On Petition to Reheab.
The petitioners, Helen Gilbert Reynolds and the Third National Bank, Trustee, have filed their petition to rehear, complaining of a failure by the Court to respond to the following assignment of error: “The Circuit Court erred in refusing to strike from the record in this case the transcript of the evidence and pleadings in the lunacy inquisition, as this proceeding .is a separate suit from the lunacy inquisition and is between different parties.”
We think it is clear from the record that the County Judge and the Circuit Judge both treated the petition as a proceeding to set aside the judgment in the lunacy case and not as an independent suit. The petition was *217filed within the time allowed by law for making a motion for a new trial and to set aside the judgment and decree of the eonrt. Passing to the question made in the petition that this is “a suit entirely separate from the lunacy proceeding,” it is insisted by petitioners, “The trial court did not hold against these complainants upon the ground that they did not have such an interest as entitled them to intervene in the lunacy proceeding. The trial court — which was the Circuit Court — merely sustained the defendants’ demurrer without setting out the reasons therefor.” The record fails to show anything other than that the demurrer was sustained. We must conclude therefore that the holding of the Court was that some one or more or all grounds of the demurrer (twenty-five in number) were well taken and the petition was dismissed. The demurrer challenged (1) the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit, (2) “that petitioners do not occupy such relationship to Mrs. Altman as would entitle them to file the petition,” and (3) “the property rights of petitioners are not involved or affected by the lunacy proceedings.” It thus clearly appears that petitioners are mistaken in the view that the Circuit Judge did not hold against them on the ground that they were not parties in interest. In sustaining the demurrer he expressly held that they did not have sufficient interest to entitle them to intervene and that their property rights were not involved.
We think it is unnecessary that we consider the question of the jurisdiction of the County Court to entertain this petition as an independent suit. If petitioners did not have such interest as entitled them to intervene and participate in the lunacy trial, it follows, for the same reason, they have no right to file an independent suit challenging the judgment and decree of the Court. We *218are firmly convinced that the trial court was not in error in sustaining the demurrer, based upon the authorities cited in the original opinion. The case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Herb, 125 Tenn., 408, 143 S. W., 1138, deals with a question of jurisdiction and since we have pretermitted that question we will not undertake to distinguish it from the instant case.
The only interest petitioners have is remote and indirect. It most assuredly cannot be called a present interest. Petitioners express a fear that the verdict of the jury, finding that Mrs. Altman was of unsound mind prior to the execution by her of deeds to Altman Reynolds, will be invoked as prima facie evidence of insanity in a suit hereafter to be instituted by H. Stone Reynolds to have said deeds declared void and of no effect; in other words, that the decree in question might result in shifting the burden of proof in such a case from complainants to the petitioners. If the purpose of the petition now before us was to have the lunacy judgment set aside to avoid this possible embarrassment, it cannot be maintained for the reason (1) it does not involve a present interest, and (2) is too remote .to be made the basis of a cause of action. Moreover, the verdict of the jury finding Mrs. Altman to be of unsound mind prior to the institution of the lunacy proceedings does not involve or affect any future interest of petitioners. The form of the writ of inquisition, as found in Code, section 9615, is as follows:
“State of Tennessee,
“-County.
* ‘ To the sheriff of-county — Greeting:
“You are hereby commanded to inquire, by the oath of twelve freeholders, summoned by yourself, whether -, of-, in the county of-, is an idiot or *219lunatic, or is otherwise of unsound mind, so that he has not capacity sufficient for the government of himself and his property, and, if so, from what time, after what manner, and how; and if the said-, being in the same ■condition, hath alienated any lands or tenements or not, and, if so, what lands and what tenements, to what person ■or persons, where, when, after what manner, and how; and what lands and tenements, goods and chattels, yet remain to him; how much they are worth by the year; whether he has a wife and children, and their names and Ages. And yon are further commanded that at certain ■days and places, appointed by yourself, you diligently make inquisition in the premises; and the same, distinctly And plainly made, return into the county court of said ■county at its next session, together with this writ. ’ ’
The authority conferred under the foregoing section is purely directory, containing as it does a direction for a broad and searching inquiry as to the mental .status of the alleged lunatic, as well as the extent of his -or her property, and who may have possession of it. The .authority would exist independent of the statute. The jury must hear testimony as to the condition of mind of the lunatic prior to the inquisition to determine that the person proceeded against is not suffering from a mere temporary mental aberration but that it is-of some duration and justifies the appointment of a guardian.
In the instant case there was no issue before the jury as to whether Mrs. Altman could or could not make a valid contract on some particular day prior to the institution of the lunacy proceedings. For us to express a definite opinion as to what effect the Chancellor should give the decree in the lunacy case in a suit yet to be instituted and tried by him would be of doubtful propriety.
The petition is denied.