dissenting.
[¶ 17] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 18] A post-conviction relief application must contain minimal information:
“The application must identify the proceedings in which the applicant was convicted and sentenced, give the date of the judgment and sentence complained of, set forth a concise statement of each ground for relief, and specify the relief requested.”
N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-04(1). This law requires that the application contain additional information, but this case was not dismissed for failure to comply with those requirements. See N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-04(2).
*878[¶ 19] The statute regulating the content of a post-conviction relief application also states “[argument, citations, and discussion of authorities are unnecessary.” N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-04(1). And, just like other civil litigants are not required to ask for a trial, nothing in the post-conviction relief statutes requires that an applicant for post-conviction relief request an evi-dentiary hearing on the merits of a claim.
[¶ 20] The post-conviction relief statutes allow a court to summarily dismiss a matter before the state’s response where the applicant fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or for second or successive requests for similar relief. See N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(1).
[¶ 21] The law allows for summary disposition on motion. “The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition if the application, pleadings, any previous proceeding, discovery, or other matters of record show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(3). Summary disposition under this proceeding is equivalent to summary judgment and this Court has imposed a procedural requirement that the applicant “be put to his proof.” See Howard v. State, 2015 ND 102, ¶ 16, 863 N.W.2d 203 (District court did not err summarily dismissing application for post-conviction relief that was not properly supported with reference to pertinent portions of the record and to appropriately respond to State’s motion for summary disposition by raising genuine issues of material fact).
[¶ 22] I have disagreed with a majority of this Court about what the State must do to put an applicant to his proof. See Delvo v. State, 2010 ND 78, ¶ 22, 782 N.W.2d 72 (Crothers, J., dissenting) (“Here, the legal effect of the majority’s decision is that Delvo was put to her proof by nothing more than allegations in the State’s answer.”) I continue that disagreement here because the state clearly did not move for summary disposition. Majority, at ¶ 3. The majority instead, concludes Cody “was put to his proof by the district court’s scheduling order.” Majority, at ¶ 9.
[¶ 23] First, it is unprecedented in civil litigation for the district court to essentially be the moving party on a motion for summary judgment. We should not open that door here. Second, the district court’s actions were inadequate to put Cody on notice, if indeed it can be the moving party. The district court’s statement supposedly putting Cody to his proof was that both Cody and the State could file briefs, after which “the court will determine whether the Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any stated issue.” Majority, at ¶ 9.
[¶ 24] Rather than putting Cody to his proof, I would conclude the district court’s scheduling order was a process to narrow the issues for hearing. Such a procedure is explicitly permitted by statute. See N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-09(4) (“If an evidentia-ry hearing is necessary, the court may determine which issues of material fact are in controversy and appropriately restrict the hearing.”). Even without statutory authority, narrowing the issues for hearing would be within the district court’s inherent authority to control its docket. See Gullickson v. Kline, 2004 ND 76, ¶ 15, 678 N.W.2d 138 (“We are mindful of the necessity of the trial court having complete control over the proceedings before it[.]”) (quoting Ward v. Shipp, 340 N.W.2d 14, 18 (N.D. 1983)).
[¶ 25] Daniel J. Crothers