Voces de la Frontera, Inc. v. David A. Clarke, Jr.

2017 WI 16

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2015AP1152
COMPLETE TITLE: Voces De La Frontera, Inc. and Christine Neuman
Ortiz,
Petitioners-Respondents,
v.
David A. Clarke, Jr.,
Respondent-Petitioner-Appellant-
Petitioner.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION FILED: February 24, 2017
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: November 3, 2016

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Milwaukee
JUDGE: David L. Borowski

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED: BRADLEY, A. W., J. dissents, joined by
ABRAHAMSON, J. dissent.
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, A., J. did not participate.

ATTORNEYS:

For the respondent-petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there
was a brief by Oyvind Wistrom, Lindner & Marsack, S.C.,
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Oyvind Wistrom

For the petitioners-respondents, there was a brief by Peter
G. Earle, and Law Office of Peter Earle, LLC., Milwaukee, and
oral argument by Peter G. Earle
2017 WI 16
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2015AP1152

(L.C. No. 2015CV2800)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Voces De La Frontera, Inc. and Christine Neuman
Ortiz,

Petitioners-Respondents,
FILED
v. FEB 24, 2017

David A. Clarke, Jr., Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court

Respondent-Petitioner-Appellant-
Petitioner.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed;

writ of mandamus is quashed.

¶1 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. We review a decision

of the court of appeals1 affirming an order of the circuit court2

that granted mandamus requiring Milwaukee County Sheriff David

A. Clarke, Jr. (Sheriff) to provide unredacted versions of

1
Voces de La Frontera, Inc. v. Clarke, 2016 WI App 39, 369
Wis. 2d 103, 880 N.W.2d 417.
2
The Honorable David L. Borowski of Milwaukee County
presided.
No. 2015AP1152

immigration detainer forms (I-247 forms) to Voces de la Frontera

(Voces) pursuant to its public records request. The I-247 forms

were sent to the Sheriff's office by the United States

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and contain

immigration-related information about certain individuals held

at the Milwaukee County Jail.

¶2 Our review requires us to determine whether the I-247

forms are exempt from disclosure under Wisconsin public records

law. Specifically, we decide whether there is a statutory or

common-law exemption to the public records law such that the

forms are exempt from disclosure. And, if there were no such

exemption, we would decide whether the public interest weighs in

favor of releasing or withholding the documents.

¶3 We conclude that I-247 forms are statutorily exempt

from disclosure according to the terms of Wisconsin public

records law, and therefore, we need not reach common-law

exemptions or the public interest balancing test. Stated more

fully, under Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2),3 any record specifically
exempted from disclosure pursuant to federal law also is exempt

from disclosure under Wisconsin law. Federal regulation

8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2013) precludes release of any information

pertaining to individuals detained in a state or local facility

and I-247 forms contain only such information. Consequently,

read together, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 236.6

3
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.

2
No. 2015AP1152

exempt I-247 forms from release under Wisconsin public records

law. Furthermore, because I-247 forms are statutorily exempt

from release, the public interest balancing test has no

application here.

¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

¶5 On February 5, 2015, Voces submitted a public records

request to the Sheriff. Voces requested copies of all I-247

forms4 that the Sheriff received from ICE since November 2014.

The custodian, Captain Catherine Trimboli, responded to Voces,

but indicated that she was unable to immediately provide the

requested forms. She explained that she needed to speak with

ICE.5

4
I-247 forms are requests by the federal government to a
state or local entity to hold an individual for a period of time
not to exceed forty-eight hours after the individual is released
from state custody.
5
Captain Trimboli did not cite 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as a reason
for non-disclosure of the forms. However, it is sufficient that
Captain Trimboli recognized that I-247 forms may contain
sensitive information and accordingly took measures to ensure
that such information was not improperly released. We cannot
expect a records custodian to have expertise in federal
immigration law sufficient to determine the effect of federal
law on release of I-247 forms. For this reason, a record
custodian's failure to cite a statutory exemption to the public
records law is of no consequence to our analysis. Journal Times
v. Racine Bd. of Police & Fire Com'rs, 2015 WI 56, ¶¶74-75, 362
Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563 (reasoning, this "court's de novo
determination whether certain information is statutorily
exempted from disclosure is not aided by anything a custodian
might say in a denial letter, nor is it deterred by the
custodian's silence." (internal quotations omitted)). See also
State ex rel. Blum v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. of Johnson Creek,
(continued)
3
No. 2015AP1152

¶6 Voces filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking

to compel the Sheriff to produce the I-247 forms. Prior to

ruling on the mandamus, as a compromise, the circuit court

ordered the Sheriff to produce redacted copies of all I-247

forms. Accordingly, the Sheriff produced twelve I-247 forms,

but redacted the following information: (1) subject ID;

(2) event number; (3) file number; (4) nationality; and (5) a

series of boxes pertaining to immigration status. On April 7,

2015, the Sheriff provided forms with the detainee's nationality

no longer redacted.

¶7 On June 3, 2015, the circuit court granted Voces' writ

of mandamus and ordered the Sheriff to produce all I-247 forms,

unredacted. Conducting a balancing test, the court weighed

Voces' strong interest in examining I-247 forms against the

Sheriff's interest in protecting the information contained

within the forms.6 The circuit court concluded that the

balancing test weighed in favor of disclosure. The court

ordered the Sheriff to produce unredacted versions of the I-247

209 Wis. 2d 377, 387-88, 565 N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1997)
(explaining, "the existence of a statute exempting certain kinds
of information from disclosure is not uniquely within the
custodian's knowledge" and therefore a custodian's "failure to
specifically cite the statutory exemption does not preclude us,
or the trial court, from determining whether the Board was
authorized to deny the request.").
6
On June 11, 2015, the court of appeals temporarily stayed
the circuit court's order compelling the Sheriff to provide
I-247 forms pending review.

4
No. 2015AP1152

forms to Voces within forty-eight hours, but stayed the order

until June 12, 2015.7

¶8 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court. The

court concluded that I-247 forms are not exempt from disclosure

under Wisconsin public records law. The court concluded that

"(1) no exception to disclosure under Wisconsin's open records

law applies; and (2) the Sheriff failed to meet his burden of

showing that the public interest in non-disclosure outweighs

disclosure, given Wisconsin's very strong legislative intent and

public policy favoring disclosure."8

¶9 First, the court of appeals rejected the Sheriff's

argument that I-247 forms are exempt from disclosure under Wis.

