State v. Carpenter

[Cite as State v. Carpenter, 2023-Ohio-2838.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 22CA24
:
v. :
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
JACOB L. CARPENTER, : ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 8/07/2023
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Nicole Tipton Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta,
Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Jacob L. Carpenter appeals the November 22, 2022 sentencing

entry of the Washington County Court of Common Pleas. Carpenter asserts

a sole assignment of error regarding the trial court’s acceptance of his guilty

plea. Carpenter argues that his plea was not knowingly made because

although the trial court informed him that as a consequence of his plea he

would be classified as a Tier I sex offender, the trial court failed to inform

him of the specific duties which would follow as a result of that sex offender

classification. However, based on our review of the current Ohio law and
Washington App. No. 22CA24 2

the facts of this case, we find no merit to the assignment of error.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶2} Appellee State of Ohio incorporates by reference the Statement

of the Case and the Statement of Facts set forth within Carpenter’s appellate

brief, with three exceptions which will be set forth below. On March 22,

2022, Carpenter was indicted in a four-count indictment. Count One alleged

attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of R.C.

2907.04(A)/R.C. 2907.04(B)(3)/R.C. 2923.02(A)/R.C. 2903.02(E)(1), a

felony of the fourth degree. He was also charged in Count Two with

importuning, in violation of R.C. 2907.07(D)(2)/R.C. 2907.07(F)(3), a

felony of the fifth degree. Count Three alleged possession of criminal tools

in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A)/R.C. 2923.24(C), a felony of the fifth

degree. Count Four alleged tampering with evidence in violation of R.C.

2921.12(A)(1)/R.C. 2921.12(B), a felony of the third degree.

{¶3} The indictment stemmed from cell phone communications

between Carpenter and C.D.R., a thirteen-year-old female. On August 26,

2021, Carpenter began sending text messages to C.D.R.’s phone. Later in

the day, C.D.R.’s mother discovered the messages, sexual in nature, on her
Washington App. No. 22CA24 3

daughter’s phone and began, herself, returning Carpenter’s messages.

C.D.R.’s mother thereafter contacted the Marietta Police Department.

{¶4} A detective from the police department began using C.D.R.’s

cell phone and continued messaging with Carpenter. At some point during

the text communication between the detective and Carpenter, Carpenter

solicited the detective for sexual activity while apparently still believing that

he was texting with C.D.R.

{¶5} After Carpenter’s arraignment and the criminal proceedings

ensued, Carpenter eventually opted for a jury trial which began on

November 8, 2022. During trial on November 10, 2022, Carpenter entered a

plea of guilty to Count Two, importuning. The remaining counts were

dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement.

{¶6} On November 21, 2022, Carpenter was sentenced to five years

of community control and ordered to serve 120 days in the Washington

County Jail. He was also classified as a Tier I Sex Offender. This timely

appeal followed.

{¶7} Additionally, Appellee notes that Carpenter requested the trial

be stopped so that he could enter into the plea agreement and plead guilty.

Appellee points out that neither Carpenter nor his counsel asked any

questions, made any comments, or interposed any objection about the trial
Washington App. No. 22CA24 4

court’s brief statement during the plea hearing that, as part of sentencing

later to be imposed, Carpenter would be classified as a Tier I sex offender.

Likewise, both Carpenter and his attorney remained silent at sentencing

when the trial court fully explained all the registration requirements.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF
MR. CARPENTER BY ACCEPTING HIS GUILTY
PLEA WHEN THE COURT FAILED TO DETERMINE
THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE MAXIMUM
PENALTIES INVOLVED.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶8} Carpenter challenges the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary

nature of his plea to Count Two, importuning. Crim.R. 11(C)(2) governs the

acceptance of guilty pleas by the trial court in felony cases and provides that

a trial court should not accept a guilty plea without first addressing the

defendant personally and:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the
charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if
applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation
or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the
sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea,
may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is
Washington App. No. 22CA24 5

waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses
against him or her, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in the defendant's favor, and to require
the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled
to testify against himself or herself.

