ON REHEARING.
In the absence of a proper written request, the’ trial judge is not réquired to charge the jury on the subject of credibility of witnesses, or on the subject of impeachment of witnesses. Childs v. Ponder, 117 Ga. 553 (4) (43 S. E. 986); Phillips v. State, 121 Ga. 358 (49 S. E. 290). When he charges upon a given subject he should 'charge correctly and fully thereon, and relatively to the subject of impeachment of witnesses, this requirement is complied with when the general, fundamental, underlying rule of impeachment is charged, that is, “a witness whose unworthiness of credit is'absolutely established in the mind of the jury is impeached and ought not to be believed unless corroborated.” Smith v. State, 109 Ga. 479 (2) (35 S. E. 59). If instructions upon the particular methods or modes of impeachment are desired they must be requested, or else their omission will not be reversible error (Millen & Southwestern R. Co. v. Allen, 130 Ga. 656 (5), supra) ; for the general, fundamental, underlying rule of impeachment just stated reaches the ultimate fact of impeachment sought by any attempt tó Impeach, and the methods of modes of impeachment are merely evidentiary routes. by which the ultimate fact is sought to be established; and “in the absence of a request so to do, the failure of the judge in charging the jury to apply a rule 'of evidence to the testimony of a particular witness is not cause for a new trial” (Holmes v. State, 131 Ga. 806, 63 S. E. 347)’; and “the trial court [is] not under necessity of taking up various phases of the evidence and submitting them to the jury” (Fouts v. State, 175 Ga. 71 (6) (165 S. E. 78) ; Yopp v. State, 175 Ga. 314 (165 S. E. 29); and elaborations of general principles' must ‘ always be requested. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Brown, 138 Ga. 328, 332 (6) (75 S. E. 330). Even when the trial judge, after charging the general) fundamental, underlying rule just stated, goes further and charges correctly upon one or more modes or methods of impeachment, his failure to charge also upon another mode or method raised by the evidence, is not' reversible error, in the absence' of proper request, for “mere failure to charge as' to one-method of impeachment does not in any'wise invalidate a correct charge"as *447to another and different method of impeachment.” Smaha v. George, 195 Ga. 412 (supra).
To the foregoing rule there is the single exception embraced in the Code, § 38-1806: “If a witness shall swear wilfully and knowingly falsely, his testimony shall be disregarded entirely, unless corroborated by circumstances or .other unimpeached evidence.” But before this rule of total rejection is applicable, the false swearing must be made in the case on trial, and not upon the trial of some other case, no matter how closely .related; it must be wilfully and knowingly false; the witness must admit that he wilfully .and knowingly swore falsely, or the nature and character of his own testimony must be such as to render the purpose to falsify “plainly manifest” (Smaha v. George, supra); and also, the false testimony may relate to a matter which is merely “collateral” to the main issue, although it must be relevant and incidentally material thereto. Fishel v. Lockard, 52 Ga. 632 (4) ; Day v. Crawford, 13 Ga. 508 (4).
Ground 3 of the motion for rehearing is. the only ground which raises issues under the Code, § 38-1806. This ground invokes special ground 6 of the motion for new trial, and contends that “Kinard and Mrs. Tant . . wilfully and knowingly swore falsely as to material matters in the instant case,” and that the trial court should have charged, without request, as stated in that ground of the motion for new trial. The evidence to which this ground for rehearing relates refers to a meeting between Kinard and Mrs. Taut in which they discussed the case of Jones. The brief of evidence refutes the contention that either Kinard or Mrs. Tant swore wilfully and knowingly falsely in this connection. Mrs. Tant testified in this regard that she had talked to Mr. Presley of the solicitor-general’s office about Jones’s case, and had written him about, it, and, “I have not written anybody else about the case. I dropped Mr. Kinard a card once, but it was not about the case. As to how many times I have seen Mr. Kinard from the day of July 10, the date of this verdict, until today — I saw him once before we came over here the first time, and. then he came back the day we came over here, then I saw him once before we came for the grand jury, and I saw him on the. train coming down. I saw him on the Seaboard train. .1 came on the train, and he caught the same train I did. I do not know the date, but it was when we were to meet *448before the grand jury. I did not know he was going to be on the same train. I don’t guess he knew I was going to be on the same train, but he could come at the same time, and come on the same train if he wanted to. I got on the Seaboard at Orangeburg. I think it was the Seaboard. If it was not the Seaboard, it was the Coast Line. Then I got on the Coast Line. I got on whichever one comes through Orangeburg. Mr. Kinard got on the same train at Orangeburg. He got on first and when I got on, I saw him getting on.” The testimony speaks for itself. There is absolutely nothing in it which shows that anything which Mrs. Tant swore was wilfully and knowingly false in any way. Kinard testified that he had talked to Presley, and that he had testified before the grand jury, and that “I have not talked to anyone else. J have employed an attorney — I don’t