Stat. § 19.36 because a federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6,

prevented disclosure of immigration-related information in the

possession of state or local entities.9 The court reasoned that

the regulation applied to only those individuals currently in

custody of the federal government.10 Because the individuals at

issue in the present case were not currently in federal custody,
the court of appeals reasoned, the federal regulation did not

7
In the interim, the Sheriff petitioned for leave to
appeal. But on June 17, 2015, the circuit court issued a final
order, and the Sheriff filed a notice of appeal. Consequently,
on June 24, 2015, the court of appeals dismissed the Sheriff's
petition for leave to appeal as moot.
8
Voces, 369 Wis. 2d 103, ¶18.
9
Id., ¶40.
10
Id., ¶28.

5
No. 2015AP1152

prevent the release of I-247 forms.11 Next, the court concluded

that the public interest balancing test weighed in favor of

disclosure.12

¶10 We granted the Sheriff's petition for review and now

reverse.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶11 This is a review of a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is a

remedy that can be used "to compel a public officer to perform a

duty of his office presently due to be performed." State ex

rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶27, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665

N.W.2d 155. "In order for a writ of mandamus to be issued, four

prerequisites must be satisfied: '(1) a clear legal right;

(2) a positive and plain duty; (3) substantial damages; and

(4) no other adequate remedy at law.'" Pasko v. City of

Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, ¶24, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72

(quoting Law Enforcement Standards Bd. v. Village of Lyndon

Station, 101 Wis. 2d 472, 494, 305 N.W.2d 89 (1981)).
¶12 Our review requires us to interpret and apply

Wisconsin public records law. Statutory interpretation and

application present questions of law that we review

independently, while benefiting from the analyses of the circuit

court and the court of appeals. Osborn v. Board of Regents of

11
Id.
12
Id., ¶47.

6
No. 2015AP1152

University of Wisconsin System, 2002 WI 83, ¶12, 254 Wis. 2d

266, 647 N.W.2d 158 (Nichols v. Bennett, 199 Wis. 2d 268, 273,

544 N.W.2d 428 (1996)).

¶13 Moreover, our review also requires us to interpret a

federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. We apply general

principles of statutory interpretation when construing federal

regulations. See State v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 576

N.W.2d 904 (1998) ("When interpreting an administrative

regulation, we generally use the same rules of construction and

interpretation as applicable to statutes."); Village of Lyndon

Station, 101 Wis. 2d at 489 ("As a corollary to the rule that

validly enacted administrative rules are given the effect of

law, it is generally accepted that the rules and regulations of

administrative agencies are subject to the same principles of

construction as apply to the construction of statutes . . . .");

see also Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., Inc., 787 F.3d 190, 199

(3d Cir. 2015) ("In interpreting a federal regulation, we look

to well-established principles of statutory interpretation.").
B. Statutory Interpretation, General Principles

¶14 Statutory interpretation "begins with the language of

the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we

ordinarily stop the inquiry." Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76,

¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659. "Statutory language is

given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that

technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their

technical or special definitional meaning." State ex rel. Kalal
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271
7
No. 2015AP1152

Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee Cty.,

2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).

Moreover, the "structure of the statute in which the operative

language appears" is important. Id., ¶46. And, "statutory

language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not

in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language

of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to

avoid absurd or unreasonable results." Id., ¶46 (citing State

v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶13, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416).

¶15 "The test for ambiguity generally keeps the focus on

the statutory language: a statute is ambiguous if it is capable

of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two

or more senses." Id., ¶47. And, "Wisconsin courts ordinarily

do not consult extrinsic sources of statutory interpretation

unless the language of the statute is ambiguous." Id., ¶50.

Extrinsic sources are those "interpretative resources outside

the statutory text—typically items of legislative history." Id.

(citation omitted).
¶16 It is under this framework that we review whether

I-247 forms are exempt from disclosure under the Wisconsin

public records law.

C. Wisconsin Public Records Law

¶17 Wisconsin public records law affords the public the

right to inspect certain documents within the possession of a

8
No. 2015AP1152

state entity.13 It "serves one of the basic tenets of our

democratic system by providing an opportunity for public

oversight of the workings of government." Nichols, 199 Wis. 2d

268, 273 (citing Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 433-34). To that end,

"we have a presumption of open access to public records, which

is reflected in both our statutes and our case law." Osborn,

254 Wis. 2d 266, ¶13; see also Wis. Stat. § 19.31 (providing "it

is . . . the public policy of this state that all persons are

entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the

affairs of government and the official acts of those officers

and employees who represent them"). "This presumption reflects

the basic principle that the people must be informed about the

workings of their government and that openness in government is

essential to maintain the strength of our democratic society."

Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶15, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646

N.W.2d 811 (citing Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 433-34).

¶18 Nevertheless, the public's right to access records is

not unrestricted. See Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178,
194, 549 N.W.2d 699 ("However, the right to public access is not

absolute."). "The strong presumption of public access may give

13
The public records law applies only to "records." Record
is defined expansively: "A 'record' subject to the Public
Records Law is 'any material on which . . . information is
recorded or preserved . . . which has been created or is being
kept by an authority.'" Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2005 WI 120,
¶25, 284 Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551. In the present case,
neither party disputes that I-247 forms are records for purposes
of Wisconsin public records law.

9
No. 2015AP1152

way to statutory or specified common law exceptions, or if there

is an overriding public interest in keeping the public record

confidential." Kroeplin v. Wisconsin Dep't of Nat. Res., 2006

WI App 227, ¶13, 297 Wis. 2d 254, 725 N.W.2d 286 (citation

omitted); see also Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, City of

Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984) ("Thus,

the general presumption of our law is that public records shall

be open to the public unless there is a clear statutory

exception, unless there exists a limitation under the common

law, or unless there is an overriding public interest in keeping

the public record confidential."). Accordingly, there are three

ways in which a record may be exempt from disclosure: (1) the

record is statutorily exempt; (2) the record falls under a

common-law exemption; or (3) the public interest balancing test

weighs in favor of non-disclosure. See Linzmeyer, 254

Wis. 2d 306, ¶¶23-24.

¶19 Under this framework, we first examine whether the

records at issue are statutorily exempt from disclosure.14 The
legislature codified a presumption of public access. It

follows, that the legislature is similarly free to codify which

records are subject to public inspection and which records are

statutorily exempt from inspection. See Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)

14
Because we ultimately conclude that the I-247 forms at
issue in the present case are exempt from disclosure under a
statutory exemption, we do not address the contours of the
common-law exceptions or weigh competing interests under the
balancing test.

10
No. 2015AP1152

("Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right

to inspect any record." (emphasis added)).

¶20 There are statutory exemptions to the Wisconsin public

records law's presumption of access that are codified in Wis.

Stat. § 19.36. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1)-(13). For the

types of records described in the statute, the legislature has

determined that they are categorically exempt from disclosure to

the public.