{¶9} “Thus, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a ‘court must inform the

defendant that he is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-

incrimination, his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his

right of compulsory process of witnesses.’ ” State v. Tolle, 2022-Ohio-2839,

194 N.E.3d 410, at ¶ 9 (4th Dist.), quoting, State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d

473, 423 N.E.2d 115, paragraph one of the syllabus (1981). See also

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). “In addition to these constitutional rights, the trial

court must determine that the defendant understands the nature of the

charge, the maximum penalty involved, and the effect of the plea.” State v.

Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 41.

{¶10} When reviewing a defendant's constitutional rights (right to a

jury trial, right to call witnesses, etc.), a trial court must strictly comply with

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). Tolle, supra, at ¶10; State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d

176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 18. In contrast, when reviewing a

defendant's non-constitutional rights (maximum penalty involved,

understanding effect of plea, etc.), a trial court must substantially comply

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Tolle at ¶ 11; State v. Veney, supra, ¶ 18.
Washington App. No. 22CA24 6

“ ‘[S]ubstantial compliance’ means that ‘under the totality of the

circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his

plea and the rights he is waiving.’ ” State v. Morrison, 4th Dist. Adams No.

07CA854, 2008-Ohio-4913, at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Puckett, 4th Dist. Scioto

No. 3CA2920, 2005-Ohio-1640, at ¶ 10, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio

St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977); State v. Carter, 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 396

N.E.2d 757 (1979).

{¶11} In Veney, the Court held as follows regarding the acceptance of

guilty pleas:

“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the
plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. Failure on any of those points renders
enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the
United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.”
Veney, supra, at ¶ 7, quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d
525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996); State v. Montgomery,
supra, at ¶ 40; State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472, 2011-
Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 9.

See Tolle, at ¶ 12. “ ‘It is the trial court's duty, therefore, to ensure that a

defendant “has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its

consequence.” ’ ” Tolle, at ¶ 13; quoting Montgomery at ¶ 40, quoting

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969); State v.

Conley, 4th Dist. Adams No. 19CA1091, 2019-Ohio-4172, at ¶ 34.
Washington App. No. 22CA24 7

{¶12 } When appellate courts evaluate whether a defendant

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, a court must

independently review the record to ensure that the trial court complied with

the Crim.R. 11 constitutional and procedural safeguards. See Tolle, at ¶ 14;

State v. Leonhart, 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA38, 2014-Ohio-5601, at

¶ 36; State v. Eckler, 4th Dist. Adams No. 09CA878, 2009-Ohio-7064, at ¶

48; Veney, supra, at ¶ 13 (“Before accepting a guilty or no-contest plea, the

court must make the determinations and give the warnings required by

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) and notify the defendant of the constitutional

rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).”); State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127,

128, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991) (“When a trial court or appellate court is

reviewing a plea submitted by a defendant, its focus should be on whether

the dictates of Crim.R. 11 have been followed.”); See also State v. Shifflet,

2015-Ohio-4250, 44 N.E.3d 966 (4th Dist.), ¶ 13, citing State v. Smith, 4th

Dist. Washington No. 12CA11, 2013-Ohio-232, at ¶ 10.

{¶13} “The purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is ‘to convey to the defendant

certain information so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision

whether to plead guilty.’ ” Tolle, at ¶ 15, quoting Ballard, supra, at 479-

480, 423 N.E.2d 115. As stated above, although literal compliance with

Crim.R. 11(C) is preferred, it is not required. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d
Washington App. No. 22CA24 8

239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 29, citing State v. Griggs, 103

Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 19. Therefore, an

appellate court will ordinarily affirm a trial court's acceptance of a guilty

plea if the record reveals that the trial court engaged in a meaningful

dialogue with the defendant and explained “in a manner reasonably

intelligible to that defendant” the consequences of pleading guilty. Ballard

at paragraph two of the syllabus; Barker at ¶ 14; Veney at ¶ 27; Conley at

¶ 37.

