Opinion filed April 19, 1932.
Davis, J.From a final decree foreclosing an unrecorded purchase money mortgage, the defendants below, William E. Sapp and Mrs. William E. Sapp, his wife, Commercial Bank & Trust Company, a Florida corporation, and Lindsey Hopkins, have entered their appeal on behalf of themselves, and all of their' similarly situated co-defendants, assigning as error the entry of said final decree for the complainants. The decree appealed from was arrived at on the basis of the record before the Chancellor as it appeared on the final hearing, considered in connection with a special stipulation of facts which had been agreed to by all the parties, so as to directly present the one controlling point of law necessary to be determined in order to' fix the equities.
The case is apparently one of first impression in this Court, and in view of the number of defendants who will be affected by the ultimate decision, the question of law involved appears to be of considerable importance. Oral argument was had before Division B, where the controversy over the question was ably presented by both sides. In addition to this, the Court has had the benefit of elaborate briefs convincingly prepared and filed by several of different counsel for appellants, it appearing that the parties interested on the appellants’ side of the question amount *249to nearly two hundred in number, due to' the peculiar circumstances under which this case arose.
Notwithstanding the voluminous record, the facts are not controverted, and there is but one outstanding question of law presented for decision, upon the determination of which will depend the reversal or affirmance of the decree appealed fro'm: “Is a person who claims under a duly recorded deed from the guardian of a minor, whose authority to make the deed is dependent upon proceedings had before the County Judge, charged with notice of the terms and conditions upon which the guardian was authorized by the County Judge to sell the minor’s land, when it appears that while the grantees from the grantee of the guardian are otherwise bona fide purchasers for value without notice, the records of the County Judge, nevertheless, show that the lands involved in a foreclosure suit brought to enforce an unrecorded purchase money mortgage given to the guardian and another, by his original grantee, were lands sold by such guardian under authority of the Court, upon terms of part cash and balance to be secured by a purchase money mortgage on the land sold, it appearing that all of the defendants claim their interests under the recorded deed from the guardian, executed under and in pursuance of the County Judge’s proceedings, but who were without any notice or knowledge of the unrecorded purchase money mortgage, except such as would be charged to them by virtue of what could have been ascertained by inquiry based upon the proceedings taken by the guardian before the County Judge 9”
The lower court decided the question in the affirmative, and decreed that the foreclosure should proceed under complainant’s unrecorded purchase money mortgage, notwithstanding the claims of the defendants that they should be considered as bona fide purchasers for value, without notice, from the guardian’s original grantee under the re*250corded warranty deed which the guardian had executed at the time of the guardian’s sale.
The facts, stated chronologically, are as follows:
The complainant Mrs. Warner was the daughter of the complainant Mrs. Markley. Mrs. Warner (formerly Annie Lester Patterson), on June 23, 1911, and at the time of the making of the guardian’s sale hereinafter mentioned, was a minor; James M. Jackson, Jr., was the legally constituted guardian of her estate, under order of the County Judge of Dade County.
The minor was originally seized and possessed of the fee simple title to the lands involved in this suit, subject to the estate by dower of her mother, Mrs. Markley.
On June 23, 1911, the County Judge of Dade County entered an order based upon a petition filed by James M. Jackson, Jr., guardian, authorizing the guardian to sell the minor’s interest in the real estate involved in this suit and other lands, at private sale, for cash, or upon terms. On September 6, 1932, James M. Jackso'n, Jr., filed his report of sale in the office of County Judge of Dade County, showing that the real estate involved in this suit had been sold to George E. Merrick for the sum of $20,000.00 upon the following terms: $2,000 cash and $18,000 in five years, together with interest at the rate of 8 per cent, per annum, payable semi-annually on all deferred payments, and that the said deferred payments were to he secured by a purchase money mo'rtgage on said property.