¶21 Exemptions detailed in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2) are

of particular relevance in this case. These sections provide:

(1) APPLICATION OF OTHER LAWS. Any record which is
specifically exempted from disclosure by state or
federal law or authorized to be exempted from
disclosure by state law is exempt from disclosure
under s. 19.35(1), except that any portion of that
record which contains public information is open to
public inspection as provided in sub. (6).

(2) LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORDS. Except as otherwise
provided by law, whenever federal law or regulations
require or as a condition to receipt of aids by this
state require that any record relating to
investigative information obtained for law enforcement
purposes be withheld from public access, then that
information is exempt from disclosure under
s. 19.35(1).
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2). As the text of the statute relates,

§ 19.36(1) prevents the release of any record that is exempted

from disclosure under federal law. Similarly, § 19.36(2)

exempts from disclosure any record "relating to investigative

information obtained for law enforcement purposes."

¶22 Therefore, we examine whether federal law prohibits
disclosure of I-247 forms. In the case now before us, it

11
No. 2015AP1152

follows that if 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 prohibits disclosure of

information in I-247 forms, they are exempt from disclosure

under Wisconsin public records law. At oral argument, Voces

agreed, but contended that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 did not prohibit

disclosure of the information in I-247 forms.

D. 8 C.F.R. § 236.6

¶23 Our consideration of the text and purpose of 8 C.F.R.

§ 236.6 compels the conclusion that it applies to any detainee

for whom an I-247 form has been issued by the federal

government. As we explain below, to hold otherwise would flout

the language and purpose of the federal regulation.

¶24 We begin with an examination of the text of 8 C.F.R.

§ 236.6 to determine its meaning. The regulation provides as

follows:

No person, including any state or local government
entity or any privately operated detention facility,
that houses, maintains, provides services to, or
otherwise holds any detainee on behalf of the Service
(whether by contract or otherwise), and no other
person who by virtue of any official or contractual
relationship with such person obtains information
relating to any detainee, shall disclose or otherwise
permit to be made public the name of, or other
information relating to, such detainee. Such
information shall be under the control of the Service
and shall be subject to public disclosure only
pursuant to the provisions of applicable federal laws,
regulations and executive orders. Insofar as any
documents or other records contain such information,
such documents shall not be public records. This
section applies to all persons and information
identified or described in it, regardless of when such
persons obtained such information, and applies to all
requests for public disclosure of such information,
including requests that are the subject of proceedings
pending as of April 17, 2002.
12
No. 2015AP1152

¶25 The court of appeals reasoned that the phrase "holds

any detainee on behalf of" the federal government required that

the individual be in federal custody at the time when I-247 form

was served in order for 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 to apply.15 The court

of appeals reasoned that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 applied only to those

detainees who were then subject to the forty-eight hour hold

requested by I-247 forms.16

¶26 In contrast, the Sheriff contends that the first

sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is definitional. He reasons that

the clause "holds any detainee on behalf of" the federal

government refers to those individuals subject to an immigration

detainer insofar as the facility is or was housing, maintaining,

or servicing them prior to the federal government's potential to

obtain custody. Under this interpretation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is

not temporally limited; rather, it explains which types of

entities and individuals are subject to the regulation. And,

any individual that is subject to an I-247 request (an

immigration detainer request) is a detainee who has been housed,
maintained or provided services by a state or local entity,

regardless of when that occurred.

¶27 Both of these interpretations are reasonable, as

reasonably well-informed persons could interpret the text of

8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as the court of appeals has and as the Sheriff

15
Voces, 369 Wis. 2d 103, ¶28.
16
Id., ¶¶28-29.

13
No. 2015AP1152

has. The existence of two reasonable interpretations compels

the conclusion that the regulation is ambiguous. See Bruno,

2003 WI 28, ¶19.

¶28 When a regulation is ambiguous, we may consult

extrinsic sources to interpret the regulation's meaning. See

State v. Williams, 2014 WI 64, ¶19, 355 Wis. 2d 581, 852

N.W.2d 467 ("Finally, and most important, if the interpreting

court concludes that the statute is ambiguous, the court may

consider extrinsic sources such as legislative history to

discern the meaning of the statute." (citing Kalal, 271

Wis. 2d 633, ¶51)). Consistent with this principle, we look to

extrinsic sources to assist us in determining the meaning of

8 C.F.R. § 236.6.

¶29 The statement of purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 was

provided by the agency that promulgated the regulation and was

set out in the notices in the Federal Register. It demarcates

three purposes underlying the regulation: (1) to protect

privacy of detainees; (2) to guarantee uniform treatment of
information pertaining to detainees; and (3) to prevent ongoing

investigations from being adversely impacted. See Comm'r of

Correction v. Freedom of Info. Com'n, 52 A.3d 636, 647-48 (Conn.

2012) ("The regulation was intended to ensure that the

disclosure of information about detainees would be subject to a

uniform federal policy, to protect the privacy of detainees,

and, most significantly, to prevent adverse impacts on ongoing

investigations and investigative methods.").

14
No. 2015AP1152

¶30 Indeed, the privacy interests of the detainees were a

substantial concern. This interest is evinced in the statement

of purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as set out in the notices:

By channeling requests for information through the
FOIA, which contains a privacy exception, the rule
also protects detainees' privacy. Just as the
government has a substantial interest in protecting
legitimate national security, intelligence and law
enforcement functions under the FOIA, detainees may
have a substantial privacy interest in their names and
the personal information connected with their status
as detainees.17
Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization

Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 68 FR 4364-01, 4366

(January 29, 2003). And, allowing public access to information

about an individual could have grave consequences for that

17
The notices of the regulation also explain:

For example, individuals who were originally detained
because of their possible connection to terrorism,
have an overwhelming interest in not being connected
with such activity. And particularly with respect to
those individuals cooperating with the government's
law enforcement investigations, there are powerful
reasons why such persons would wish to conceal their
identities and whereabouts. Indeed, other INS
regulations expressly shield from disclosure
information pertaining to or contained in an asylum
application. See 8 CFR § 208.6(a). Contrary to some
of the commenters' suggestions, the fact that certain
detainees may wish to publicly identify themselves,
which they are free to do, in no way undermines this
assessment.

Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization
Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 68 FR 4364-01, 4366
(January 29, 2003).

15
No. 2015AP1152

individual. After all, "allowing such disclosures would be

highly adverse to the privacy interests of a detainee who does

not wish to be identified as a possible terrorist or who, after

his release from detention, is cooperating with an ongoing

government investigation." Comm'r of Correction, 52 A.3d at

648.