{¶14} Additionally, it has been held that a defendant who seeks to

invalidate a plea on the basis that the trial court partially, but not fully,

informed the defendant of his or her non-constitutional rights must

demonstrate a prejudicial effect. See Tolle at ¶ 16; Veney at ¶ 17; Clark at ¶

31. To demonstrate that a defendant suffered prejudice due to the failure to

fully inform the defendant of his or her non-constitutional rights, the

defendant must establish that, but for the trial court's failure, a guilty plea

would not have been entered. See Clark at ¶ 32, citing State v. Nero, 56

Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990)(stating that “[t]he test is

‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made’ ”). However, when a

trial court completely fails to inform a defendant of his or her non-

constitutional rights, the plea must be vacated, and no analysis of prejudice
Washington App. No. 22CA24 9

is required. See Clark at ¶ 32, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86,

2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22.

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶15} R.C. Chapter 2950 “Sex Offenders” sets forth the classification

of sex offenders into Tiers I, II, and III, dependent upon the type of offense

committed, age of victim, and other factors to be taken into consideration

when sentencing an individual convicted of a sex offense. The Ohio

Supreme Court has held that the Adam Walsh Act version of R.C. Chapter

2950 is punitive, not remedial. Thus, the registration and other requirements

imposed upon a sexual offender are a component of the offender's maximum

penalty. See State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164

N.E.3d 286; State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952

N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 16.

{¶16} Carpenter contends that the trial court erred by failing to advise

him, prior to entering his plea of guilty, of the maximum penalty with regard

to his sex offender classification. Carpenter argues he was given minimal

notifications about his duty to register as a Tier I sex offender because: (1)

he was not informed that his registration would be for fifteen years; (2) he

was not made aware of the consequences of failing to register; and (3) he

was not advised that he would have certain residency restrictions consistent
Washington App. No. 22CA24 10

with R.C. 2950.034(A). Thereby, Carpenter asserts that the trial court

completely failed to explain to him the required duties of a Tier I sex

offender before he entered his plea. Thus, Carpenter urges us to conclude

that his plea was not entered knowingly and must be vacated.

{¶17} As discussed above, explanation of a defendant’s maximum

sentence falls into the category of non-constitutional rights. We begin our

analysis by examining, in pertinent part, the plea colloquy between

Carpenter and the trial court. The plea colloquy began as follows:

The Court: Okay. And then the Court has been presented with
that written guilty plea by the defendant. Is that
correct Attorney Smith?

Mr. Smith: Yes, Judge.

The Court: And that’s your signature on the document?

Mr. Smith: It is.

The Court: And did you go over the guilty plea and answer all
of your client’s questions?

Mr. Smith: I did.

***

The Court: And then, Mr. Carpenter, is it your intention, then,
to enter a guilty plea to Count 2, importuning?

Defendant: Yes.

***
Washington App. No. 22CA24 11

The Court: And you can read and write?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Did you read the written guilty plea?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Have you had the opportunity to review the written
plea with your attorney?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Did your attorney answer any questions or
concerns you may have had?

Defendant: Yes.

{¶18} At this point, the trial court discussed Carpenter’s constitutional

rights, to which Carpenter responded that he did understand. The colloquy

continued:

The Court: All right. And do you understand the nature of the
charge you’re pleading guilty to, importuning?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: And do you understand the maximum possible
prison term is 12 months?

Defendant: Yes.

{¶19} Next, the trial court explained the components of post-release

control, and again, Carpenter acknowledged understanding these provisions.

