris explained, she and her husband were “shocked” at Phelps’s
request because she was “asking [them] to give her access to property that
would benefit her in a sale without any offer of compensation” to them. The
Harrises found the “whole thing . . . quite hostile” because Phelps’s attorney
threatened them, “if you don’t sign it, we could sue you and we’d win.”
Despite the Harrises’ refusal to create an express easement on their
property to benefit Parcel 20, Phelps conveyed Parcel 20 to the Garcias with a
grant deed that contained an express easement for use of the Driveway. The
purported easement referenced the Tobins’ 1966 grant deed, which created
the Easement over the Harrises’ land for the benefit of Parcel 31. The
Garcias’ grant deed defined the purported easement as “Parcel 2” with the
following description:
“An easement for ingress and egress, repairs, installation and
maintenance of water, gas, sewer, and power lines and conduit,
installation and maintenance and repairs of poles, guide wires
and lines for transmission of electrical energy over that portion of
the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 26,
Township 9 South, Range 2 East, San Bernardino Base and
Meridian, according to the United States Official Survey thereof,
approved January 31, 1895, in the County of San Diego, State of
11
California, in Grant Deed recorded October 31, 1966, as
Instrument No. 173195, of Official Records[.]”5 (Italics added.)
Mr. Garcia, who had previously worked as a commercial real estate
banker, assumed from its inclusion in his grant deed that the purported
express easement granting him use of the Driveway on the Harrises’ land
had been confirmed when the sale closed in June 2018. He acknowledged,
however, that he never reviewed the Tobins’ 1966 grant deed referenced in
the purported easement’s description.
F. June 2018 to Present Day: The Garcias’ Ownership
The Garcias continue to own and reside on Parcel 20. They have been
using the Driveway on the Harrises’ land as the sole route to access their
property since their purchase in June 2018. Although the Harrises contend
the Garcias use the Driveway more than their predecessors, they believe the
Garcias’ use has caused “[n]ormal wear and tear,” “[n]othing extraordinary.”
The Garcias never asked the Harrises for permission to use the
Driveway and have never received any easement from the Harrises for use of
the Driveway. To the contrary, shortly after the Garcias moved onto their
land, Mrs. Harris told the Garcias they did not have any easement to use the
Driveway. This prompted Mr. Garcia to review the 2018 grant deed from
5 The Garcias’ grant deed also contained a second express easement,
which burdened Parcel 31 for the benefit of Parcel 20. This easement is
identified as “Parcel 3” in the Garcias’ grant deed and allows ingress and
egress from the southwest corner of Parcel 31 over to Parcel 20. The area of
this easement appears as the red-striped portion of Fig. 2, ante. This second
easement, in combination with the purported easement over Parcel 30, would
allow the Garcias to use the Driveway like their predecessors, namely by
traveling down the Driveway over Parcel 30, through the gate between
Parcels 30 and 31 onto Parcel 31, and then across the southwest corner of
Parcel 31 to cross over onto Parcel 20. The second easement is not at issue in
this appeal.
12
Phelps, which showed an easement. He then told Mrs. Harris that he and his
family had a right to use the Driveway.
The Harrises later discovered the Garcias’ grant deed contained the
purported easement burdening the Harrises’ land for the benefit of Parcel 20.
The Harrises had their attorney send a letter to the Garcias in August 2019
informing them of the invalidity of the purported easement. The Garcias,
however, did not change their use of the Driveway. Instead, this litigation
followed.
II.
The Trial Court’s Statement of Decision
In November 2019, the Garcias filed this lawsuit, asserting three
causes of action: (1) to quiet title for a prescriptive easement, (2) for an
equitable easement, and (3) for declaratory relief. In April 2021, the Harrises
filed a cross-complaint against the Garcias to quiet title as to the purported
express easement in the 2018 grant deed conveying Parcel 20 from Phelps to
the Garcias.6
Following the bench trial, the trial court issued a 20-page statement of
decision in favor of the Harrises on both the Garcias’ complaint and the
Harrises’ cross-complaint. Before adjudicating the Garcias’ claims, the court
expressly found “certain portions of the testimony of Robert Garcia and
Paulette Garcia [we]re not credible,” particularly their testimony about “the
6 In June 2020, the Harrises sued Phelps in small claims court, asserting
she slandered the Harrises’ title to Parcel 30 by purporting to convey to the
Garcias an express easement for use of the Driveway. The Harrises
ultimately obtained a default judgment for the maximum amount of $10,000
when Phelps failed to appear.