¶31 Another purpose of the regulation is to ensure the

uniform treatment of the information contained within the forms.

See Release of Information Regarding Immigration and

Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities,

67 FR 19508-01, 19509 (2002) ("The rule bars release of such

information by non-[f]ederal providers in order to preserve a

uniform policy on the release of such information."). I-247

forms are federal records; the state does not generate or input

information into them. The federal government has an interest

in seeing that the information contained within the forms is

treated uniformly by all facilities.

¶32 A final purpose of 8 C.F.R § 236.6 is "to prevent
adverse impacts on ongoing investigations and investigative

methods." Comm'r of Correction, 52 A.2d at 648; see also Am.

Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Cty. of Hudson, 352

N.J. Super. 44, 69, 799 A.2d 629 (App. Div. 2002) ("The counties

are not privy to the character and extent of federal

investigations in progress nor, apparently, do they possess any

independently acquired information regarding the role of the INS

16
No. 2015AP1152

detainees in those investigations."). The notices containing

the statement of purpose initially passed in 2002,18 provide:

Release of information about a specific detainee or
group of detainees could also have a substantial
adverse impact on ongoing investigations being
conducted by federal law enforcement agencies in
conjunction with the Service. Even though an
individual detainee may choose to disclose his own
identity or some information about himself, the
release by officials housing detainees of a list of
detainees or other information about them could give a
terrorist organization or other group a vital roadmap
about the course and progress of an investigation. In
certain instances, the detention of a specific alien
could alert that alien's coconspirators to the extent
of the federal investigation and the imminence of
their own detention, thus provoking flight to avoid
detention, prosecution and removal from the United
States. Premature release of the identity of or
information relating to a specific alien in detention

18
The regulation was initially passed as a temporary
regulation in 2002 before being permanently enacted in 2003.
The regulation was promulgated in response to a request for
documents pertaining to individuals detained by, what was at the
time, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In that
case, "INS detainees [were] housed in the Hudson County
Correctional Center and the Passaic County Jail pursuant to
long-standing contracts between the INS and the counties." Am.
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Cty. of Hudson, 352
N.J. Super. 44, 58, 799 A.2d 629, 637 (App. Div. 2002). The
plaintiff requested the records of the individuals detained
pursuant to these agreements, and a trial court in New Jersey
ordered the jails to provide the records. Id. at 638. As the
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior court explained,
"five days after the trial court's order and judgment were
entered, the INS promulgated as an 'interim rule' a regulation
barring disclosure of the information sought here, 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.6 (2002)." Id. Based on the interim regulation, the
court concluded that, "[t]o the extent the State laws involved
may be viewed as requiring public disclosure of information
regarding INS detainees, they would be in conflict with 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.6." Id. at 655.

17
No. 2015AP1152

could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity
of a confidential source and techniques or procedures
for law enforcement investigations or prosecution.
Release of Information Regarding Immigration and Naturalization

Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67 FR 19508-01,

19509 (April 22, 2002).

¶33 Our examination of the purposes underlying 8 C.F.R.

§ 236.6 removes any ambiguity as to its meaning. We conclude

that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is not temporally limited; it applies to

all information pertaining to those individuals subject to I-247
forms. It is evident after exploring the purpose of the

regulation that "detainee" is a generalized term; it refers to

all individuals subject to an I-247 form.19 It would be

inconsistent with the three main purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 to

hold that it applies only to information pertaining to those

individuals presently in federal custody. And, "[a]ll of these

purposes would be undermined by allowing state and local

entities to disclose information about a detainee . . . subject

only to their own policies and procedures." Comm'r of

Correction, 52 A.3d at 648.
¶34 The regulation must be read to protect a detainee's

information regardless of when an I-247 form was received and

19
The inclusion of the phrase "such detainee" at the end of
the second sentence of the regulation does not alter this
analysis. "Such detainee" merely refers back to the phrase "any
detainee" in the preceding sentence. 8 C.F.R. § 236.6.
Accordingly, the phrase "such detainee," like the phrase "any
detainee," is a categorical description and does not temporally
limit the regulation.

18
No. 2015AP1152

regardless of whether a detainee is in the forty-eight hour hold

requested in I-247 in order to protect a detainee's privacy.

After all, the sensitivity of a detainee's information cannot,

and we conclude does not, depend on when the I-247 form was

received by the state or local entity. If the documents could

be released at any time prior to the forty-eight hour period,

then the privacy protections at the heart of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6

would be illusory.20 As a consequence, the regulation must be

interpreted to cover all information contained within an I-247

form regardless of whether the individual that is the subject of

the detention request is solely in state or federal custody or

has been released. Our conclusion that the regulation is not

temporally limited is consistent with this directive.

¶35 Similarly, the federal government's interest in the

uniform treatment of immigration-related records by all

facilities requires that the regulation applies to all I-247

forms, without a temporal limitation. Stated otherwise,

8 C.F.R. § 236.6 controls I-247 information pertaining to
detainees without regard for when a facility receives that form.

State or local entities do not have discretion to decide whether

I-247 forms may be released. A contrary interpretation would

20
We note that the intent of those seeking the information
does not diminish the detainee's privacy interest in the
information. If the information can be accessed by one party,
then it can be obtained by any other organization or individual
that seeks the same information. This, of course, includes
those individuals or organizations with potentially less noble
aspirations than Voces.

19
No. 2015AP1152

vitiate consistency in treatment of I-247 forms and the

information they contain.

¶36 Finally, the regulation is meant to protect sensitive

information pertaining to government criminal or immigration-

related investigations. Surely, such an important interest

cannot succumb to the temporal limitations that an alternative

interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 would impose. For this

reason alone, the regulation must be interpreted to protect the

information contained within I-247 forms.

¶37 Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals

inaccurately interpreted 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 when it added the

requirement that an individual who is subject to a I-247 form

must be in the custody of the federal government for 8 C.F.R.

§ 236.6 to apply. The regulation is not so narrow, and the word

"custody" is conspicuously absent from its text. Section 236.6

applies to any individual subject to an I-247 immigration

detention request. And, a different federal regulation

discussing detainers distinguishes between "custody" and an
individual subject to a detainer request:

Any authorized immigration officer may at any time
issue a Form I–247, Immigration Detainer–Notice of
Action, to any other Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agency. A detainer serves to advise
another law enforcement agency that the Department
seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of
that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing
the alien.
8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2011).

20
No. 2015AP1152

¶38 Therefore, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 protects all information

contained within I-247 forms pertaining to detainees that are

housed, maintained, or held in facilities run by state or

private entities. Stated otherwise, the regulation is not

temporally limited and does not apply only to those individuals

in federal custody. Rather, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 renders the I-247

forms that Voces seeks "record[s] . . . specifically exempted

from disclosure by . . . federal law," under Wis. Stat.