The report further shows that the property had been sold at private sale to the highest and best bidder “on reasonable terms” to George E. Merrick for the sum of twenty thousand dollars, “two-thirds of which the said Annie Lester Patterson, a minor, is entitled to receive, and will receive, and the other one-third o'f said $20,000 being paid to Jessie B. Markley, formerly Jessie B. Patterson, widow of Samuel L. Patterson, and mother of Annie Lester *251Patterson, a minor,” on certain terms and conditions as to deferred payments which contemplated and embraced Lie total purchase price as being subject thereto.
On September 6, 1923, based upon the report of sale aforesaid, the County Judge entered an order confirming the said sale and directing the guardian to execute and deliver a deed to George E. Merrick, conveying all of the right, title and interest of the minor in and to said property, and authorizing and empowering him “to take back a purchase money mortgage constituting a first lien against the property for all deferred payments.”
On August 16, 1923, a deed was executed by Jessie B. Markley, joined by her husband, and James M. Jackson, Jr., guardian of Annie Lester Patterson, a minor, conveying the property to George E. Merrick. This deed was dated August 16, 1923, but it was not filed for record until September 7, 1923, the day after the County Judge entered the order confirming the sale.
On August 4, 1923, George E. Merrick executed two promissory notes, bearing the date and evidencing the deferred portion of the purchase price for the land. One of the notes was for $12,000, payable to the order of James M. Jackson, Jr., as guardian of Annie Lester Patterson, and the other of the notes was for $6,000, payable to the order of Jessie B. Markley. The notes, according to their terms, were to' become due on or before five years after said date.
To secure these notes, George E. Merrick executed and delivered a purchase money mortgage upon the land he had purchased at the guardian’s sale. This mortgage was executed to James M. Jackson, Jr., as guardian of Annie Lester Patterson, a minor, and to Jessie B. Markley, individually, because of her own individual interest in the same property, and was on the same date as the notes which were secured thereby. This mortgage was never *252recorded because it was lost or misplaced and was not found until after the bill was filed in this cause and shortly before the final hearing.
In 1926, Merrick and wife executed and delivered two mortgages, dated August 4, 1923, acknowledged September 30, 1926, one of which was executed to James M. Jackson, Jr., as guardian of Annie Lester Patterson, for the purpose of securing the note of $12,000 executed to the guardian, as af oresaid, and the other of which was executed to Jessie B. Markley for the purpose of securing the note for $6,000, payable to Mrs. Markley, as aforesaid. Each of said mortgages showed that it was a purchase money mortgage upon the land and was given in lieu of the former mortgage of like import, tenor and date, which had been lost prio'r to record. These last mentioned mortgages were filed for record on March 4, 1927, and were recorded.
The parcel of land involved in this suit, when conveyed to Merrick, was an entire parcel, but after the purchase thereof by Merrick he caused the same to be subdivided into lots and blocks which were later sold fro'm time to time to the numerous defendants who later appeared to resist the foreclosure here involved.
On November 1, 1924, after the record of the deed from Jackson, as guardian, and Mrs. Markley to Merrick, but before the execution and record of the two evidentiary mortgages above mentioned, Merrick executed to the appellant, A. J. Orme, as Trustee, a mortgage upon all of said lands and other lands, securing an indebtedness of $300,000, and after the record of the deed from Jackson, as guardian, and Mrs. Markley to Merrick, but before the filing for record of the two evidentiary mortgages above mentioned, Merrick executed deeds to certain of the defendants described in the bill, purporting to convey specified lots in the subdivision of the property conveyed by the guardian and Mrs. Markley to him. These deeds appear *253to have been recorded after the deed from the guardian and Mrs. Markley to Merrick, but before the recording o'f the two evidentiary mortgages above mentioned.
Merrick later executed a deed conveying to Coral Gables Corporation all of the land, except such lots as had theretofore been conveyed by him to certain of the defendants described in the bill. This deed was also executed after the recording of the deed from the guardian and Markley to Merrick, but before the filing for record of the two evidentiary mortgages.
After Coral Gables Corporation received the deed above mentioned it executed to certain of the defendants described in the bill, deeds conveying certain of the lots in the subdivision. All of these deeds likewise were executed after the recording o'f the deed from Jackson, as guardian,- and Mrs. Markley to Merrick, and some of them were executed before the filing for record of the two evidentiary mortgages.