The colloquy continued as follows:
Washington App. No. 22CA24 12

The Court: And do you understand that by signing the guilty
plea, you’ve admitted guilt, you’ve waived the
Constitutional rights explained during the guilty
plea, and when the Court accepts the plea, you’ll
be found guilty of a felony, and the Court will then
proceed with judgment as well as sentencing?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: And do you understand that part of sentencing is,
you’re going to be a Tier I sex offender?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Okay. And are you doing this today voluntarily, of
your own free will?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: And my understanding, there is a plea agreement,
which is written in the change of plea form. It
says you’ll plead to Count 2. The State’s going to
dismiss Counts 1, 3, and 4. You’ll forfeit the
Samsung cell phone. You’ll receive five years
community control and [be] sentenced to 120 days
incarceration and then you’ll be a Tier I sex
offender. Is that the State’s understanding of the
complete agreement?

Ms. Coil: Yes, Your Honor. Yes.

The Court: Attorney Smith, is that your understanding?

Mr. Smith: It is, Judge.

The Court: Is that your understanding of the agreement you’ve
reached with the State, Mr. Carpenter?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
Washington App. No. 22CA24 13

The Court: Have any threats or promises or inducements been
made to you, to get you to plead guilty, that we’ve
just discussed here?

Defendant: No.

***

The Court: And Mr. Carpenter, did you hear the agreement?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Is that the complete agreement you’ve reached with
the State to resolve your case?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

{¶20} At this point, the prosecutor recited the underlying facts

supporting Carpenter’s conviction. The trial court inquired:

The Court: And then, Attorney Smith, is that your
understanding of the facts?

Mr. Smith: Yes, yes, Judge.

The Court: All right. And the, Mr. Carpenter, did you hear
what the Prosecutor said?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Is that the truth?

Defendant: Yes.

The Court: All right. Now, I’m about to accept your plea of
guilty, and when I do, it would be difficult to
withdraw it. But you can tell me right now, do you
want to continue the jury trial that’s in your case?
Do you want to waive your right to have a jury and
Washington App. No. 22CA24 14

have the Court decide your case and have a court
trial? Or do you want me to accept your guilty
plea?

Defendant: I want you to accept the guilty plea.

***

The Court: So the Court finds today, Defendant in open court
was advised of all Constitutional rights, made a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
those rights, pursuant to Criminal Rule 11 and 7.
The plea is accepted and ordered filed. The Court
does find Defendant guilty of Count 2,
importuning, a felony of the fifth degree.

{¶21} At this point, the parties agreed to continue the matter for

sentencing. At sentencing on November 21, 2022, after the trial court

imposed the agreed sentence of community control, explained post-release

control, and explained that Carpenter would forfeit his cell phone, the trial

court turned to the matter of the sex offender classification as follows:

The Court: The Court further finds that pursuant to Revised
Code Section 2950.01,[as a] result of these
convictions, you are a Tier I sex offender. So next
I have to go over the explanation of duties to
register as a sex offender.

{¶22} The trial court then proceeded to explain the detailed

registration requirements and the consequences of failing to abide by them,

an explanation that encompassed nearly five full pages of the hearing

transcript. The trial court also inquired whether Carpenter understood the
Washington App. No. 22CA24 15

requirements of his Tier I status. Carpenter acknowledged twice that he did

understand his duties.

{¶23} Both parties have directed us to State v. Dangler, 162

Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, wherein the Supreme Court

of Ohio was confronted with an argument that a “plea was invalid because

the trial court failed to comply fully with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement

that the court explain the ‘maximum penalty’ for the offense (sex offender

registration requirements) at the time the court accepted the plea.” Id. at ¶ 1.

Dangler argued that although the trial court informed him he would have to

register as Tier III sex offender for the rest of his life, it erred in failing to

“more fully explain the restrictions and obligations that went along with his

status as a sex offender.” Id. Dangler further argued that the failure by the

trial court gave “him an automatic right to withdraw his plea, without any

need to demonstrate prejudice.” Id.