§ 19.36(1). For similar reasons, these records also contain

information obtained for federal law enforcement investigative

purposes, and Wis. Stat. § 19.36(2) prevents their disclosure.21

¶39 We are not alone in our interpretation of 8 C.F.R.

§ 236.6. The Supreme Court of Connecticut also examined the

purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 and concluded that the regulation

prohibits disclosure of documents that pertain to those

individuals that are no longer in state or federal custody.

Comm'r of Correction, 52 A.3d at 649 ("Nothing in the language

of the regulation differentiates between information about
detainees who have been transferred to the custody of another

21
We note that our decision does not pass judgment on the
desirability of the Sheriff's compliance or non-compliance with
the Department of Homeland Security's immigration detention
requests. Rather, the issue in the present case "involve[s] the
nature and scope of information that must be made available to
the public concerning INS detainees. The power to regulate
matters relating to immigration and naturalization resides
exclusively in the federal government." Am. Civil Liberties
Union of New Jersey, Inc. v. Cty. Of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 654
(N.J. App. Div. 2002).

21
No. 2015AP1152

governmental entity and information about detainees who have

been released."). In Commissioner of Correction, the

Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the lower court's conclusion

that "because the first sentence of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 uses the

present tense when it refers to any 'person . . . that houses,

maintains, provides services to, or otherwise holds any

detainee'; the regulation applies only to a person who currently

engages in one of the described activities . . . ." Id. at 646

(internal citations omitted). Rather, the court accepted the

federal government's reasoning and concluded that "the use of

the present tense . . . [is] not a temporal limitation with a

beginning and an end." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, the court concluded that the regulation continues

to prevent the release of I-247 forms even after a detainee has

been released from custody. Id. at 649. Our interpretation,

that the regulation is not temporally limited in application, is

consistent with the Connecticut Supreme Court's holding.

¶40 Finally, we note that our opinion does not curb the
presumption of openness that Wisconsin public records law so

carefully protects. An overarching purpose of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6

is to channel requests for federal records through federal law;

namely the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).22 See generally

22
The notices explaining the purpose of the regulation
state: "Accordingly, any disclosure of such records will be
made by the Service and will be governed by the provisions of
applicable Federal law, regulations, and Executive Orders. This
rule does not address or alter in any way the Service's policies
regarding its release of information concerning detainees; these
(continued)
22
No. 2015AP1152

5 U.S.C. § 552. After all, the federal government is in a

better position to determine whether there are privacy and

safety risks innate in releasing records that it created.

¶41 In the present case, the requested records, I-247

forms of individuals housed in Milwaukee County Jail, fall under

the umbrella of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. The individuals in the

present case, all of whom are subject to I-247 requests, are

detainees that were housed, maintained, or serviced by a local

entity.23 Accordingly, federal law mandates that information

pertaining to these detainees contained in I-247 forms not be

released.

¶42 Given that a federal law prevents the release of the

information in I-247 forms, we conclude that both Wis. Stat.

§ 19.36(1) and Wis. Stat. § 19.36(2) apply to exempt I-247 forms

from disclosure under Wisconsin public records law. As the text

of the statute suggests, § 19.36(1) prevents the release of any

document that is exempted from disclosure under federal law.

¶43 Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 19.36(2) exempts from
disclosure any record containing information that federal law

mandates not be released because it "relat[es] to investigative

policies remain unchanged." Release of Information Regarding
Immigration and Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal
Facilities, 67 FR 19508-01, 19509 (April 22, 2002).
23
Neither party disputes that the Milwaukee County
Sheriff's Department participates in ICE's detainer program, and
Voces cited the Sheriff's participation in the program as one of
the reasons it sought to obtain the requested forms.

23
No. 2015AP1152

information obtained for law enforcement purposes." And, as

discussed above, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 mandates that state or local

entities are not to release information contained within I-247

forms. Therefore, both of these provisions exempt I-247 forms

from disclosure pursuant to the provisions of Wisconsin public

records law. Accordingly, the Sheriff cannot be compelled to

produce them.

III. CONCLUSION

¶44 In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the

common-law exemptions or balancing test because we conclude that

the I-247 forms are statutorily exempt from disclosure under

Wisconsin public records law. Stated more fully, under Wis.

Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2), any record exempted from disclosure

pursuant to federal law is exempt from disclosure under

Wisconsin law. And, federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 236.6

precludes the release of any information pertaining to

individuals detained by a state or local facility and I-247

forms contain such information. Accordingly, read together,
Wis. Stat. §§ 19.36(1)-(2) and 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 exempt I-247

forms from release under Wisconsin public records law.

Furthermore, because I-247 forms are statutorily exempt from

release, the public interest balancing test has no application

here.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is

reversed; writ of mandamus is quashed.

¶45 Annette Kingsland Ziegler, J., did not participate.

24
No. 2015AP1152.awb

¶46 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). Wisconsin's

Public Records Law "serves one of the basic tenets of our

democratic system by providing an opportunity for public

oversight of the workings of government." Majority op., ¶17

(citations omitted). Relying on this basic tenet, Voces de la

Frontera requests unredacted copies of federal immigration

detainer forms issued to Milwaukee County Sheriff David Clarke

by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").

¶47 The circuit court determined that Wisconsin's Public

Records Law requires the release of unredacted copies of the

detainer forms. It explained that Voces de la Frontera made a

compelling case and that Sheriff Clarke offered no good reason

to justify any redaction.

¶48 The court of appeals affirmed. Noting uncontested

facts, it rejected Sheriff Clarke's newly raised argument that

an obscure federal regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, precluded

release of the detainer forms.1

1
8 C.F.R. § 236.6 provides in relevant part:

1
No. 2015AP1152.awb

¶49 Sheriff Clarke now contends that no detainer forms

should be released. He asserts that the forms are statutorily

exempt from disclosure and that his office erred when it

previously released redacted detainer forms to Voces.

¶50 Reneging on previously uncontested facts and relying

on a belatedly cited obscure federal regulation——never before

applied to state or local detainees——Sheriff Clarke tosses a

"hail mary" pass to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.2

¶51 The majority catches the pass and runs with it, but

unfortunately makes no forward progress for the people of this

state. Instead, a majority of this court loses ground, yet

again chipping away at Wisconsin's long-standing commitment to

open government. See, e.g., Democratic Party of Wisconsin v.

Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, 2016 WI 100, 372 Wis. 2d 460, 888

N.W.2d 584.