13
potential expense and difficulty of creating a driveway [for ingress and
egress] on their own property.”
On the Garcias’ first cause of action for a prescriptive easement to use
the Driveway, the trial court found the Garcias failed to establish the
required five years of adverse use. On their second cause of action for an
equitable easement, the court found the Garcias’ trespass on the Harrises’
land was not innocent and the hardship to the Garcias in ceasing use of the
Driveway was not greatly disproportionate to the hardship to the Harrises
from the continued encroachment. On their third cause of action for
declaratory relief, the court rejected both theories advanced by the Garcias.
It found no one had obtained an irrevocable license to use the Driveway, and
the doctrine of after-acquired title did not apply to create an express
easement benefitting Parcel 20.
In their cross-complaint to quiet title, the Harrises sought a judgment
to quiet the Harrises’ interest in Parcel 30 “free and clear” of the purported
express easement in the 2018 grant deed from Phelps to the Garcias. The
trial court granted the Harrises’ request. Consistent with its findings on the
Garcias’ cause of action for declaratory relief, the court found Parcel 20 did
not benefit from an express easement to use the Driveway over Parcel 30. As
a result, Phelps’s purported conveyance of such easement to the Garcias was
invalid.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
The parties do not agree on the standard of review that governs this
appeal. The Garcias assert that we should apply de novo review to all issues
on appeal because “[t]he facts in this case are almost entirely undisputed”
14
and the appeal “predominately concerns” application of law to those
undisputed facts. (See Martinez v. Brownco Construction Co. (2013) 56
Cal.4th 1014, 1018 [where the issue involves the application of law to
undisputed facts, review is de novo].) The Harrises contend we should review
the denial of a prescriptive easement for substantial evidence and the denial
of an equitable easement and irrevocable license for abuse of discretion. We
agree with the Harrises.
Although the trial court found the parties’ stipulated facts “streamlined
the presentation of evidence at the trial,” it expressly noted the stipulated
facts did not contain “all of the facts” it found relevant to its decision.
Instead, the court’s decision rested on additional facts it determined after a
two-day trial involving eight witnesses, numerous exhibits, and the court’s
inspection of the properties in question. And in finding those additional
facts, the court made credibility determinations. We do not review such
factual findings de novo. (See Crocker National Bank v. City and County of
San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881, 888 [“If the pertinent inquiry requires
application of experience with human affairs, the question is predominantly
factual and its determination is reviewed under the substantial-evidence
test.”].)
We agree with the Harrises that substantial evidence review and its
equitable equivalent—abuse of discretion—apply to our consideration of the
court’s denial of a prescriptive easement, equitable easement, and irrevocable
license as a basis for declaratory relief. (In re Executive Life Ins. Co. (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th 344, 358 (Executive Life) [employing abuse of discretion
review as “the equivalent of the substantial evidence test”].) Substantial
evidence review requires “view[ing] the whole record in a light most favorable
to the judgment, resolving all evidentiary conflicts and drawing all
15
reasonable inferences in favor of the decision of the trial court.” (Beck
Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 1160, 1203.) In other words, “we must accept any reasonable
interpretation of the evidence which supports the trial court’s decision.”
(Ibid.)
As for the trial court’s denial of an express easement under the doctrine
of after-acquired title, the Harrises do not propose an applicable standard of
review. We interpret deeds in the same manner as contracts. (Pear v. City
and County of San Francisco (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 61, 70 (Pear).) The de
novo standard therefore governs our review of how the deed language should
be interpreted. (Id. at p. 71.) However, to the extent extrinsic evidence must
be used to resolve ambiguities in a deed’s language, we review the trial
court’s factual findings regarding such extrinsic evidence for substantial
evidence. (Id. at pp. 70–71.) We set forth the appropriate standard of review
in our analysis of each cause of action.
The Harrises contend the Garcias’ failure to identify the correct
standard of review is a tacit admission their appeal lacks merit (Sonic
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 456, 465 [“[f]ailure to acknowledge the proper scope of review is
a concession of a lack of merit”]), and because they have relied on the wrong
standard of review, they have failed to satisfy their appellate burden for a
substantial evidence standard of review. As a result, the Harrises urge us to
treat the issues reviewed for substantial evidence as waived and presume the
record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact. (See Doe v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [“A
party who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding must
16
set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence on that point, both favorable
and unfavorable.”].)