know just what case you are talking about. I have not talked with Mrs. Tant about these cases at all. As to whether I talked to her when we were together on the train from Orangeburg, South Carolina, to Atlanta, about the case — I made arrangements with her, I went over to see her and to find out if she was coming and how she was coming. Then I came here on the same train with her. Something was said about the case. I do not know what was said about the case. About all I talked about was the trouble I was in. I have not talked with her about this case since I have been here this time. I went to see Mrs. Tant to make arrangements to find out when she was coming over here on this trip. I thought she was coming through the country, and I could bring her down here, and save us a little money. I saw her and made the arrangements, and we did come together on the same train. I had made the arrangements previous to that. She told me what train she was coming on. It was not exactly an accident that we caught the same train. As to whether it was an arrangement — that was about the only train we could come on from up there in that section. We came on the same train. As to whether we arranged to come on the same train — well, there was not but one train to come on.” Q. “You said you went to see her to find out when she was coming, and made arrangements, and came together, that is true, isn’t it?” A. “We can come on the same train because” — Q. “You made arrangements to come on the same train?” A. “Not exactly.” This testimony in no way bears the mark of wilful and knowing false swearing. While there is some differ*449ence in phraseology in that Kinard said he had “not talked with Mrs. Tant about these cases at all,” and then said that on the-train, “something was said about the case. I don’t know what was said about the case. About all I talked about was the trouble I was in.” It is manifest that the witness was doing his utmost to deny that he had “talked about the case,” that while “something” was said (by someone) about the case he had not “talked” about it.
If this testimony shows perjury, then not one witness out of a hundred, being belabored by a skillful cross-examiner, could claim not to have perjured himself. It is clear that no such wilful and knowing false-swearing appears here as is contemplated by the Code, § 38-1806. But if Kinard’s testimony did appear such as to render the purpose to falsify “plainly manifest,” the result would be the same. For his testimony related only to a collateral matter. The gist of the ease was whether Kinard and Mrs. Tant perjured themselves on their divorce trials, and if so, whether Jones procured them to do so. These were the primary material facts in issue. All other matters, though material in the sense that they were relevant, were nevertheless collateral. If the jury believed the testimony of Kinard and Mrs. Tant as to their perjury on thé divorce trials, and believed that their testimony was sufficiently corroborated, and believed their testimony that Jones procured them to commit these perjuries, then the jury had the right to convict Jones, even though they believed that Kinard and Mrs. Tant had sworn falsely on the trial about not having previously discussed the ease. Webster’s New International Dictionary (3d ed.) defines “collateral” in part as follows: “(b) related to, but not strictly a part of the main thing ot matter under consideration; as, collateral issues, (c) Tending to support the main result; as collateral evidence.” “Collateral facts are those which are not directly involved or connected with the principal issue or matter in dispute . . facts which yet have sufficient bearing on the case to'be admitted under the rules of evidence . . (but which are) incidental . . (and) not directly involved.” Summerour v. Felker, 102 Ga. 254, 257 (29 S. E. 448). As stated, ground 3 of the motion for rehearing is the only ground invoking the Code, § 38-1806, and the above testimony is the only testimony claimed to require a charge, without request, upon the principle of that section. However, in ground 3 of the motion for rehearing, certain other *450alleged testimony is incidentally referred to as showing wilful and knowing false-swearing by Kinard and Mrs. Tant on the trial of Jones. We will now refer to that testimony and show that it did not authorize a charge on said section. In the motion it is stated: “Kinard swore that he thought Jones was to originally bring his case in Augusta rather than in Atlanta, although the divorce petition and its verification, which was signed by Kinard, shows that a Fulton County divorce was originally contemplated.” Kinard’s testimony shows that he understood all along that his case was to be brought in Augusta, and when he learned otherwise thought Jones had confused him with another client. There is no inconsistency about this in any of Kinard’s testimony. And that Kinard’s understanding was correct is shown by Jones’s letters to Mrs. Tant. If there be any inconsistency between Kinard’s testimony as to his understanding, and the petition for divorce and its verification, such would not authorize a charge on section -38-1806, for such inconsistency would not arise out of Kinard’s own testimony alone, and before said section is applicable the false swearing must be apparent from the testimony of the witness himself. Further, this relates only to a collateral matter. The gist of the perjury and Jones’s subornation is'the matter of residence in Georgia; and whether the case was to be brought in Augusta or Atlanta would be merely incidental.