¶52 Once more a majority of this court reverses a

unanimous court of appeals decision affirming a circuit court

order requiring the release of records to the public, further
undermining the principle that Wisconsin Public Records Law be

construed "in every instance with a presumption of complete

public access." Wis. Stat. § 19.31.

¶53 This time the majority rewrites a federal regulation

by deleting the phrase "on behalf of the Service" from the

2
A "hail mary" is "a long forward pass in football,
especially as a last-ditch attempt at the end of a game, where
completion is considered unlikely." Random House Unabridged
Dictionary 859 (2d ed. 1993).

2
No. 2015AP1152.awb

regulatory language in order to reach its conclusion that yet

another public records request must fail. Given the cumulative

effect of the majority's approach, one wonders if a day will

come when we awake to find that this continuous "chipping away"

has substantially gutted Wisconsin's commitment to open

government.

¶54 Contrary to the majority, I agree with the circuit

court that Clark offers no good reason to counter the strong

presumption of open access to these public records. I likewise

agree with the unanimous court of appeals that the federal

regulation does not statutorily exempt immigration detainer

forms from release under Wisconsin's Public Records Law. Both

the plain language of the federal regulation and its

promulgation history establish that it applies only to detainees

in the custody of the federal government.

¶55 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

¶56 I begin by setting forth more complete facts to
provide the necessary context. After new federal guidelines

were released, Voces de la Frontera ("Voces") submitted a public

records request seeking copies of immigration detainer forms (I-

247) issued by ICE to Sheriff Clarke's office. Following a

delay without a response, Voces filed an action seeking the

issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the release of the

detainer forms under Wisconsin's Public Records Law.

¶57 Sheriff Clarke eventually released redacted versions
of the requested detainer forms. In reaching a determination

3
No. 2015AP1152.awb

about what information to redact, Sheriff Clarke's record

custodian explained that she consulted with ICE, and redacted

certain information based primarily on ICE's advice.

¶58 Voces sought release of unredacted versions of the

detainer forms. The circuit court ordered Sheriff Clarke to

produce unredacted copies, concluding that Voces made a

compelling case that it had a strong interest in ensuring its

government was complying with federal guidelines. It further

observed that "there was never a very good reason given as to

why [] information should be redacted other than ICE [] believes

it should be redacted."

¶59 Sheriff Clarke appealed, raising a new argument before

the court of appeals that an obscure federal regulation, 8

C.F.R. § 236.6, precludes release of the redacted portions of

the detainer forms. Relying on undisputed facts, the court of

appeals several times observed that Sheriff Clarke "does not

dispute the fact that the prisoners in question here were held

on state charges which had not expired." Voces De La Frontera,
Inc. v. Clarke, 2016 WI App 39, ¶28, 369 Wis. 2d 103, 880

N.W.2d 417; see also id., ¶¶25, 36.

¶60 The court of appeals rejected Sheriff Clarke's new

argument, concluding that the plain language of the federal

regulation applies only to detainees held on behalf of the

federal government. Id., ¶28. Applying the balancing test, it

further determined that Sheriff Clarke failed to meet his burden

to overcome the strong presumption in favor of release of the
unredacted detainer forms. Id., ¶47.

4
No. 2015AP1152.awb

¶61 Having been unsuccessful in both the circuit court and

the court of appeals, Sheriff Clarke now turns to this court.

At issue is whether the detainer forms are statutorily exempt

from disclosure pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1)-(2).

¶62 The parties agree and the majority acknowledges that

the requested I-247 forms are public records as defined by Wis.

Stat. § 19.32(2). Majority Op., ¶17 n.13. Consequently, any

analysis must begin with a strong presumption favoring release

of the requested records. See Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84,

¶15, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811.

¶63 The majority contends that read together Wis. Stat.

§ 19.36(1)-(2) and the federal regulation statutorily preclude

release of the I-247 forms.3 Majority op., ¶3. It posits that 8

C.F.R. § 236.6 prohibits release of any information pertaining

to individuals detained in a state or local facility, despite

3
Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(1)-(2) (2013-14) provide:

(1) Any record which is specifically exempted from
disclosure by state or federal law or authorized
to be exempted from disclosure by state law is
exempt from disclosure under s. 19.35(1), except
that any portion of that record which contains
public information is open to public inspection
as provided in sub. (6).

(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, whenever
federal law or regulations require . . . that any
record relating to investigative information
obtained for law enforcement purposes be withheld
from public access, then that information is
exempt from disclosure . . . .

5
No. 2015AP1152.awb

the fact that this obscure federal regulation has never before

been applied to state or local detainees.4 See id.

¶64 However, the majority's non-textual interpretation is

trumped by the regulation's plain language and the agency's

intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation. See

Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1988). The plain

language of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 provides:

No person, including any state or local government
entity or any privately operated detention facility,
that houses, maintains, provides services to, or
otherwise holds any detainee on behalf of the
Service . . . shall disclose or otherwise permit to be
made public the name of, or other information relating
to, such detainee. . . . (emphasis added).
"Service" refers to the federal government's Immigration and

Naturalization Service ("INS").5 The phrase "on behalf of the

Service" indicates that that the regulation applies only to

4
Neither the majority nor the parties cite to any case that
has previously applied 8 C.F.R. § 236 to detainees in state or
local custody. Additional research yielded no such case.
5
The INS promulgated 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as an interim rule in
April 2002, and adopted it as a final rule without change in
January 2003. Release of Information Regarding Immigration and
Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67
Fed. Reg. 19508-11 (Apr. 22, 2002); 68 Fed. Reg. 4364-67 (Jan.
29, 2003). In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, INS was disbanded and replaced with three new federal
agencies, one of which is ICE. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Overview of INS History 11 (2012),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/History%20and%20
Genealogy/Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf. Therefore,
in the context of this discussion of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6,
references to the INS and ICE are used interchangeably.

6
No. 2015AP1152.awb

detainees being held on behalf of federal immigration

authorities.6

¶65 Likewise, the supplementary information published in

the Federal Register in connection with the promulgation of 8

C.F.R. § 236.6 consistently makes clear that the regulation is

limited to detainees held "on behalf of" federal immigration

authorities. Release of Information Regarding Immigration and

Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 68

Fed. Reg. 4364 (Jan. 29, 2003) ("This final rule governs the

public disclosure by any state or local government

entity . . . of . . . information relating to any immigration

detainee being house or otherwise maintained . . . on behalf of

the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS or Service)");

67 Fed. Reg. 19508 (Apr. 22, 2002) ("This rule will establish a

6
Receipt of an I-247 form by a state or local law
enforcement agency does not convert a state or local detainee
into a federal detainee in the custody of ICE. The language of
the I-247 form explains that it is simply a request from ICE to
a state or local agency: "IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain
custody of the subject for a period not to exceed 48
hours . . . beyond the time when the subject would have
otherwise been released from your custody to allow DHS to take
custody of the subject" (emphasis in the original).