We agree the Garcias do not appropriately acknowledge all of the
evidence on each of their positions, specifically unfavorable evidence. Most
notably, the Garcias overlooked the trial court’s findings from its inspection
of the properties regarding the difficulty of putting in a new driveway for
ingress and egress on the Garcias’ land. Nor do the Garcias address the
court’s findings that the Garcias’ own testimony on that point lacked
credibility. The Garcias’ attempt to ignore contrary evidence is evident from
their careful framing of the facts as “almost entirely undisputed.” (Italics
added.) Despite these and other deficiencies in the Garcias’ appeal, we
exercise our discretion to address the merits of their arguments.
II.
Prescriptive Easement
A party claiming a prescriptive easement “must show use of the
property which has been open, notorious, continuous and adverse for an
uninterrupted period of five years.” (Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings,
Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 564, 570 (Warsaw); see Civ. Code, § 1007; Code of Civ.
Proc. § 321.) “ ‘The term “adverse” in this context is essentially synonymous
with “hostile” and “ ‘under claim of right.’ ” ’ ” (McBride v. Smith (2018) 18
Cal.App.5th 1160, 1181 (McBride).) “ ‘To be adverse to the owner a
claimant’s use must give rise to a cause of action by the owner against the
claimant.’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, “ ‘a prescriptive easement can arise only if the
owner had an opportunity to protect his or her rights by taking legal action to
prevent the wrongful use, yet failed to do so.’ ” (Ibid.)
As the trial court correctly found, the Garcias’ own use of the Driveway
(hostile or not) does not satisfy the requisite five years of adverse use.
17
(Warsaw, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 570.) They purchased their land in June
2018 and filed this lawsuit in November 2019. As a result, the Garcias must
rely on hostile use by their predecessors to “ ‘tack[ ]’ ” onto their own adverse
use to meet the five-year requirement. The court rejected the Garcias’
attempt to combine their use with the prior owners’ use to establish the
statutory five-year period of adverse use, because it found no prior use was
hostile.
The trial court found use of the Driveway by Phelps (and the other
previous owners) was not hostile because Phelps owned both Parcels 20 and
31, and Parcel 31 benefitted from the Easement which expressly allowed
Phelps to use the Driveway for ingress and egress. The court also rejected
the Garcias’ argument that Phelps’s use should be considered hostile because
it went beyond the scope of the Easement. And because “Phelps and her
predecessors had an express easement to use the [D]riveway by virtue of
their ownership of Parcel 31, [the court found] the Harrises had no legal right
to prevent Phelps and her predecessors from using the [E]asement in the
manner in which they did.” For the same reason, the court also found
“Phelps and her predecessors . . . did not commit a trespass during the
alleged prescriptive period.” Last, the court acknowledged, though it did not
find this fact dispositive, that Phelps herself testified she did not believe her
use of the Driveway was hostile to the Harrises.
On appeal, the Garcias contend the trial court erred in finding they
were not entitled to a prescriptive easement. Their arguments coalesce
around the contention that their predecessors’ use of the Driveway was
hostile because it exceeded the scope of the Easement created in 1966. As
hostility is one of the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive
easement, its existence is a question of fact that we review for substantial
18
evidence. (Warsaw, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 570–572.) We conclude
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that use of the Driveway by
the Garcias’ predecessors was not hostile to the Harrises.
The Easement allowed the Garcias’ predecessors (who owned Parcel 31)
to use the western 30 feet of Parcel 30 “for ingress and egress” to Parcel 31.
The Garcias stipulated that their predecessors traveled along the Driveway
to Parcel 31 before traveling from Parcel 31 to Parcel 20. Their ingress and
egress thus occurred between Parcel 31 and Paradise Valley Road, not
between Parcel 20 and Paradise Valley Road. Even if their ultimate
destination was the house on Parcel 20, they went there by way of Parcel 31.
The Garcias contend such use of the Driveway was “inherently hostile”
because the Harrises knew the Garcias’ predecessors were using the
Driveway to access residential and commercial structures on Parcel 20,
rather than terminating their travel on Parcel 31. (Capitalization omitted.)
But the Garcias offer no case law or other authority in support of their
position. Nor are we aware of any such authority. As we have explained, the
Garcias’ predecessors operated within the scope of the Easement as owners of
Parcel 31. They used the Driveway for ingress and egress to Parcel 31 before
traveling from Parcel 31 to Parcel 20. The Harrises could not have prevented
the Garcias’ predecessors from using the Driveway in that manner. As Mr.
