Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Frederick J. Marshall, J.), entered January 14, 2016. The order granted the motion of defendant to dismiss the complaint and dismissed the complaint.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is modified on the law by denying the motion in part and reinstating the first, second, and sixth causes of action, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: As we explained in a prior appeal, Marinaccio v Town of Clarence (90 AD3d 1599 [2011], revd 20 NY3d 506 [2013], rearg denied 21 NY3d 976 [2013]), following a jury trial, plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $1,642,000 in an action asserting causes of action for, inter alia, trespass and private nuisance, concerning flooding on his property that was caused by water flowing from a subdivision on land adjacent to plaintiff’s land. Following the trial, the parties entered into a confidential settlement agreement (agreement), pursuant to which defendant would pay plaintiff $1,200,000, and plaintiff would deed to defendant a 30-foot strip of land along the border of his property for defendant’s *1785use in constructing a drainage ditch for the purpose of diverting the storm water from the subdivision into the drainage ditch.
The agreement also contains a release by which plaintiff “irrevocably and unconditionally remises, releases, and forever discharges . . . [defendant] ... of and from all, and all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits, . . . damages known or unknown, . . . [and] claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, . . . relating to past, present or future damages related to the ongoing intrusion of storm water to [plaintiffs property], including all claims sounding in negligence, trespass, [and] nuisance . . . [Plaintiff] expressly releases and waives any and all claims of economic damages of any sort . . . with respect to [his property],” with certain reservations. The agreement further provides that plaintiff “has been fully compensated for all damages to [his property],” and that defendant “shall promptly take such actions as may be deemed necessary to . . . undertake the construction of a drainage ditch or facility within the lands comprising the Drainage Deed ... If, within four [4] years of the execution of this Agreement, [defendant] fails to obtain all necessary approvals, or if the described work is, in the opinion of [defendant], not economically feasible, the property transferred herein will revert to [plaintiff] . . . The Court in the Action shall retain continuing jurisdiction to hear any and all disputes arising from or related to this Agreement . . . [T]he prevailing party in any such action shall be entitled to recover its costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees from the other party.”
It is undisputed that plaintiff transferred the property to defendant and that defendant constructed a drainage ditch, which plaintiff alleges is not sufficient to drain the water from the subdivision without flooding his property. Plaintiff commenced the instant action alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, negligence and nuisance. Supreme Court granted defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (5) and (7) and dismissed the complaint in its entirety, based upon the release contained in the agreement and the lack of any promise by defendant that the ditch would divert all storm waters from plaintiff’s land.
It is well settled that settlement agreements and general releases are “governed by principles of contract law” (Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 562 [1969]; see Abdulla v Gross, 124 AD3d 1255, 1257 [2015]). Viewing the facts as alleged in the first and second causes of action, for breach of contract, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and affording plaintiff all favor*1786able inferences (see Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v Superior Well Servs., Inc., 20 NY3d 59, 63 [2012]), we conclude that the release does not “evince an intention to encompass the distinct contractual obligations defendant undertook upon which plaintiff’s breach of contract causes of action are premised” (Murray-Gardner Mgt. v Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., 229 AD2d 852, 854 [1996]), i.e., the breach of the settlement agreement itself. Viewing the facts as alleged in the sixth cause of action, for attorneys’ fees, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and affording him all reasonable inferences (see generally Whitebox Concentrated Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P., 20 NY3d at 63), we likewise conclude that the court erred in granting defendant’s motion with respect to that cause of action. We therefore modify the order accordingly.
We reject plaintiff’s contention that the court erred in granting those parts of defendant’s motion with respect to the fourth and fifth causes of action, for negligence and nuisance, respectively, inasmuch as those causes of action were encompassed by the release (see CPLR 3211 [a] [5]; see generally Abdulla, 124 AD3d at 1257), and the third cause of action, for breach of the covenant of good faith, inasmuch as it is premised on the same allegations and seeks the same relief as the first and second causes of action, for breach of contract (see DiPizio Constr. Co., Inc. v Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 107 AD3d 1565, 1566-1567 [2013]).
All concur except Peradotto, J., who dissents in part and votes to affirm in the following memorandum.