{¶24} The Supreme Court rejected Dangler's argument, holding that

when a trial court has informed a defendant that he or she is subject to the

“sex-offender-registration scheme,” the defendant is only entitled to have his

conviction vacated for lack of a more complete explanation if he

demonstrates prejudice. Id. at ¶ 2. In other words, the Court held that

Dangler had to demonstrate “that he would not have entered the plea but for
Washington App. No. 22CA24 16

the incomplete explanation[ ]” and that Dangler was not entitled to withdraw

his plea because he had not demonstrated prejudice. Id. Thus, Dangler

essentially reiterated the “traditional rule” which states that “a defendant is

not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was

prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of

Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, supra, at 108, 564 N.E.2d

474.

{¶25} In Tolle, supra, at ¶ 21, we observed that, as discussed in

Dangler at length, there are exceptions to the traditional rule that relieve

defendants from the requirement of demonstrating prejudice. See Dangler at

¶¶ 14-17. For example, if a trial court fails to strictly comply, and instead

only substantially complies with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) constitutional

notifications, no prejudice must be shown. Id. at ¶ 14. Further, “a trial

court's complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C)

eliminates the defendant's burden to show prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 15, citing State

v. Sarkozy, supra, at ¶ 22. Thus, a defendant must show prejudice if the trial

court fails to substantially comply with the non-constitutional notifications
Washington App. No. 22CA24 17

contained in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) but is not required to demonstrate

prejudice if the trial court completely fails to comply.1

[T]he Dangler Court summarized as follows:

Properly understood, the questions to be answered are
simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant
provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied
fully with the rule, is the purported failure of the type that
excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating
prejudice? And (3) if a showing of prejudice is required,
has the defendant met that burden?

Dangler at ¶ 17. See also Tolle, supra.

{¶26} Appellee has directed us to State v. Ulm, 2022-Ohio-4147, 205

N.E.3d 19 (2d Dist.). Ulm entered into a plea agreement in exchange for an

agreed-upon sentence. The trial court conducted the plea hearing and the

sentencing hearing followed immediately. On that date, Ulm signed a plea

and waiver form, and two forms which set forth an explanation of his duties

to register as a Tier II and Tier III sex offender. At the outset of the plea

hearing, defense counsel noted that Ulm was present to do the plea, the sex

offender designation, and to proceed to sentencing. Counsel also affirmed

Ulm had executed the offender registration notification forms. However, the

only mention of the sex offender registration was during the plea colloquy

1
While Tolle appealed the voluntary nature of his plea, he was erroneously advised regarding his appellate
rights. Tolle’s case did not involve sex offenses or the sexual offender classification scheme.
Washington App. No. 22CA24 18

when the trial court inquired: “[and] you understand that you’re going to be

given a registration requirement?” Ulm acknowledged his understanding.

{¶27} On appeal, Ulm asserted that the trial court completely failed to

comply with Crim.R. 11 as pertained to his designation and registration

requirements prior to accepting his plea. He also asserted that the forms did

not substitute for the court’s obligation to personally address him prior to

accepting his pleas and therefore, there was not substantial compliance.

The appellate court acknowledged that Dangler is dispositive.

{¶28} The Ulm court concluded that because the transcript revealed

he had signed the notification forms and acknowledged his understanding

during the plea hearing, the trial court partially complied. The court noted

that the issue was whether there was “some compliance” and not the “degree

of such partial compliance.” Id at ¶ 14. The court also noted that Ulm did

not assert, and the record on its face did not reflect, that Ulm’s plea decision

would have been different if he had been provided a complete explanation of

the R.C. Chapter 2950 requirements.2

{¶29} In State v. Obhof, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2021-A-0021,

2023-Ohio-408, the trial engaged in the Crim R. 11 colloquy and then asked

2
Carpenter correctly points out a distinction in his case. While Carpenter also signed notification forms,
the date on the forms reflects the sentencing date, not the plea date. Nothing in the transcript at the plea
hearing indicates the trial court discussed these forms with Carpenter prior to his plea.
Washington App. No. 22CA24 19

the prosecutor if there was anything further to review with Obhof. The

prosecutor stated: “Your Honor, perhaps, just his sex offender registration

requirements * * *.” The trial court responded as follows:

Alright, well, yeah, with regard to that, I think that that’s
something that I’m going to address in connection with the
sentencing. But if we covered his rights, and I’ve gone
through the checklist that I have, so hopefully I haven’t
missed anything that’s important.