Harris explained, he could not object to Phelps’s use of the Driveway because
she “accesse[d] the parcel that ha[d] the valid easement and from there she
can go wherever she wants. She’s on her property.” Thus, because the
predecessors’ use fell within the scope of the Easement, substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that their use was not hostile.
The Garcias separately contend their predecessors expanded the use of
the Easement in a manner that created a separate prescriptive easement.
19
We do not understand exactly how this contention differs from the Garcias’
argument in favor of “inherent[ ]” hostility. Both contentions rely on the
Garcias’ predecessors using the Easement in a manner outside of the scope of
their rights to use the Easement as owners of Parcel 31. The Garcias seem to
focus on the increasing use of the Easement “over the years” as somehow
providing an independent basis to establish the hostility necessary for a
prescriptive easement. However, neither of the cases relied on by the Garcias
are analogous to the circumstances here.
First, in McBride, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at page 1180, the plaintiff
sought a prescriptive easement over a portion of a neighbor’s property. The
plaintiff already owned a “Secondary Access Easement” over that portion of
the neighbor’s property but alleged she had used it for primary access, rather
than secondary access, for the requisite statutory period. (Id. at p. 1182.)
The Court of Appeal concluded the alleged facts were sufficient to support a
cause of action for prescriptive easement and reversed the trial court’s
decision to sustain a demurrer to that cause of action. (Ibid.) Setting aside
the procedural differences between McBride and this case, the alleged
hostility is not the same. The plaintiff in McBride allegedly operated outside
of the literal scope of an express easement by using a “Secondary Access
Easement” for primary access. (Ibid.) In contrast here, the use of the
Driveway by the Garcias’ predecessors fell within the literal scope of the
Easement (“ingress and egress” to Parcel 31) while ultimately traveling to a
different parcel beyond Parcel 31. Nothing in McBride compels the
conclusion that the use of the Driveway by the Garcias’ predecessors was
adverse to the Harrises.
Second, the Garcias identify Kerr Land & Timber Co. v. Emmerson
(1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 200. Kerr involved the scope of an easement for
20
transporting timber harvested in properties “lying on various sides” of the
property bearing the easement. (Id. at p. 208.) Suit was filed after the
easement had been used to haul timber from at least 12 miles away and after
the easement owners had charged tolls for others to use the easement. (Id. at
pp. 210–211.) The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s finding that
“ ‘lying on various sides’ ” meant adjacent to the burdened property and
remanded for additional findings on the intended scope of the easement. (Id.
at p. 227.) The case was also remanded for additional findings regarding the
existence of a prescriptive easement, which depended on the scope of the
express easement. (Id. at pp. 233–234.)
Unlike Kerr, which involved the question of how far away is too far to
fall within the scope of an express easement, the Garcias’ predecessors
operated within the literal scope of the express easement burdening
Parcel 30. They used it for ingress and egress to Parcel 31, even when their
journey ultimately concluded at Parcel 20. Nothing in Kerr indicates a
limitation should be added to the otherwise clear language of an express
easement.
Even if the cases cited by the Garcias held otherwise, the trial court
here made factual findings contrary to the Garcias’ position. The Garcias
claim “the scope of the Easement ha[d] been greatly expanded over the
years,” but the court found “the weight of the evidence presented at this trial
indicate[d] that the owners of the express easement used the [D]riveway in a
manner consistent with the express easement and did not overburden the
[E]asement.” Substantial evidence developed at trial supports those findings.
Mrs. Showman testified she used the Driveway at least once or twice a week
when she lived on Parcel 20 between 1976 and 2003. And at the Driveway’s
highest point of use between 2008 and 2015 when Phelps owned Parcels 20
21
and 31, Mrs. Harris testified Phelps and Bayuk used the Driveway daily.
Bayuk testified customers used the Driveway once per week and others
connected with the business (e.g., veterinarians) used the Driveway less
frequently. While use of the Driveway may have increased, substantial
evidence supports the court’s conclusion that such use did not expand beyond
the original scope of the Easement (i.e., ingress/egress) and did not
overburden the Easement.
We thus affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Harrises on
the Garcias’ first cause of action for prescriptive easement.
III.