Certain of the defendants described in the bill received deeds from Coral Gables Corporation conveying specified lots in the subdivision, which deeds were executed and recorded after the filing for recofd of the two evidentiary mortgages above mentioned.
The bill for foreclosure was filed October 27, 1928. It sought the foreclosure of the original unrecorded and lost mortgage deed dated August 4, 1923, executed by Merrick to James M. Jackson, Jr., as guardian of Annie Lester Patterson, a mintfr, and Jessie B. Markley, for default in the payment of principal and interest of the secured -debt. The two later mortgages executed and delivered subsequent to the execution and delivery of the original unrecorded mortgage deed appear to have been referred to in this foreclosure bill for the sole purpose of establishing the terms and provisions of the original mortgages, which at the time of the filing of the bill was not at hand, because *254of its having been misplaced under the circumstances hereinbefore stated.
The effect of the decree of foreclosure is to hold that the many defendants who had acquired their titles t.o their individual lands through the chain of title containing the recorded deed from Jackson, the guardian, and Mrs. Markley, were not bona fide purchasers for value without notice insofar as the two unrecorded purchase money mortgages from Merrick to the guardian, and Mrs. Markley were concerned, and that by reason thereof, the complainants were both entitled to enforce their mortgages by foreclosure proceedings brought and maintained not only by the minoT, who had subsequently attained her majority, but by Mrs. Markley, who had taken a separate mortgage for her part of the single unpaid purchase price.
It was undoubtedly the purpose of Section 5698 C. G. L., 3822 R. G. S.* to require all mortgages on real estate to be recorded in a separate mortgage book kept in the office of the Glerb of the Circuit Court (See Section 4858 C. G. L., 3077 R. G. S.) in order for same to be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration, mid without notice. Such has been the constructioh consistently put upon the statute by this Court. Carolina Portland Cement Co. vs. Roper, 68 Fla. 299, 67 Sou. Rep. 115; People’s Bank of Jacksonville v. Arbuckle, 82 Fla. 479, 90 Sou. Rep. 458; Rambo v. Dickenson, 92 Fla. 758, 110 Sou. Rep. 353.
But the statute also expressly recognizes that “notice” of an unrecorded instrument may take creditors or subse*255quent purchasers oAt of the class entitled to rely on the record, or absence of a record, of a particular mortgage sought to be foreclosed as against those who claim to be subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice of property covered by an unrecorded mortgage.
Notice is of two kinds, actual and constructive. Constructive notice has been defined as notice imputed to a person not having actual notice, for example: such as would be imputed under the recording statutes to persons dealing with property subject to those statutes. Actual notice is also said to be of two kinds: (1) express, which includes what might be called direct information, and (2) implied, which is said to include notice inferred from the fact that the person had means of knowledge, which it was his duty to use and which he did not use, or as it is sometimes called, implied actual notice. Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47, 103 Pac. 1016, 20 Ann. Cas. 29, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1180; Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 239, 35 L. Ed. 1063; Hoy v. Bramhall, 19 N. J. Eq. 563, 97 Am. Dec. 687; Acer v. Westcott, 46 N. Y. 384, 7 Am. Rep. 355. Constructive notice is a legal inference, while implied actual notice is an inference of fact, but the same facts may sometimes be such as to prove both constructive and implied actual notice. Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195, 9 Atl. 122, 1 A. S. R. 295.
The principle applied in cases of alleged implied actual notice is that a person has no' right to shut his eyes or ears to avoid information, and then say that he has no notice; that it will not suffice the law to remain wilfully ignorant of a thing readily ascertainable by whatever party puts him on inquiry, when the means of knowledge is at hand. McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. 14, 22 L. Ed, (U. S.) 311; Williams v. Woodruff, 35 Colo. 28, 85 Pac. 90, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 986; Vann v. Marbury, 100 Ala. 438, 14 So. 273, 46 A. S. R. 70, 23 L. R. A. 325; Webb v. John Hancock *256Mutual Life Ins. Co., 162 Ind. 616, 69 N. E. 1006, 66 L. R. A. 632.