{¶30} Neither Obhof nor his counsel asked any questions or made any

comment about this statement. At no point prior to Obhof’s entering his

plea did the trial court reference the registration requirements. Also, the

signed plea agreement did not reference Obhof’s sex offender registration

requirements. The trial court immediately proceeded to sentencing and only

then explained to Obhof the full requirements of being classified as a Tier III

sex offender. Again, neither Obhof or his attorney commented or inquired

further.

{¶31} The appellate court applied the Dangler analysis and concluded

that the trial court did partially comply and that Obhof had not demonstrated

any prejudice. The court observed: “ ‘A complete failure to comply’ with a

non-constitutional requirement of Crim.R. 11 occurs when the court makes

‘no mention’ of the requirement.” Id, supra, at ¶ 26, quoting Dangler, at ¶

15, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d
Washington App. No. 22CA24 20

1224 (In case involving complete failure to mention post-release control).

The Obhof court reasoned that although the trial court’s explanation fell

short “as a whole,” the court did tell Obhof that there were sex offender

registration requirements which it would fully explain at sentencing.

Therefore, Obhof was at least aware that registration requirements were part

of the maximum penalty involved prior to entering his plea. Neither he nor

his counsel objected or sought further information at that time. And, nothing

in the record demonstrated that Obhof would not have entered his plea but

for the court’s failure to explain the sex-offender-classification scheme more

thoroughly.

{¶32} In State v. Fisher, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109276, 2021-Ohio-

1592, the trial court explained at the plea hearing only that Fisher was being

classified as a Tier III sex offender and that the specific requirements would

be further discussed at sentencing. This general explanation is similar to the

one given to Carpenter. On appeal of the intelligent, knowing, and voluntary

nature of Fisher’s plea, the Fisher court also discussed the Supreme Court’s

analysis in Dangler. The Fisher court reasoned:

The failure to provide a detailed breakdown of all
registration requirements does not constitute the complete
failure to advise the offender; consequently, in this setting,
a defendant seeking to vacate a guilty plea must
demonstrate prejudice. Advising the offender of the tier
classification system suffices to trigger the requirement
Washington App. No. 22CA24 21

that the defendant show prejudice. The sole purpose of the
prejudice requirement is to avoid the squandering of
judicial and taxpayer resources by overturning guilty pleas
the offender has no desire to abandon.

See also State v. Griffin, 2020-Ohio-6830, 164 N.E.3d 1032, at ¶ 13, (7th

Dist.) (Because the statutory sex offender scheme as a whole is considered

punitive, and each separate aspect of the scheme is not a discrete criminal

“penalty” for purposes of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), a trial court does not

“completely fail” to comply with its duty on this type of maximum penalty

by failing to individually review each sex offender obligation. (Internal

citations omitted.) See also State v. Anderson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-

1110, 2021-Ohio-22.3

{¶33} Applying Dangler to the underlying facts herein, we cannot say

that the trial court completely failed to advise Carpenter as required by

Crim.R. 11(C) despite not reviewing the specific duties Carpenter would be

subject to as a classified Tier I sex offender. The transcript shows that the

trial court advised Carpenter twice at his plea hearing that he would be

classified as a Tier I sex offender. After both times, the trial court paused

and asked Carpenter whether he or his counsel had questions and asked

3
In Anderson, a case remanded for application of Dangler, the 6th District found that in light of the
significant reduction in sentence by entering a plea to a reduced charge (instead of rape, and having the
benefit of a jointly-recommended sentence of three years) there was nothing in the record to support
Anderson’s claim that he would not have entered his plea if he had known of two additional requirements
of his Tier III sex-offender classification and thus did not establish prejudice. The appellate court
concluded Anderson was not entitled to have his plea vacated.
Washington App. No. 22CA24 22

Carpenter if he understood the plea agreement. Carpenter neither asked for

clarification nor interposed objection. The trial court also emphasized twice

that Carpenter was entering a plea and would next proceed to sentence.