Equitable Easement
California courts have long “had the discretionary authority to deny a
landowner’s request to eject a trespasser and instead force the landowner to
accept damages as compensation for the judicial creation of an easement over
the trespassed-upon property in the trespasser’s favor.” (Shoen v. Zacarias
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 19 (Shoen).) Three requirements must be
established for a court to have discretion to grant an equitable easement to a
trespasser: (1) the trespass must have been innocent, rather than willful or
negligent; (2) the public or the property owner will not be irreparably injured
by the easement; and (3) the hardship to the trespasser from having to cease
the trespass must be greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused by the
continued encroachment. (Ibid.) “Unless all three prerequisites are
established, a court lacks the discretion to grant an equitable easement.”
(Ibid.)
The trial court found the Garcias failed to meet their burden of
establishing the first and third requirements: “ ‘innocent’ ” trespass and
“ ‘greatly disproportionate’ ” hardship. The Garcias contend the court erred
22
in its findings. We review the court’s application of the equitable easement
doctrine for abuse of discretion.7 (Shoen, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.)
That standard requires “we resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the
judgment and determine whether the court’s decision ‘ “falls within the
permissible range of options set by the legal criteria.” ’ ” (Hirshfield v.
Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 771.) In other words, an abuse of
discretion only appears when the trial court “exceeded the bounds of reason.”
(Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.) We conclude the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the Garcias an equitable easement.
The Garcias contend the trial court erred in finding they were not
innocent trespassers because they had a “reasonable belief” their purchase of
Parcel 20 included access via the Driveway. This argument overlooks the
governing standard of review. The Garcias fail to acknowledge the evidence
on which the court relied in finding them negligent. In particular, the court
identified a “ ‘Seller Property Questionnaire’ ” received by the Garcias, which
advised them, “ ‘Seller does not guarantee access to the property over the
current driveway.’ ” The court also noted the Garcias’ purchase agreement
advised them, “ ‘Confirmation of recorded shared driveway easement to be
confirmed prior to [close of escrow].’ ” In light of those disclosures, the court
reasonably found the Garcias were on notice of the potential unavailability of
the Driveway to access Parcel 20. The court also reasonably found the
7 The Garcias contend the abuse of discretion standard does not apply
here because the court denied equitable relief and therefore made “no finding
in equity.” The Garcias cite no authority for their position that grants of
equitable easements should have a different standard of review than denials.
We see no reasoned basis for such a distinction, as the court is deciding
whether to act in equity in both cases, and therefore we do not apply a de
novo standard.
23
Garcias’ assumption that the escrow officer confirmed the purported
easement insufficient to avoid a finding of negligence, where they neither
ensured confirmation of the purported easement nor affirmatively obtained
an easement.
On this record, we cannot say the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. Instead, its negligence finding fell squarely within the permissible
range of options based on the evidence adduced at trial. We therefore
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Garcias
were not innocent trespassers.
We also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its
weighing of the relative hardships to the parties. The court concluded the
hardship to the Garcias from having to cease use of the Driveway would not
be “ ‘greatly disproportionate’ ” to the hardship caused to the Harrises by the
Garcias’ continuing use. In reaching that conclusion, the court determined
the Garcias were not credible in their testimony regarding “the potential
expense and difficulty of creating a driveway on their own property.” Relying
on its own inspection of the properties, the court found the Garcias’ use of the
Driveway was “essentially a matter of convenience,” as “[t]hey can easily
make a hole in their fence along the southern boundary of their property and
install their own dirt driveway onto their property.” The court gave no
weight to Mr. Garcia’s testimony that installation of a new driveway would
cost as much as $150,000 because of the absence of a “reasoned basis” for the
estimate. Instead, it concluded “the Garcias [we]re exaggerating the
supposed difficulty of putting a new dirt driveway on their own property.”
Moreover, the trial court determined that, even if the Garcias had
established the elements necessary for the creation of an equitable easement,
it “would nevertheless exercise its discretion to deny the request” because
24
“[t]he overall balance of the equities in this case favors the Harrises over the
Garcias.”
The Garcias fail to grapple with the trial court’s resolution of credibility
and factual findings. Instead, they simply refer to their own trial testimony,
which the court rejected as not credible, to support a contrary decision. This
again overlooks the governing standard of review. We are not permitted to
ignore or reconsider the trial court’s resolution of credibility. (Executive Life,
supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 358.) Having found the Garcias’ trespass was not
innocent and the hardship to the Garcias would not be greatly
disproportionate to the hardship to the Harrises caused by the continued
encroachment, the court lacked the discretion to grant an equitable
easement. (Shoen, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 19.) Accordingly, the trial
court’s denial of an equitable easement was not an abuse of discretion.