In the ease at bar the appellees contend that since the deed dated August 16, 1923, executed by Jessie B. Hartley and James M. Jackson, Jr., as guardian of Annie Lester Patterson, a minor, conveying the property to George E. Merrick was itself duly recorded under the recording statutes, that the record of this deed constitutes notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers not only as to the existence vel non and contents of that deed, but also as to all such other facts as they would have learned from that record, had it been examined, including the proceedings before the County Judge which culminated in the execution of said guardian’s deed, the validity of which deed could only have been determined by an investigation of the proceedings had before the County Judge, upon which the legality óf the deed to convey the minor’s title necessarily depended. Charles V. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 282 Fed. 983.
These guardianship proceedings, so it is asserted, show every fact with respect to the unrecorded purchase money mortgage of the complainants, and defendants, being deemed to have implied actual knowledge thereof, through the inquiry suggested by the guardian’s deed into the County Judge’s proceedings, are to be deemed charged in this case with knowledge of what was shown by the proceedings had before the County Judge, since the guardian’s deed, without reference to such proceedings to support its validity, would not have been effectual as proof of title in any one claiming under it. McIntyre v. Parker, 77 Fla. 690, 82 Sou. Rep. 253; Davis v. Shuler, 14 Fla. 438; McGehee v. Wilkins, 31 Fla. 83, 12 Sou. Rep. 228.
In several jurisdictions the rule is that purchasers and creditors are charged only by construction with notice of the facts actually exhibited by the record made under the *257recording statutes, and not with such facts outside of the record itself, as might have been ascertained by inquiries which an examination of the record would have induced a prudent man to take. Neas v. Whitener-London Realty Co., 119 Ark. 301, 178 S. W. 390, Ann. Cas. 1917B 780; L. R. A. 1916A 525; Gilchrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576, 30 Am. Rep. 250; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Texas 454, 26 Am. Rep. 304.
But the rule supported by the best authority is, that the record is constructive notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers not only of its own existence and contents, but of such other facts as those concerned with it would have learned from the record, if it had been examined, and inquiries suggested by it, duly prosecuted, would have disclosed. Nolen v. Henry, 190 Ala. 540, 67 Sou. Rep. 500, Ann. Cas. 1917B 792; Wetzler v. Nichols, 53 Wash. 285, 101 Pac. 867, 132 A. S. R. 1075; Gaines v. Saunders, 50 Ark. 322, 7 S. W. 301; Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 35 L. Ed. 1063, 12 Sup. Ct. 239; H. B. Claflin Co. v. King, 56 Fla. 767, 48 Sou. Rep. 37; Gulf Coast Canning Co. vs. Foster, — (Miss.) — 17 Sou. Rep. 683; Martin v. Neblett, 86 Tenn. 383, 7 S. W. 123.
If in the investigation of a title, a purchaser, with common prudence, must have been apprised of another right, notice of that right is presumed as a matter of implied actual notice. Reeder v. Barr, 4 Ohio 446, 22 Am. Dec. 762; Singer v. Scheible, 10 N. E. 616; American Inv. Co. v. Brewer, 74 Okla. 271, 181 Pac. 294; Cambridge Valley Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. 326; Blake v. Blake, 260 Ill. 70, 102 N. E. 1007. Means of knowledge, with the duty of using them, are in equity equivalent to knowledge itself. Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1, 21 L. Ed. (U. S.) 587. See also Taylor v. American Nat. Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 Sou. Rep. 678; Hunter v. State Bank of Florida, 65 *258Fla. 202, 61 Sou. Rep. 497; McRae v. McMinn, 17 Fla. 876; Figh v. Taber, 203 Ala. 253; 82 Sou. Rep. 495.