{¶34} When a trial court has informed a defendant that he is subject to

the sex offender registration, the defendant is only entitled to vacate his plea

for lack of a more complete explanation if prejudice is shown. In his

appellate brief, Carpenter, without arguing prejudice, asserts that “telling a

person unfamiliar with the court system that he will be a Tier I sex offender

means nothing to that person.” If true in Carpenter’s case, that is exactly

why it behooves a person considering entering a plea to ask questions when

given the opportunity to, or to ask his attorney to request further clarification

from the trial court.4

{¶35} If a showing of prejudice was required, Carpenter would not be

able to satisfy his burden. Carpenter was indicted on four counts. Count

One, unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, is a fourth-degree felony with a

definite prison term of six to eighteen months. Counts Two and Three,

importuning and possessing criminal tools, both carried definite prison terms

4
While it would have been several months before the plea hearing, we do observe that at arraignment on
March 4, 2022, Carpenter’s initial trial counsel waived formal service, reading, and defects in the
indictment, as well as explanation of the penalties associated with the charges. Counsel affirmatively stated
on the record: “I have advised him of registration duties pursuant to Counts 1 and 2, as well as the
maximum possible penalties on all four counts.” Certainly this does not in any way alleviate the trial court
of its notification duties but it does belie Carpenter’s assertion that he had no knowledge of requirements
associated with being classified as a Tier I sex offender.
Washington App. No. 22CA24 23

of twelve months. Count Four, tampering with evidence, a felony of the

third degree, carried a definite prison term of 9 to 36 months. If convicted

on each count, consecutive sentences could have been imposed. The plea

agreement allowing Carpenter to plead to only one of the counts and receive

a community control sanction, with 12 months reserved and 120 days jail,

and forfeiture of his cell phone, was a very favorable agreement. Carpenter’s

jury trial had been commenced and the State had introduced considerable

credible testimony and documentary evidence. It is not reasonable to

believe that Carpenter would not have entered the plea agreement if he had

known of the specific requirements of Tier I sex offender classification.5

{¶36} Here, at the plea hearing the trial court notified Carpenter that

he would be classified as a Tier I sex offender and he would further explain

the significance of that designation at the sentencing hearing. The trial court

substantially complied with its duty under Crim.R. 11(C) to notify Carpenter

of a non-constitutional right, his maximum sentence which included a Tier I

sex offender classification and resulting consequences. Carpenter has not

established prejudice and none can be found on this record. Based on the

5
Several appellate courts have emphasized a “best-practices” approach would be to include a more
thorough advisement in all cases during the plea colloquy. See Obhoff, supra, at ¶ 11(“As in Dangler, we
‘encourage trial courts to be thorough in reviewing consequences of a defendant’s decision to enter a plea,
including those stemming from classification as a sex offender: the duty to register and provide in-person
verification, the community-notification provisions, and the residence restrictions.’ ”); State v. Stennett,
2022-Ohio-4645, 204 N.E.3d 691, at ¶ 22 (8th Dist.); State v. Griffin, 2020-Ohio-6830, 164 N.E.3d 1032, at
¶ 23 (7th Dist.).
Washington App. No. 22CA24 24

foregoing, we find no basis for vacating Carpenter’s plea and no merit to

Carpenter’s sole assignment of error challenging the intelligent, knowing,

and voluntary nature of his plea. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Washington App. No. 22CA24 25

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be
assessed to Appellant.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to
exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued
stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a
stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the
expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice
of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period
pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of
Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior
to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,
__________________________________
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Washington App. No. 22CA24 26

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.