IV.
Declaratory Relief
In their third cause of action for declaratory relief, the Garcias sought
“a judicial determination of their right to use the [Driveway] in the manner
described in [the Garcias’ 2018 grant deed] and consistent with the use by the
prior owners of [Parcel 20].” The Garcias advanced two theories in support of
their claim. First, the Garcias argued an irrevocable license had been created
by the Harrises’ inaction in response to their predecessors’ use of the
Driveway to access Parcel 20. Second, the Garcias argued the Tobins’ 1975
grant deed to the Johnsons had created an express easement for the benefit
of Parcel 20 pursuant to the doctrine of after-acquired title.
The trial court rejected both theories. It found “no factual basis for
concluding that any person ever obtained an irrevocable license to use the
[D]riveway,” as none of the Garcias’ predecessors used the Driveway in a
25
manner hostile to the Harrises. As for the doctrine of after-acquired title, the
court found it inapplicable because the Harrises did not grant anything to the
Garcias and “it would be inequitable to apply any type of estoppel doctrine to
the Harrises in this case.” Accordingly, the court found invalid the
“purported easement [over Parcel 30] in the deed conveying Parcel 20 to the
Garcias” because no such easement benefitting Parcel 20 existed at the time
of the conveyance. “Phelps could not convey something she did not own.”
The Garcias contend the trial court erred on both counts. We address
each count and conclude the Garcias’ contentions are not meritorious.
A. No Irrevocable License
We review the decision of whether to grant an irrevocable license for
abuse of discretion. (Richardson v. Franc (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 744, 751
(Richardson).) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it found “no factual basis for concluding that any person ever obtained an
irrevocable license to use the [D]riveway.”
“ ‘A license gives authority to a licensee to perform an act or acts on the
property of another pursuant to the express or implied permission of the
owner.’ ” (Richardson, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 751.) Such license can
generally be revoked by the licensor at any time without excuse or
consideration to the licensee. (Ibid.) Further, “ ‘conveyance of the property
burdened with a license revokes the license.’ ” (Ibid.) A license may become
irrevocable if two conditions are met: (1) “a landowner knowingly permits
another to repeatedly perform acts on his or her land,” and (2) “the licensee,
in reasonable reliance on the continuation of the license, has expended time
and a substantial amount of money on improvements with the licensor’s
knowledge.” (Ibid.) An irrevocable license is the equivalent of an easement.
(Ibid.)
26
The Garcias contend their predecessors obtained an irrevocable license
to use the Driveway. Under the first condition for an irrevocable license, the
Garcias argue the Harrises “knowingly permitted” the Garcias’ predecessors
to use the Driveway by not making efforts to stop such use. The Garcias’
argument ignores the Easement owned by their predecessors, as the owners
of Parcel 31. The Harrises had no need to permit the Garcias’ predecessors to
use the Driveway (implicitly or explicitly) because they already had a right to
use it to access Parcel 31. Thus, the predecessors’ use cannot be considered to
show any implied permission from the Harrises. The Garcias also point to
when the Harrises gave Schmidt and Phelps express permission to widen the
entrance to the Driveway to accommodate transport of a manufactured home.
This sort of temporary, one-time permission, however, does not give rise to an
irrevocable license, as it does not involve “repeatedly perform[ing] acts” on
another’s land. (Richardson, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 751.) In any event,
the manufactured home was moved onto Parcel 31, not Parcel 20, and
therefore could not result in an irrevocable license benefitting the latter.
Nor could the Garcias’ own use of the Driveway result in an irrevocable
license. The Garcias acknowledge the Harrises made efforts to stop the
Garcias from using the Driveway soon after they moved onto Parcel 20. The
Harrises explicitly informed the Garcias they had no right to use the
Driveway. The Garcias’ use of the Driveway on their few visits to Parcel 20
prior to purchasing it did not amount to the Harrises impliedly “permit[ting]
another to repeatedly perform acts” on Parcel 30. (Richardson, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th at p. 751.) In deciding to purchase Parcel 20, the Garcias could
not reasonably rely on having access to the Driveway based on such scant
information. Nor could they reasonably rely on future use of the Driveway
when making post-purchase improvements to Parcel 20 and the Driveway, as
27
the Harrises had already informed the Garcias they had no right to use the
Driveway.