In the motion for rehearing it is stated: “Although he (Kinard) finally admits that his evidence in the Florida trial was false and he knew it to be false, when the issue was first presented to him on cross-examination, he took the position that he thought it was true at the time. Although it is evident that his Florida proceeding was fraudulent, and that he knew it was based on false and perjured evidence, on the trial of the instant ease he first contended that the judgment'secured in Florida was set aside for false testimony by his wife and her lawyer.” We cannot agree to the defendant’s construction of Kinard’s testimony as to the Florida divorce. His testimony as to that on the trial of Jones is perfectly consistent in and of itself. As to whether or not he swore falsely in Florida he testified: “I went before a notary named Mrs. Frances M. Hale in Florida on the 5th of June, 1940, and swore that I was an actual bona fide resident of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. The lawyer said that is what it would take to establish my resi*451deuce. According to what the lawyer told me, I did not swear . falsely. I do not know whether I swore falsely or not when I swore to;that. On June 5, 1940, I was paying rent on a room in Jacksonville, Duval County, and I do. not know whether I was an actual bona fide resident of Jacksonville, Duval County, or not. If paying rent on a room down there established my residence, I was correct in the statement that I had been an actual bona fide resident of Jacksonville, Duval County, for more than ninety days. I'don’t know whether renting a room down there and paying a room rent legally established my residence there or not. They asked me did I come there with the intention of residing permanently and I answered, ‘yes.’ That was false. As to whether I knew it was false when I swore it — I did what the lawyer told me to do.” Kinard did not deny that he swore falsely in Florida, he merely said that he swore what his lawyer told him was necessary to swear, and that as to “residence,” if what his lawyer told him was meant by “residence” were true, he did not swear falsely in that particular; that he (Kinard) did not know whether paying room rent established a Florida “residence” or not. Kinard did not swear that the Florida divorce was set aside because of false testimony delivered by his wife and her lawyer. On the contrary he testified it was set aside at their instance by. reason of his own false testimony. This is the only possible construction of the following testimony of Kinard as to this matter: “On the 29th of August my wife found out about it, and went down to Judge Gray and told him, and he set my divorce aside and so notified me and my lawyer;' he set it aside on false testimony too. I know when my wife found it out she went to Jacksonville, and it was set aside for false testimony, on the part of her and the lawyer that carried her down there.” If it should be said, however, that Kinard’s testimony on the trial of Jones as to the Florida divorce were wilfully and knowingly false on its face, § 38-1806 would nevertheless be inapplicable. For his testimony related, not to the direct and primary material fact as to the guilt of Jones, but merely to a collateral matter.
■ We also call attention to the fact that special ground 6 shows no reversible error, irrespective of the foregoing, because the charge which it is there stated should have been given is not perfect in that it is not clear whether it refers to false swearing in the. case on trial or in some other case.
*452Ground 10 of the motion for rehearing also refers incidentally to the alleged false swearing on the trial of Jones by Mrs. Tant and Kinard with reference to .their alleged discussion of Jones’s case. From what has been said it appears that this contention is without merit, for there was no false swearing in that connection. This ground of the motion for rehearing assigns error on special grounds 7, 8, and 9 of the motion for new trial, which assign error upon the court’s charge on procurement. These grounds are without merit for the reasons stated in division 12 of our opinion.
Ground 2 of the motion for rehearing assigns error on special ground 1 complaining of a failure to charge without request that witnesses might be found to be impeached if they wilfully and knowingly ■ swore falsely in judicial proceedings. This special ground is dealt with in division 4 of the opinion. The motion for rehearing states: “This' assignment of error was not based upon the provision of Code, § 38-1806, which refers to instances where the witness swears wilfully and knowingly falsely in the case on trial.” This being true, there is no' merit in this ground. For there was no request to charge as contended, and the court gave in charge the general, fundamental, underlying rule of impeachment, which was correct in itself and not rendered incorrect for failure to charge as to a particular mo,de or manner of impeachment; nor did the correct charge upon one mode (contradictory statements) make it reversible'error for the court to fail to charge, without request, on other modes presented by the evidence.
