UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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ATINKUMAR PATEL, )
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Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Case No. 22-cv-1930 (TSC)
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U.S. CITZENSHIP & )
IMMIGRATION SERVICES et. al., )
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Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Atinkumar Patel petitions this court for a writ of mandamus to compel
Defendants United States Citizenship & Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Ur Jaddou (Director
of USCIS), Alejandro Mayorkas (Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland
Security), and Alissa Emmel (Chief of the USCIS Immigrant Investor Program Office) to
immediately process his Form I-526, for an EB-5 visa. Defendants have moved to dismiss, and
the court will GRANT their motion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. EB-5 Visa Program
In 1990, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to establish a program
that sets aside visas for “employment creation” immigrants who invest in new commercial
enterprises that create full-time jobs for American workers. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-649, § 121(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 4987 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)).
These are referred to as “EB-5 visas.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6. Two years later, Congress established
the “Pilot Immigration Program,” now known as the Regional Center Program. See Departments
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of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993
(1993 Appropriations Act), Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 610, 106 Stat. 1828, 1874 (1992) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1153 note). A regional center is an “economic unit, public or private, which is
involved with the promotion of economic growth, including increased export sales, improved
regional productivity, job creation, and increased domestic capital investment.” 8 C.F.R. §
204.6(e); see 58 Fed. Reg. 44,606, 44,608 (Aug. 24, 1993).
Under the regulations in effect at the time of Plaintiff’s I-526 petition, an applicant could
become eligible for an EB-5 visa if the applicant invested $500,000 or more in a “targeted
employment area,” 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(f), which may include projects in designated regional
centers within the Regional Center Program. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e), (j)(4). Such an investment
must directly create at least ten full-time jobs in the United States for qualifying employees. See
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(g)–(h).
To obtain an EB-5 visa, a foreign investor must first file a Form I-526 petition with
USCIS. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(a). Once the I-526 petition is processed and a visa becomes available
the applicant advances to ‘conditional’ lawful permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C. §
1186b(a). In adjudicating I-526 petitions, USCIS adheres to a “visa availability” approach,
which means it prioritizes adjudicating applications, on a modified “first-in, first-out” basis, by
petitioners from countries that have yet to meet their visa availability cap determined by
Congress. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153(e); 22 C.F.R. § 42.54.
B. Plaintiff’s Petition
Plaintiff is an Indian citizen seeking to participate in the EB-5 Immigrant Investor
Program. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 1 On November 15, 2019, Plaintiff invested $500,000 in
exchange for a 1-unit membership interest of ARCFE Group 9, LLC, a startup commercial
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enterprise that pooled funds to develop and construct an eight-story residential building and a
twenty-story mixed use rental building in Long Island City, New York. Id. ¶¶ 22, 23. ARCFE
Group 9, LLC is affiliated with American Regional Center for Entrepreneurs, Inc., a designated
regional center approved by USCIS. Id. ¶ 21.
On the same day of his investment, Plaintiff submitted a I-526 petition (Receipt No.
WAC2090031415) along with supporting documentation, and a $3,675.00 filing fee, to USCIS.
Id. ¶ 24. USCIS received the submission on November 19, 2019 and has not yet taken any
action on it. Id. ¶¶ 24–25.
Nearly thirty-two months later, on July 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit. He claims that the
delay in adjudicating his application harms his interest in obtaining permanent resident status, as
well as his financial investment, because the longer adjudication takes the greater the risk that the
project does not have available funds to repay his investment if his petition is denied. Id. ¶¶ 27–
29.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” In evaluating a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, courts “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true” and grant “plaintiff the
benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a
court need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor “inferences
. . . unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d
178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). Further, the court may consider “any documents
either attached to or incorporated in the complaint[,] and matters of which [courts] may take
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judicial notice.” Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117
F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). “The latter category includes information posted on official
public websites of government agencies.” Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off. (“Da Costa
I”), 643 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2022), aff’d, No. 22-5313, 2023 WL 5313526 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
18, 2023).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that USCIS has unreasonably delayed adjudication of his I-526 petition,
and the court should “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(1). To evaluate the reasonableness of a delay in agency action, courts in this
district apply six factors:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of
reason;
(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed
with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory
scheme may supply content for this rule of reason;
(3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less
tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;
(4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency
activities of a higher or competing priority;
(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests
prejudiced by delay; and
(6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in
order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.
Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Fed Comm’ns Comm. (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70
(D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Da Costa I, 643 F. Supp. 3d at 8 (applying TRAC factors and
dismissing the complaint). Ultimately, the “central question in evaluating ‘a claim of
unreasonable delay’ is ‘whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus’”—
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an extraordinary remedy. In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79).
1. Reasonableness (Factors One and Two)
The first two TRAC factors require the court to evaluate “whether the agency’s response
time complies with an existing specified schedule and whether it is governed by an identifiable
rationale.” Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Int. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 74 F. Supp. 3d
295, 300 (D.D.C. 2014).
Defendants argue that USCIS regulations adhere to a rule of reason because USCIS
“manages I-526 petitions by prioritizing petitions for individuals from countries where visas are
currently available or soon to be available” and manages those workflows in “first-in, first out
order.” Def Mot., ECF No. 7 at 9–10; see also USCIS, Questions and Answers: EB-5 Immigrant
Investor Program Visa Availability Approach (last updated Aug. 28, 2023)
https://perma.cc/9HCH-M9AQ (“Workflows are generally managed in FIFO order when a visa is
available or will be available soon.”). Defendants also argue that there is no congressionally
imposed timeline for adjudication of EB-5 visa applications. Def Mot., ECF No. 7 at 12–13.
Plaintiff does not dispute the methodology that USCIS uses but argues that thirty-one months
and counting is per se an unreasonable delay, Pl. Opp’n, ECF No. 8 at 5–6, and Congress has
expressed that adjudication of I-526 petitions should take no more than 180 days. Id. at 6 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1571(b)).
In Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off. (“Da Costa II”) the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of a non-citizen’s unreasonable delay claim regarding their I-526
petition to USCIS. No. 22-5313, 2023 WL 5313526 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 2023). The Circuit
concluded that USCIS “employs a rule of reason to adjudicate Form I-526 petitions,” id. at *6,
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and 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) “is insufficient to set a deadline” for adjudication and is more of an
“aspirational statement,” id. at *9. The Court held that even though the plaintiff had waited more
than four years for adjudication, “the delay ha[d] not reached the level of disproportionality . . .
sufficient to grant relief.” Id.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Da Costa II is binding on this court, and therefore, based
on the record before it, the court finds that USCIS’s adjudication process is governed by a rule of
reason.
2. Prejudice of Delay (Factors Three and Five)
“The third TRAC factor looks to whether ‘human health and welfare are at stake’— in
which case judicial intervention is more justified — and the fifth assesses the ‘nature and extent
of the interests prejudiced by delay.’” Da Costa I, 643 F. Supp. 3d at 15 (quoting TRAC, 750
F.2d at 80). Plaintiff alleges that the delay puts “his money . . . at risk,” Compl. ¶ 28, and argues
that his harm consists of not having the “benefits and stability associated with EB-5 status,” Pl.
Opp’n at 7, being in “immigration limbo,” and an inability to “plan his next steps,” id. at 9. But
these harms are the “sort of prejudice . . . inherent in the [adjudication] process,” Fangfang Xu v.
Cissna, 434 F. Supp. 3d 43, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), and do not show that health or welfare is at
stake. Consequently, the court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient harm from delay to
tip TRAC factors three and five in his favor.
3. Competing USCIS Priorities (Factor Four)
The fourth factor examines “the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities
of a higher or competing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.
Plaintiff argues that prioritizing its application will “have no effect on USCIS activity of
a higher or competing priority.” Pl. Opp’n at 8. But the Da Costa II Court considered that
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argument and concluded that it “rests on wishful thinking about how the USCIS adjudication
system works.” 2023 WL 5313526, at *8. The Court further explained that this factor tips
greatly in favor of USCIS because “[i]n the absence of plausible allegations that USCIS is not
applying its rule of reason, moving Plaintiffs’ petitions to the front of the line would disrupt
competing agency priorities with no overall improvement in the USCIS backlog.” Id. Because
Plaintiff has not alleged that USCIS is failing to apply its rule of reason, this factor too weighs in
Defendants’ favor.
4. Impropriety by USCIS (Factor Six)
Finally, the court considers whether there is “any impropriety lurking behind agency
lassitude.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. This factor is either neutral or favors Defendants.
The Complaint does not allege any impropriety by USCIS. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that
the adjudication delays are “intentional” to “create a potential defense against lawsuits and also
end members of the public and Congressional inquiries as to why Forms I-526 take so long.” Pl.
Opp’n at 9–10.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged any impropriety by USCIS, the court need not speculate
as to whether his assertions in opposition have any merit.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, the court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF
No. 7.
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Date: September 29, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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