B. No Express Easement over Parcel 30 Was Created to Benefit Parcel 20
The Garcias further contend they had an express easement to use the
Driveway based on the doctrine of after-acquired title. We review
interpretations of the language of a deed de novo. (Pear, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 71.) In contrast, any factual findings regarding extrinsic
evidence are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) Under those
standards of review, we agree with the trial court that the Garcias do not
have an express easement to use the Driveway.
Easement grants are interpreted like contracts. (Continental Baking
Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 521.) “Although extrinsic evidence is not
permitted in order to add to, detract from, or vary the terms of an integrated
written agreement, extrinsic evidence is admissible in order to explain what
those terms are. [Citations.] Therefore, extrinsic evidence as to the
circumstances under which a written instrument was made has been held to
be admissible in ascertaining the parties’ expressed intentions, subject to the
limitation that extrinsic evidence is not admissible in order to give the terms
of a written instrument a meaning of which they are not reasonably
susceptible.” (Id. at pp. 521–522.) In other words, when the language of a
deed is ambiguous, evidence outside the document is admissible to determine
the intention of the grantor. (Id. at pp. 522–523.)
Grants are to be interpreted in favor of the grantee. (Civ. Code,
§ 1069.) Thus, “ ‘doubtful clauses in the deed are to be construed most
strongly against the grantor, and as favorably to the grantee as the language,
construed in the light of the surrounding facts, will justify.’ ” (City of
28
Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 242–243, italics
added (Manhattan Beach).)
Under the doctrine of after-acquired title, “if a grantor purports to
convey an interest in land which the grantor does not own, but afterwards
acquires, the interest passes to the grantee at the time the grantor obtains
it.” (Noronha v. Stewart (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 485, 489.) This has been
codified for grants of fee simple in Civil Code section 1106. However, the
common-law rule is broader and “ ‘applies to the transfer of any estate.’ ”
(Noronha, at p. 490.)
The Garcias contend they received an express easement to use the
Driveway through their purchase of Parcel 20. Their contention stems from
the Tobins’ sale of Parcels 20 and 31 to the Johnsons in 1975. The Johnsons’
1975 grant deed identified the transferred interests as follows:
“PARCEL 1:
“That portion of the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
of Section 26, Township 9 South, Range 2 East, San Bernardino
Base and Meridian, according to the United States Official
Survey thereof, approved January 31, 1895, in the County of San
Diego, State of California, described as follows:
“COMMENCING at [legal description omitted].”
“PARCEL 2:
“An easement for ingress and egress, repairs, installation and
maintenance of water, gas, sewer, and power lines and conduit,
installation and maintenance and repairs of poles, guide wires
and lines for transmission of electrical energy over that portion of
the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 26,
Township 9 South, Range 2 East, San Bernardino Base and
Meridian, according to the United States Official Survey thereof,
approved January 31, 1895, in the County of San Diego, State of
California, described as follows:
“COMMENCING at [legal description omitted].
29
“PARCEL 3:
“All that portion of Lot 5 -the Southwest Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter- of Section 26, Township 9 South, Range 2
East, San Bernardino Base and Meridian, in the County of San
Diego, State of California, according to Official Plat thereof,
described as follows:
“BEGINNING at [legal description omitted].”
The Garcias argue the Johnsons’ 1975 grant deed was ambiguous
regarding whether the easement for ingress and egress over Parcel 30
(identified as “PARCEL 2” in the grant deed) benefitted Parcel 31 (identified
as “PARCEL 1”), Parcel 20 (identified as “PARCEL 3”), or both.
(Underscoring omitted.) Given the ambiguity, the Garcias argue the deed
must be interpreted broadly in favor of the Johnsons as grantees so that the
easement benefits both Parcels 20 and 31. The Garcias acknowledge the
Tobins had only received an easement benefitting Parcel 31 from Silveria in
1966. This made the easement in the Johnsons’ 1975 deed an unauthorized
grant in that it purported to benefit Parcel 20. Despite the grant being
originally unauthorized, the Garcias contend the doctrine of after-acquired
title perfected the grant. Specifically, the Tobins acquired Parcel 30 after
deeding the easement to the Johnsons. The Garcias argue the Tobins’
acquisition of Parcel 30 “validated the additional grant of an express
[e]asement . . . to benefit Parcel 20 and burden Parcel 30.”
