UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2247
RICHARD SAMPSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HOSPIRA, INCORPORATED
Defendant – Appellee,
and
MIKE LEONARD; BRAD BAZEMORE; LEI ZHENG
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (4:10-cv-00121-D)
Submitted: June 6, 2013 Decided: July 3, 2013
Before AGEE and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Teresa DeLoatch Bryant, THE LAW OFFICES OF TERESA DELOATCH
BRYANT, PLLC, Greenville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Phillip J. Strach, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART,
P.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Richard Sampson appeals the district court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Hospira, Inc.
(Hospira), on Sampson’s claim that Hospira unlawfully terminated
Sampson’s employment as a laboratory technician in a chemical
plant. Sampson, who is Native American, alleged that Hospira
terminated his employment in violation of North Carolina law
based on his interracial relationship with an African American
co-worker, who became pregnant during the course of their
relationship. 1 After reviewing the record, we affirm the
district court’s judgment.
We review an award of summary judgment de novo, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of Sampson, the non-moving party.
PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119-20 (4th
Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record
fails to disclose a genuine issue of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Couch
v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200 (4th Cir. 2012); Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
Under the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act
(EEPA), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2, an employer may not
1
The district court had jurisdiction over this case under
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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discriminate against an employee on the basis of “race,
religion, color, national origin, sex or handicap.” We analyze
a wrongful discharge claim under the EEPA pursuant to the same
burden-shifting requirements applicable to federal anti-
discrimination statutes. N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. Gibson, 301
S.E.2d 78, 82-84 (N.C. 1983).
In the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff seeking to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination must demonstrate
“(1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he
suffered from an adverse employment action; (3) that at the time
the employer took the adverse employment action he was
performing at a level that met his employer’s legitimate
expectations; and (4) that the position was filled by a
similarly qualified applicant outside the protected class.”
King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003).
When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). If the employer satisfies this
evidentiary standard, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reasons for termination offered by the employer “were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
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(quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 143 (2000)).
For purposes of our analysis, we will assume without
deciding that Sampson established a prima facie case of
discrimination under the EEPA. 2 We therefore address Sampson’s
argument that the district court erred in concluding that
Hospira established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
terminating Sampson’s employment, namely, that Sampson entered
false data into a log book in violation of Hospira’s “no-
tolerance policy” requiring accurate documentation. Sampson
contends that he provided sufficient evidence that Hospira’s
explanation for terminating his employment was pretextual. We
disagree with Sampson’s argument.
The record demonstrates that on June 26, 2007, Sampson was
asked to repair equipment used to perform testing on chemical
solutions. In order to make the repair, Sampson needed to
determine a “working standard” for an identified solution. To
determine the working standard, Sampson was required to weigh
2
Because we assume without deciding that Sampson
established a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of
North Carolina law, we do not address whether an individual is a
member of a protected class under the EEPA based on a sexual
relationship with an individual of another race. We observe
that the district court also assumed without deciding that
Sampson qualified as a member of a protected class under the
EEPA.
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the solution, manually record that weight amount in a log book
and note the date of entry, confirm the weight amount with
another employee, and record that weight amount in a computer
software file. Sampson manually recorded a weight amount of
408.15 mg in the log book, but a weight of 396.67 mg was
documented in the computer software file. Two days later,
Sampson struck through the original weight amount of 408.15 mg
that he had written in the log book, and entered a different
weight amount of 396.67 mg.
When Sampson’s supervisors were informed about the altered
log book, they questioned Sampson. Sampson contended that he
had made a transcription error that he later had corrected.
Sampson’s supervisors, however, determined that Sampson had
failed to perform the required initial weighing procedure to
obtain the weight of the working standard. The supervisors
reached this conclusion based on the fact that they were unable
to find a “volumetric” container bearing the weight of 408.15
mg, that no other employee had confirmed a working standard of
408.15 mg, and that the weight standard entered into the
computer software file was 396.67 mg, rather than 408.15 mg.
In support of his position that Hospira’s explanation was
pretextual, Sampson relies on statements in the district court
record from two former Hospira supervisors, who opined that
Sampson’s conduct of entering an improper “working standard”
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into a log book did not constitute a falsification of data.
That evidence, however, is not germane to the issue whether
Hospira relied on a pretextual reason for terminating Sampson’s
employment. In conducting our review, we consider the opinion
of the Hospira supervisors who actually made the decision to
discharge Sampson, not the opinions of former Hospira personnel.
See DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir.
1998) (it is the “perception of the decision maker which is
relevant” in determining whether an employer’s reasons for
terminating an employee are pretextual) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The evidence before the district
court showed that the Hospira supervisors who decided to
terminate Sampson’s employment considered his contention that he
merely made a transcription error but found no evidence to
support that contention and, ultimately, did not believe
Sampson’s explanation.
Sampson contends, nevertheless, that the record contained
evidence of pretext based on his supervisors’ comments about his
relationship with his coworker, which his supervisors made about
one week before Sampson entered the false data in the log book.
We find no merit in this argument. Although the evidence showed
that the supervisors expressed disapproval that Sampson had
impregnated a co-worker, the supervisors’ comments did not refer
to the race of either employee or to the fact that Sampson had
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been involved in an interracial relationship. Moreover, the
allegedly suspicious timing of events, namely, that Sampson’s
supervisors learned about his relationship one week before the
data-recordation incident, is insufficient to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Hospira’s stated reason for
terminating Sampson’s employment was pretextual.
We likewise find no merit in Sampson’s additional argument
that evidence of discriminatory animus was demonstrated by
information he received from another Hospira employee, who
stated that she was “personally familiar with joking in the
laboratory regarding [Sampson] and his relationship” with his
co-worker. This general statement did not exhibit animus on the
part of the Hospira supervisors who decided to terminate
Sampson’s employment or constitute a statement regarding
Sampson’s involvement in a relationship with a person of a
different race.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district
court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of
Hospira, because Sampson failed to present a disputed issue of
material fact that would permit a jury to conclude that Sampson
was discharged from his employment based on his race or on his
involvement in an interracial sexual relationship. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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presented adequately in the materials before this Court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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