In the case at bar, even if the order of the County Judge, dated September 6, 1923, cannot be construed to be co'nr structive notice of any matter, contract, lien or relationship recited therein over which the County Judge had no jurisdiction, as argued by appellants, it does not necessarily follow that apellants can base their claims of title to the land in question upon the assumed validity of the guardian’s deed to Merrick, and at the same time repudiate and deny notice of matters which would have been discovered by a prudent man put on inquiry, especially when those matters must unquestionably ’ have been brought' to their attention if they had examined the proceedings of the County Judge which constituted the guardian’s authority for the making of such a deed.
This is true because neither the proceedings before the County Judge, nor the guardian’s deed standing alone, was sufficient to convey the minor’s title. Both together constituted one inseparable and indivisible unit forming a single link in the title chain, because in an action of ejectment the guardian’s deed alone would not have been admissible in evidence. McGehee v. Wilkins, 31 Fla. 83, 12 Sou. Rep. 228, and cases cited.
So recording of the guardian’s deed imputed notice of the indispensable proceedings preliminary to the execution 'of that deed, which had been taken before the County Judge to give that deed validity, and under the authorities we have heretofore cited, those who would rely upon such deed as evidence of the rights they assert,' must do so Charged with implied actual notice of all facts appearing in the proceedings had befo're the County Judge, and df all facts that a prudent man examining those proceedings would have learned upon reasonable inquiry from the facts disclosed there.
*259And in this case it appears that an examination of the records of the proceedings before the County Judge would have brought knowledge of both the mortgages sought to be foreclosed to the appellants, since a single consideration of $20,000.00 as the purchase price to be paid for the land was referred to in the guardian’s report to the County Judge, and from that report it is plainly deducible that the unpaid balance of $18,000.00 was to be extended over a period of five years, payable in deferred payments to both of the interested owners, and not to the guardian alone.
Nor did the execution of the two new mortgages on September 20, 1926, change the equitable effect of the implied actual notice to appellees of the previo'us unrecorded mortgage. The subsequent mortgages appeared on their face to be but mere restatements of the previous one for the purpose of having the same placed on record. The execution of the two new mortgages on the same property, to coVer the same debt that was secured by the misplaced and unrecorded mortgage, did not operate to merge, release or discharge the prior mortgage, unless so intended by the parties and unless so made by them for the purpose of having them operate as a payment or satisfaction, so as to cancel the former security and substitute the latter. In such situation, the original mortgage cannot be deemed to have been discharged by the execution of the subsequent ones, in the absence of a clear showing of an intention by the parties to that effect. Such intention is affirmatively refuted in the case at bar. See 2 Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.) 666, Section 1187; 41 C. J. 806 et seq. Neither was any such merger, estoppel, payment, satisfaction or discharge of the unrecorded mortgage by the subsequent ones pleaded by defendants. See Loomis v. Dubois, 82 Fla. 293, 89 Sou. Rep. 804.
But, it is argued also that the execution by the guardian of a warranty deed to Merrick, without mentioning any *260recitals whatsoever therein to show the orders or other proceedings of the County Judge upon which it was based, constitutes no constructive notice of said orders and proceedings, although such warranty deed was properly recorded, because such a deed without recitals is “not free from criticism.” 12 R. C. L. 1142, par. 36.
The answer to this proposition is that while such recitals are appropriate, and good form dictates that they should have been incorporated to render the deed “free from criticism,” the absence of them cannot change the legal status of the iijgitrument as being a guardian’s deed whose essential validity can only be sustained when shown to be predicated upon valid preliminary proceedings before the County Judge, necessary to' have authorized the guardian to have legally made such a deed. The deed appears to have been executed by a guardian describing himself as such, so the absence of recitals in that deed describing the proceedings by which it was authorized is immaterial, since, as we have pointed out, the validity of that deed could only have been determined by examining the records in the office of the County Judge, and if such examination had been made, the fact of the probable and likely existence of the two outstanding unrecorded mortgages must necessarily have been noticed.