The problem with the Garcias’ theory is that they jump from ambiguity
in the Johnsons’ 1975 grant deed to the rule that grants must be construed in
favor of the grantee. The Garcias do not consider extrinsic evidence
regarding the intended scope of the Johnson’s grant deed. Our Supreme
Court has held that even where a deed is facially ambiguous, the instruction
to favor the grantee must yield to how broadly the “ ‘surrounding facts’ ” (i.e.,
extrinsic evidence) allow the language to be construed. (Manhattan Beach,
30
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 242–243.) The language of the 1975 deed from the
Tobins to the Johnsons is arguably ambiguous, as the Garcias contend.
However, even a cursory analysis of the chains of title of the two properties
transferred—Parcels 20 and 31—would have shown the easement was only
meant to benefit Parcel 31.
The first two parcels (“PARCEL 1” and “PARCEL 2”) listed in the
Johnsons’ 1975 grant deed match the parcel descriptions in the 1966 grant
deed from Silveria to the Tobins that transferred Parcel 31 and created the
Easement over Parcel 30. (Underscoring omitted.) The Tobins’ 1966 grant
deed made no reference to Parcel 20. In contrast, the third parcel (“PARCEL
3”) listed in the Johnsons’ 1975 grant deed matches the parcel description in
the 1969 grant deed conveying Parcel 20 to the Tobins. (Underscoring
omitted.) That 1969 grant deed made no reference to any easement or to
Parcel 31. The Tobins owned Parcels 20 and 31 as separately assessed
parcels between 1969 and 1975. They transferred those same, separately
assessed parcels to the Johnsons, rather than attempting to have them
reassessed as a single parcel. Accordingly, the extrinsic evidence shows the
Tobins intended to transfer the exact property interests received in the 1966
and 1969 grant deeds. The only easement in those deeds was transferred
along with and for the benefit of Parcel 31.
Phelps’s attempt in 2018 to have the Harrises sign paperwork granting
an easement for the benefit of Parcel 20 supports this conclusion. As the first
party to sell Parcel 20 separate from Parcel 31 since the 1960s, Phelps
indicated through her actions that she did not understand Parcel 20 to have
the benefit of the Easement over Parcel 30. Thus, the extrinsic evidence
establishes that the Tobins did not intend to transfer an easement benefitting
Parcel 20. The language of the Johnson’s 1975 grant deed, in light of the
31
extrinsic evidence, does not justify an interpretation that the transferred
easement benefits Parcel 20, even when construed most favorably for the
grantee.
Because the Tobins never granted the Johnsons an easement
benefitting Parcel 20, the doctrine of after-acquired title does not apply to
validate such a grant. The Garcias therefore did not receive an easement
benefitting Parcel 20 as successors-in-interest to the Johnsons. We thus
conclude the trial court correctly denied the Garcias declaratory relief under
the doctrine of after-acquired title.
For all of the reasons we have discussed, substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that the purported express easement over Parcel 30
conveyed by Phelps to the Garcias was invalid. The court therefore did not
err by granting the Harrises’ request to quiet title, as set forth in their cross-
complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment against the Garcias
on their cause of action for declaratory relief and the court’s judgment for the
Harrises on their cause of action to quiet title.
V.
Motion for Sanctions
The Harrises filed a motion for monetary sanctions against the Garcias.
They contend the Garcias’ appeal was meant to improperly delay the effect of
the trial court’s judgment. They further contend the Garcias’ appeal
“indisputably has no merit,” as shown by its ignorance of the “clearly
applicable” standards of review.
The Garcias’ appeal stretches the bounds of zealous advocacy at times,
particularly with respect to the standards of review. The Garcias’ reply brief
also uses unnecessarily derogative language (e.g., “the Harrises insipidly
claim”; “half-baked analysis”; “laughably incorrect”), made worse by the fact
32
that the Garcias, not the Harrises, were the ones advocating the incorrect
position. Although a close call, we do not conclude the Garcias’ appeal was so
totally and completely without merit to be objectively frivolous. (See Malek
Media Group LLC v. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 834.) We
therefore deny the Harrises’ motion for monetary sanctions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment on the Garcias’ complaint and the judgment on the
Harrises’ cross-complaint are affirmed. The Harrises are entitled to their
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
33