Additionally, a federal regulation explains that a detainer
serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the federal
government seeks custody of a detainee presently in the custody
of a state or local agency. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a); see also
Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3rd Cir. 2014)
("[D]etainers are not mandatory."); Milwaukee County Board of
Supervisors, Resolution 12-135 (June 4, 2012),
https://milwaukeecounty.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1
124069&GUID=3D583485-4F01-4B43-B892-D6FFE5D327BF ("[D]etainers
are not mandatory but are considered 'requests'").

7
No. 2015AP1152.awb

uniform policy on the public release of information on Service

detainees") (emphasis added).

¶66 Despite the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 and the

clear indications in the Federal Register reiterating that the

application of the regulation is limited to detainees in federal

custody, the majority concludes otherwise. By positing that the

regulation is not limited to detainees in federal custody, i.e.

"8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is not temporally limited," the majority

impermissibly rewrites the regulation, deleting words from it.

See Majority op., ¶33.

¶67 The majority concedes as reasonable the court of

appeals' conclusion that a detainee must be in federal custody

at the time the detainer form was served in order for 8 C.F.R.

§ 236.6 to apply. Majority op., ¶¶25, 27. Nevertheless, it

deletes words from the federal regulation to embrace an

alternative interpretation. Majority op., ¶¶33-34.

¶68 The majority embraces a conclusion of ambiguity, as it

must, in order to be free to borrow from extrinsic sources to
support its contention that the federal regulation applies to

any detainee with a federal immigration detainer——even those in

state or local custody. Majority op., ¶¶27-28. By deleting

words from the regulation to render it ambiguous, the majority

undermines the principle that statutory exceptions under

Wisconsin's Public Records Law must be clear and explicit.

¶69 As this court explained, "the general presumption of

our law is that public records shall be open to the public
unless there is a clear statutory exception . . . Exceptions

8
No. 2015AP1152.awb

should be recognized for what they are, instances in derogation

of the general legislative intent, and should, therefore, be

narrowly construed; and unless the exception is explicit and

unequivocal, it will not be held to be an exception." Hathaway

v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, City of Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 388,

397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984) (emphasis added). If, as the

majority contends, 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 is ambiguous and subject to

alternative reasonable interpretations, it follows that the

regulation does not present a "clear statutory exception"

precluding release of the record to the public. See id.

¶70 Further evincing that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 does not apply

here is the fact that neither ICE nor Sheriff Clarke cited 8

C.F.R. § 236.6 as a justification for denying Voces' public

records request until this case was on appeal.7 Such a void

7
At oral arguments, counsel revealed that Sheriff Clark's
office consulted with two different ICE representatives and the
ICE representatives did not cite 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 as
justification for denying the release of the requested I-247
forms:

The Court: [D]id ICE tell the Sheriff's office you
cannot release any information or these records
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 236.6?

Counsel for Sheriff Clarke: They were not provided
with that advice, no. The advice they received was
certain specific information on these forms should be
redacted and here are the reasons why under federal
law under FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) ICE
believed the information should be protected.

The Court: Then it doesn't appear that ICE was
applying § 236.6 to these forms because they oked the
release of the names among other arguably personal
identifiable information.

(continued)
9
No. 2015AP1152.awb

highlights that this relatively obscure federal regulation was

never intended to apply to detainees in state or local custody.

Apparently both were unfamiliar with this obscure regulation

upon which Clark and the majority now rely.

¶71 It is not surprising that neither ICE nor Sheriff

Clarke was familiar with 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 in this context.

After all, this relatively obscure regulation was promulgated to

protect information about individuals detained by the federal

government on suspicion of terrorism following the attacks of

September 11, 2001. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of New

Jersey, Inc. v. Cty. of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629, 648 (N.J. App.

Div. 2002) ("the real focus of the regulation, as evidenced by

the rationale presented in its preamble, may be seen to be on

the facilitation of law enforcement efforts in the wake of

September 11.").

¶72 Indeed, the drafting records of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 are

replete with references to federal 9/11 detainees. Absent from

the Federal Register is any mention of the need to prevent the

Counsel for Sheriff Clarke: It appears that way.
236.6 is a relatively obscure provision and why it
wasn't relied upon at the trial court level I am not
sure. But I think it clearly applies to the facts of
this case.

The Court: But not just at the trial court level, ICE
itself was not applying 236, or were they?

. . .

Counsel for Sheriff Clarke: At the time of the open
records request ICE did not tell Milwaukee County
don't produce them because 236 applies.

10
No. 2015AP1152.awb

release of information about detainees in state or local custody

who may later be transferred to federal custody.8

¶73 In sum, I conclude that the plain language of 8 C.F.R.

§ 236.6 indicates that its application is limited to federal

immigration detainees. This conclusion is supported by the

promulgation history of the regulation and the fact that neither

ICE nor Sheriff Clarke referred to this relatively obscure

regulation until this case was on appeal. Accordingly, unlike

the majority, I determine that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(1)-(2) when

read in conjunction with the entire text of 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 do

not statutorily exempt the detainer forms from disclosure.9

8
See e.g., Release of Information Regarding Immigration and
Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 67
Fed. Reg. 19510 (Apr. 22, 2002) ("Disclosure could reveal
important information about the direction, progress, focus and
scope of investigations arising out of the attack on September
11, 2001, and thereby assist terrorist organizations in
counteracting investigative efforts of the United
States. . . . In light of the national emergency declared by the
President . . . with respect to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the continuing threat by terrorists to
the security of the United States, and the need immediately to
control identifying or other information pertaining to Service
detainees . . . ."); see also 68 Fed. Reg. 4366 (Jan. 29, 2003).
9
The majority further missteps by concluding that the
requested I-247 forms are exempt in their entirety without
analysis of the possibility of redaction. Majority op., ¶3. In
so doing, the majority disregards the statutory requirement that
when a record contains some information subject to disclosure
and other information that is not, the record custodian "shall
provide the information that is subject to disclosure and delete
the information that is not subject to disclosure from the
record before release." Wis. Stat. § 19.36(6). Thus, once
again, a majority of this court "renders meaningless the
statutory direction to redact." Democratic Party of Wisconsin,
372 Wis. 2d 460, ¶121 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).

11
No. 2015AP1152.awb

¶74 Having concluded that the distinction between whether

a detainee is in federal versus state or local custody is

dispositive, I normally would turn next to apply that

distinction to this case. But not here.

