*562On Petition to Rehear.
The Insurance Company in a petition to rehear invokes application of certain maxims of equitable jurisdiction, namely, (a) that when the court takes jurisdiction for one purpose, it' will take jurisdiction for all purposes; (b) equity delights to do complete justice, and not by halves; and (c) equity will take jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits. Based thereon, it is urged that the Court, having taken jurisdiction to set aside and void the contract of insurance for fraud in its making, will take jurisdiction to determine an issue to arise in case the contract is held valid, that is, whether or not the insured committed suicide.
(1) While disposed to the view that these issues were not strictly repugnant, both going, on analysis, to defense against liability to pay the loss, they are nevertheless entirely independent and unconnected, distinct issues, or causes, of defense — two separate law suits, as to which the proof must be wholly different and unrelated. One is a purely equitable issue, the other a legal defense. Confusion and complication result. Not' questioning the soundness of the maxims invoked, nor the power of a court of equity, having taken jurisdiction of a controversy to dispose of all questions growing out of, or connected with it, in application of these general principles care must be taken to avoid violation of basic laws of pleading and fundamental rights of litigants.
(2) One of these fundamental rights is that of election, or choice, between remedies and forums. “If both a court of law and a court of equity have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter, a party may elect as to the tribunal which shall determine the controversy.” 20 *563C. J., p. 40; 9 R. C. L., p. 964, citing Bradford v. Furniture Co., 115 Tenn., 610, 62 S. W., 1104, 9 L. R, A. (N. S.), 979. While in a proper case injunctions may issue against suits at law before judgment, special grounds for equitable intervention must be shown, and every such case is subject to a sound discretion vested in the Chancellor, which will be exercised only to do justice, and never, as already said, where fundamental rights will be violated, or orderly procedure disturbed.
(3) In the instant case an important right of1 the claimant under the policy of insurance has been stressed in our original opinion. A, basic principle of pleading is also involved, termed generally multifariousness, here more specifically misjoinder. In Miller v. Harris, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.), 101, it is said that, ‘1 a bill is multifarious when several matters of a distinct and independent nature are complained of against divers defendants, or where one bill -unites against a single defendant several matters perfectly distinct and unconnected. The latter is more properly called misjoinder. . . . The Court must look to the circumstances of each casé, to avoid on the one hand multiplicity of suits, and on the other, inconvenience and hardship to defendants, in being called upon to defend as to matters that have no comiection, and to avoid complication cmd confusion of evidence. Story Eq. Pl., secs. 274, 530; 2. Gray, 471; 3 Stor. C. C., 25.” The italics used by us direct attention to particularly pertinent language. Also, see 14 Ency. of P. & P., at pages 199 and 200, and notes.
And, Mr. Gibson, so strongly relied on by petitioner, says (note on page 134, Suits in Chancery), “Chancellors dread a complicated litigation. They yearn to have all suits present clear cut, well-defined issues; and they *564abhor the confusion and complexity that result from the attempt to join disconnected matters in one suit. . . . All Courts seek to have as few issues of fact in a lawsuit as possible. The greater the number of issues, the greater the difficulty in reaching satisfactory conclusions, and in doing exact justice.” Before two or more causes of complaint, although growing out of the same transaction, may be litig'ated in one suit, the relief ashed for in relation to each must be of the same general character. The whole question is one resting in the sound discretion of the Court. “It is not the number of the parties, nor the intricacy of the claims on the one side or the other, that renders a bill multifarious; it is their disconnection or inconsistency, or the practical inconvenience of considering them, together in one suit.” (Gibson, idem page). Here we have “disconnection,” if not inconsistency, and quite apparently, “inconvenience.” Though not strictly subject to objection as multifarious, we have here, “in fact, properly speaking, a misjoinder of causes of suit, the cases or claims asserted in the bill being of so different' a character, that the Court will not permit them to be litigated in one suit.” (Gibson, sec. 284.) Misjoinder may exist even though, as here, but one thing, or object, may be involved. Wholly distinct and disconnected subjects, matters or causes of litigation may nevertheless be presented. For illustration, a suit to assert title to an automobile could not properly be joined with a suit to recover damages for personal injuries inflicted in its negligence use.
In the instant case, an orderly procedure essentially requires that the wholly independent issue of the original validity of the contract be first litigated and determined, separate and apart from the question of the applicability *565of the suicide clause. The proof aud the procedure called for to establish these wholly independent and disconnected issues are essentially different. "While the Chancery Court would have jurisdiction, when properly invoked, to determine the latter issue, it is a legal and not an equitable issue, as is the former. Legal principles apply to the one, and equitable principles to the other.
(4) In view of what has been said, we are of opinion that, if both of these issues are to be determined in the Chancery Court, a proper exercise of the Court’s discretion would require that they be litigated in two independent suits, in order to insure orderly procedure and avoid confusion and complexity.
For these reasons, in addition to those given in our original opinion, we hold that complainant may not force the defendant to litigate in this cause the issue arising under the suicide clause.
However, it was not intended to hold that the Chancellor might not, pending disposition of the question of the validity of the original contract, restrain by injunction the issuance of execution under any judgment obtained by defendant herein in a separate suit on this contract, or, in his discretion, the prosecution of such suit. Should such a contingency arise, this would afford adequate protection and conserve the rights and interests of complainant.
Without reviewing’ the authorities cited by petitioner, it suffices to say that in none of these cases was relief sought or granted as to matters wholly disconnected and' unrelated to the main issues. In each case the relief granted' grew out of, was connected with, or consequent upon the main theory of the bill. In none of them was a party deprived of his fundamental right to select his own *566forum in the prosecution of a demand, as to -which he alone had the election of action, and wherein legal rights only were involved, and where the defense of the defendant were unembarrassed. The petition to rehear is dismissed.