dissent in a memorandum by Webber, J., as follows: I would reverse and grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In moving for summary judgment, defendant submitted admissible evidence, in the form of a fire marshal’s report, establishing prima facie that the subject apartment fire originated from an extension cord or the multiple appliances plaintiff had plugged into it, and not from the building’s internal wiring. In opposition, plaintiff failed to rebut this evidence, nor did he offer any evidence that the *1148building’s wiring failed to meet code requirements or was otherwise defective.
As noted, defendant, plaintiff’s landlord, moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s negligent use of extension cords to operate numerous appliances simultaneously, as opposed to any alleged defect in the apartment’s electrical wiring, was the sole cause of the fire. In support of its motion, defendant submitted the fire marshal’s report, which concluded that the fire had originated in the apartment’s living room, in an “area of electrical wiring” located 3 feet from the west wall and 12 feet from the south wall. The report further indicated that the fire marshal observed “multiple extension cords plugged in to one outlet with power strip present,” and noted a “2x4 area of charring to wooden floor boards with a plastic residue in area of charring.” The report also noted that other than the charring to the specific portion of the wooden floor boards, there was no damage to the furniture lining the wall of the apartment closest to the charred floor boards and no damage to the wall itself.
In opposition, plaintiff argued that the fire marshal’s report was ambiguous as to which electrical wiring caused the fire, asserting that the report “could be referring to the wire of the fan or some other appliance and not an extension cord.” Plaintiff also submitted an affidavit by an expert who opined that defendant should have upgraded the building’s wiring. Conspicuously absent from the expert’s report, however, is any claim that the building’s wiring failed to meet applicable code standards or was otherwise defective. Indeed, the expert did not even inspect the apartment.
The majority ignores the fire marshal’s report and therefore does not address its conclusion that the fire originated in an area where the only present electrical wiring was plaintiff’s extension and appliance cords or his observations of multiple extension cords plugged into one outlet, along with a “plastic residue in [the] area of charring.”
The majority also ignores plaintiff’s deposition testimony conceding that he knew using extension cords to operate numerous appliances simultaneously was dangerous, and that the extension cords would regularly become hot within an hour of use, necessitating that they be disconnected. The majority also errs to the extent it bases its result on the affidavit by plaintiff’s expert, who (contrary to the majority’s assertion) identified no “specific factual evidence in the record” to support the view that the fire originated from the building’s wiring. Again, the expert — who never inspected the scene — simply *1149opined that the building’s electrical wiring should have been upgraded to support plaintiff’s desired usage, without identifying any evidence that the building’s wiring failed to meet applicable legal standards or was otherwise defective.
The record establishes that the fire resulted from plaintiff’s use of more power, through plugging multiple appliances into an extension cord, than the building’s wiring could support. The premise of plaintiff’s action is that, rather than moderating his use of power to conform to the building’s electrical capacity (or at least using different outlets for different appliances), plaintiff was entitled to have defendant upgrade the building’s wiring to accommodate his demand. However, in the absence of any evidence that the building’s wiring did not meet code standards or was otherwise defective, no basis exists for imposing liability on defendant for declining to upgrade the building’s wiring to suit plaintiff’s desire for electrical usage.
What the majority refers to as plaintiff’s “lifestyle and electrical consumption” must still be in accord with the building’s electrical capacity. Since nothing in the record supports the view that defendant was obligated to upgrade the wiring, it follows that the fire must be attributed to plaintiff’s use of more power than the building’s wiring could support— conduct in which plaintiff persisted in spite of his admitted realization of the danger it presented — and that defendant is entitled to summary judgment (see Robertson v New York City Hous. Auth., 58 AD3d 535 [1st Dept 2009]; Zvinys v Richfield Inv. Co., 25 AD3d 358, 359-360 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 706 [2006]).
I therefore respectfully dissent.