¶75 Before this case reached this court it was undisputed

that the detainees in question were in state custody. The court

of appeals repeatedly explained, "[i]t is undisputed that

Sheriff Clarke held the jail prisoners in state custody and that

custody had not expired at the time of the open records

requests." Voces De La Frontera, 369 Wis. 2d 103, ¶25; see also

id., ¶28 ("The Sheriff does not dispute the fact that the

prisoners in question here were held on state charges which had

not expired. . . . Here it is undisputed that the state custody

had not ended."); id., ¶36 ("Here the twelve detainees were

still in custody on their state charges . . . ").

¶76 However, during oral argument before this court

Sheriff Clarke reneged on the previously uncontested facts. He

now asserts that some of the detainees in question were in
federal custody at the time Voces submitted this request.

¶77 Sheriff Clarke's attempt to reconstruct the factual

record at oral arguments is unavailing. He is not requesting,

pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.15(3), that this court supplement

or correct the record because it does not accurately reflect

what occurred in the circuit court. Rather, it appears he now

wants to create a different factual record. Sheriff Clarke had

the burden before the circuit court to present sufficient facts
and legal arguments to overcome the presumption favoring release

12
No. 2015AP1152.awb

of the requested records. See Fox v. Bock, 149 Wis. 2d 403,

416, 438 N.W.2d 589 (1989). As explained further below, he

failed to meet his burden. The time to develop a factual record

is before the circuit court, not at oral arguments before this

court.

III

¶78 Having determined that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 pertains to

detainees in the custody of only the federal government and that

no statutory exemptions precluding release apply here, I examine

next whether the records should be released. See Linzmeyer, 254

Wis. 2d 306, ¶24.

¶79 This court applies "a balancing test on a case-by-case

basis to determine whether permitting inspection of the records

would result in harm to a public interest which outweighs the

public interest in opening the records to inspection." Id., ¶25

(citation omitted). As the party seeking nondisclosure, Sheriff

Clarke has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of

releasing the requested I-247 forms. See Fox, 149 Wis. 2d at
416.

¶80 The balancing test is first applied by the records

custodian. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279

N.W.2d 179 (1979). "If the custodian decides not to allow

inspection, he must state specific public-policy reasons for the

refusal. These reasons provide a basis for review in the event

of court action." Id. (citations omitted); Fox, 149 Wis. 2d at

416-17.

13
No. 2015AP1152.awb

¶81 Here, the records custodian explained that her

decision to redact information from the I-247 forms was made

pursuant to guidance provided by ICE. She stated, "[w]e work

with other law enforcement agencies and if they tell me one of

their numbers . . . is law enforcement sensitive, yes, I believe

them." The records custodian did not cite 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 or

another public policy reason as justification for her decision

to not fully comply with Voces' public records request.

¶82 Nevertheless, the majority declares, "it is sufficient

that [the records custodian] recognized that I-247 forms may

contain sensitive information and accordingly took measures to

ensure that such information was not improperly released"

because "[w]e cannot expect a records custodian to have

expertise in federal immigration law . . . ." Majority op., ¶5

n.5.

¶83 On appeal, Sheriff Clarke argues that "[t]he balancing

test requires consideration of Wisconsin's presumption of

privacy with respect to law enforcement records and personally
identifiable information . . . ." He also cites several FOIA

factors generally supporting these two public policies.

¶84 The need to protect privacy of law enforcement records

is a valid public policy concern. Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306,

¶30 (explaining that records of law enforcement investigations

can be particularly sensitive and "are generally more likely

than most types of public records to have an adverse effect on

other public interests if they are released."). Additionally,
as the Linzmeyer court explained, if the release of a police

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record would interfere with an on-going prosecution or

investigation, the general presumption of openness will likely

be overcome. Id.

¶85 Here, however, Sheriff Clarke provides no details

about how the information contained in the I-247 forms would

actually affect the privacy concerns for law enforcement records

or interfere with an on-going prosecution or investigation.

Unlike a police report which contains details about a specific

crime under investigation, the detainer forms contain

generalized information, much of which Sheriff Clarke already

disclosed on his website.

¶86 For example, evidence introduced in the circuit court

revealed that during the course of this litigation, Sheriff

Clarke's office posted on its website information about

detainees in his custody. Four separate posts were introduced

with each containing the name of a detainee, his photograph and

other personally identifying information. In bold letters above

each photograph appeared the word "Hold." Below the photograph
appeared information that indicated that it was an immigration

or ICE hold. This evidence undermines Clark's purported privacy

concerns about ICE holds.

¶87 Sheriff Clarke further argues that the strong public

interest in protecting a detainee's privacy and reputation

precludes release of the records. Yet, Sheriff Clarke's concern

about the detainees' privacy interests rings hollow considering

the disclosures he made on his website of some of the very

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No. 2015AP1152.awb

information he now seeks to withhold from Voces. Before the

circuit court Voces questioned:

[I]s it accurate to say that the only difference
between what Sheriff Clarke sua sponte on his own
behalf publishes on his website about the immigration
status of individuals in his custody and what is on
the form and what has been redacted by Sheriff Clarke
on this form under the pretext of a concern for
individual privacy is that Voces' ability to monitor
and surveil compliance with administrative priorities
is impaired . . . ?
¶88 On the other side of the balancing test is Voces

attempt to provide public oversight of law enforcement and

immigration law implementation, specifically to ensure that

Sheriff Clarke's office is complying with federal and state law.

Before the circuit court, Voces explained that it has an

interest in monitoring and collecting data to ensure that

Sheriff Clarke's office is complying with federal immigration

guidelines. Voces also expressed concern that non-compliance

with federal guidelines would hinder law enforcement abilities

by eroding public trust and collaboration between law

enforcement and immigrant communities. The circuit court found

these interests to be "compelling." I agree.

¶89 Further weighing in favor of disclosure is the fact

that Voces seeks information about the actions of an elected

official. See Democratic Party of Wisconsin, 372 Wis. 2d 460,

¶18 (citing Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶29). Additionally, "the

process of police investigation is one where public oversight is

important." Linzmeyer, 254 Wis. 2d 306, ¶27.
¶90 Sheriff Clarke points to the important public

interests of the need to protect "privacy with respect to law
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No. 2015AP1152.awb

enforcement records and personally identifiable information."

Nevertheless, on balance, I conclude that he has failed to meet

his burden. Sheriff Clarke has not established that the release

of the I-247 forms would result in harm to the public interest

outweighing the strong public interest in providing public

oversight of an elected official to ensure compliance with

federal and state law. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of

appeals decision ordering the unredacted release of the I-247

forms.

¶91 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

¶92 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S.

ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.

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