The contention of ground 4 of the motion for rehearing is that the testimony of Judge Etheridge and Bush is not sufficient to. show contradictory statements. This is untenable as shown .in division 7 of the opinion. But-if this contention were correct, the result would be the same, as Kinard and Mrs. Tant themselves testified as to their previous contradictory statements.
Ground 5'contends that the opinion is inconsistent in-that in division 6 of the opinion it is ruled that the trial court did'not limit his instructions on impeachment to impeachment by contradictory statements, while in division 9 of the opinion it is said that “the only mode of impeachment given in charge was the rule stated in the Code, § 38-1803.” The opinion, rightly construed, is not inconsistent as claimed. Both statements are correct. The court did not limit its instructions on impeachment to impeachment by *453contradictory statements, but also charged the general, fundamental, underlying rule of impeachment, and also charged the rules relating to the credibility of witnesses. But the only specific mode of impeachment, given as such in the Code, aside from the rules relating to the credibility of witnesses, as to which the trial court charged, was the mode relative to impeachment by contradictory statements. And this, of course, is the sense, and meaning of the word “mode” as used in division 9 of the opinion.
The first contention of ground 6 of the motion for rehearing is that the evidence- authorized the jury to find that Mrs. Tant. and Kinard had a general disregard for the sanctity of an oath, and that without request the court should have charged the jury that “if they found a witness unworthy, of belief, the testimony of the witness must be disregarded unless corroborated by evidence coming from an unimpeached source.” This contention is without merit. It was not reversible error -to fail, without request, to charge as to this particular mode or method of impeachment. Millen & Southwestern R. Co. v. Allen, supra; Hoody. State, 67 Ga. App. 291 (2) (19 S. E. 2d, 927); Wheelright v. Aiken, 92 Ga. 394 (2) (17 S. E. 610); Sanders v. State, 67 Ga. App. 706 (4) (21 S. E. 2d, 276). It is contended that the trial .judge.-should not have omittedvthe-words “corroborated from an -unimpeached. source," As pointed out in division 9 of the opinion these words .are-.expressly i^ed.only in cases, coming within the-Go'de, § 38-1806.d‘and! this section was inapplicable, and the judge -was not ^charging therenn. .- Moreover; ,the>- words, actually, used by the -¡ trial*;.}judge-carry implicitly within themselves the idea that the corroboration must come from a source which the jury believes, and that source is necessarily one not successfully impeached. If the jury found both Mrs. Tant'and Kinard unworthy óf belief,'it necessarily followed that they could not use théir téstiniony as a basis for corroborating other evidence; and if they found one unworthy of-belief- it likewise necessarily followed that they were precluded fí'óm using thé testimony of such unworthy one as a basis for corroborating the other, or corroborating other evidence in the case.
The second contention here made is that the opinion holds that where a witness is successfully impeached he may be corroborated by other evidence also successfully impeached. There is no such ruling in-this case.-. Division 9 .of-the.-.opinion can not be so con*454strued. All that the opinipn- holds is that the trial judge was not required to use the express . words, “unimpeached sourceíb-..T,he opinion merely points out that'these-words do not themselves expressly appear in the Code, § 38-1803, as to which.- the .judge- was charging, nor do they, expressly appear in • charges.'.appr.qved in cited eases. •
In ground 7 it is contended that the opinion is. inconsistent in the rulings in divisions 6 and 9. No inconsistency; is shown. In division 6 it is pointed out that the issue as to whether .Mrs. Tant and Kinard were unworthy of.belief because of their-general disregard for an oath was embraced in the general, fundamental, underlying rule given as to impeachment, and in the general- charge on credibility - of witnesses. .In- division 9 it is pointed out that the part Of- the - charge, .there excepted to was not error because of the omission of the express words, “unimpeached source.” It is not held in division 9 .that the charge there excepted to was limited to impeachment by contradictory statements and - not otherwise applicable. The court merely points out as one of the reasons why the express words “unimpeached source” were not required to be used is, that these words are not expressly used in the Code, or in cited cases, in connection with one of the modes of impeachment (contradictory statements) as to which the trial court correctly charged.
■ These and all other matters in the motion for rehearing having been considered, the judgment is adhered to.
Judgment adhered to.
Broyles, O. J., and Gardner, J'., concur.