The proposition we decide is not that the record of the guardian’s deed constituted constructive notice per se of the entire proceedings before the County Judge upon which that deed was based, but that the proper record of such deed, with the coneohiitant necessity imposed upon those relying on it to look to the records- of the County Judge to determine whether it had been duly authorized, warranted a finding by the Court of implied actual notice of the existence of the two unrecorded mortgages under the facts of this case, as shown by the evidence and the stipulation. The Chancellor held that as a matter of law there *261was such implied actual knowledge, which is an inference of fact drawn by the Court as a matter of law, and not by the law itself, and in the absence of any clear showing that this inference of fact was unwarranted under the evidence and the stipulation, we must affirm the Chancellor’s finding on that score.
Constructive notice as we have heretofore pointed out, is an inference the law itself draws, and which cannot be refuted when the facts giving rise to it are made to appear. Implied actual notice, on the other hand, is an inference of fact which may be drawn by the court as a matter of law, when warranted by the circumstances of a particular case calling for its application in order to do equity.
As has been stated by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in the case of Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S. W. 305, (307): “It is a familiar and thoroughly well settled principle of realty law that a purchaser has constructive notice of every matter connected with or affecting his estate which appears by recital, reference, or otherwise, upon the face of any deed which forms an essential link in the chain of instruments through which he deraigns his title. The rationale of the rule is that any description, recital of fact, or reference to other documents puts the purchaser upon inquiry, and he is bound to follow up this inquiry, step by step, from one discovery- to another and from one instrument to another, until the whole series of title deeds is exhausted and a complete knowledge o'f all the matters referred to and affecting the estate is obtained. Being thus put upon inquiry, the purchaser is presumed to have prosecuted it until its final result and with ultimate success. * * * The rule of notice thus imputed is based upon the legal presumption that information has been communicated to or acquired by a party. The presumption is not conclusive but rebuttable. * * * It may be stated as a general proposition that in all instances of constructive notice be*262longing to this class, where it arises from information of some extraneous facts, not,of themselves tending to show an actual notice of the conflicting right, but sufficient to put a prudent man upon an inquiry, the constructive notice is not absolute; the legal presumption arising under the circumstances is only prima facie; it may be overcome by evidence, and the resulting notice may thereby be destroyed. Whenever, therefore, a party has merely received information, or has knowledge of such facts sufficient to put him on an inquiry, and this constitutes the sole foundation for inferring a constructive notice, he is allowed to rebut the prima facie presumption thence arising by evidence; and if he shows by convincing evidence that he did make the inquiry, and did prosecute it with all the care and diligence required of a reasonably prudent man, and that he failed to discover the existence of, or to obtain knowledge of, any conflicting claim, interest, or right, then the presumption of knowledge which had arisen against him will be completely overcome; the information of facts and circumstances which he had received will not amount to a constructive notice. What will amount to a due inquiry must largely depend upon the circumstances of each case. If, on the other hand, he fails to make any inquiry or to prosecute One with due diligence to the end, the presumption remains operative, and the conclusion of a notice is absolute.”
In this case the inference of implied actual notice was warranted by the fact that the persons having, constructive notice of the record of the guardian’s deed, must in any event have looked to the proceedings which were necessary to support it, and accordingly must be charged with implied actual notice of what an inquiry suggested to a prudent man by those proceedings would have disclosed. There is nothing in the stipulation which inhibited the court from finding such implied actual notice as a matter *263of law from the facts before him in this case, since there was no showing that the inquiry suggested by the guard! ian’s proceedings was made, and the facts not discovered after the exercise of due diligence.
It follows from what has been said that the interests asserted by the answers of the appellants were subordinate in equity to the right of foreclosure asserted by the appellees, and that the Chancellor properly so held when he entered his decree of foreclosure, which should be and is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Buford, C.J. and Whitfield and Ellis, J.J., concur.
Brown, J., dissents.
Terrell, J., not participating.
""No conveyance, transfer or mortgage of real property, or of any interest therein, nor any lease for a term of one year or longer, shall be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice, unless the same be recorded according to law; nor shall any such instrument made or executed by virtue of any power of attorney be good or effectual in law or in equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice unless the power of attorney be recorded before the accruing of the right of such creditor or subsequent purchaser.”